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

# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# REV. ARTHUR COLLIER, M.A.

ΤΟΙΣ ΠΑΣΙ ΤΑ ΠΑΝΤΑ

# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# LIFE AND WRITINGS

OF THE

# REV. ARTHUR COLLIER, M.A.

RECTOR OF LANGFORD MAGNA, IN THE COUNTY OF WILTS,

FROM A.D. 1704 TO A.D. 1732.

## WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF HIS FAMILY.

BY

ROBERT BENSON, M.A.

---

"Quod si quis illud nihilominus mordicùs teneat, literas nimium absumere temporis, quod alias rectius impendi possit; aio, neminem adeo distringi negotiis, quin habeat sua otii intervalla, donec agendi vices atque æstus refluant, nisi aut admodum hebescit in expediendis negotiis, aut parum cum dignitate ambitiosus in negotiis cujuscunque generis captandis."—*De Augmentis Scientiar.* lib. i.

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TO

# SIR RICHARD COLT HOARE,

OF STOURHEAD, IN THE COUNTY OF WILTS, BARONET,

&c. &c. &c.

My dear Sir,

I am much gratified by your permitting me to inscribe this little work to you: indeed, when I consider how many happy hours I have spent at Stourhead in your company, as well as your labours in the illustration of our county history, I am satisfied that, on private as well as on public grounds, my book could to no one be so appropriately dedicated as to yourself. It is the delightful task of the topographer to adorn localities with mental associations; and we all feel how interesting South Wiltshire has been rendered by your reminding us that it was a district familiar to Hooker, Massinger, Clarendon, Addison, Wren, Norris, and others of intellectual celebrity: and if the present publication should be the means of exciting a fresh interest in our county, I shall deem myself amply rewarded for the pains which it has cost me.

Believe me to remain,

My dear Sir,

Your faithful friend and servant,

ROBERT BENSON.

# PREFACE.

I SHOULD feel little anxiety about the present work, if the literary reputation of those who have sought for a memoir of Arthur Collier should be deemed sufficient to justify the following attempt, and I could also persuade myself that the task has been performed in a manner worthy to satisfy their curiosity. As regards my fitness for the undertaking, I can neither disguise from myself, nor will the reader fail to perceive, that few of the objects which engaged Collier's active mind are congenial with my own pursuits—a disadvantage of which a biographer can rarely complain, since it is generally the possession of kindred tastes and sympathies which induces a person to write the life of another. As, however, this has not been my case, I proceed to state the circumstances which have almost insensibly led me to prepare the following Memoirs;

as well as to satisfy the reader of the genuineness of the Collier papers now first submitted to the public.

The history of modern Wiltshire, some years past in progress under the direction of the venerable and munificent Sir Richard Hoare, has occasioned an active search for whatever might illustrate the topography of the county. The lives of Wiltshire authors became, therefore, objects of eager curiosity. When the hundred of Branch and Dole, containing the parish of Langford Magna, issued from the press, my friend Dr. Fowler of Salisbury, a pupil of the late Mr. Dugald Stewart, remarked to me, that Arthur Collier, an eminent metaphysician, was formerly rector of Langford, but that his name did not appear in that character, and that his work, the "Clavis Universalis," was not even mentioned in the recently published account of the parish. This was natural enough; for the "Clavis Universalis" was a book of great rarity, and known only to very few readers. Being enabled to examine it,

by the kindness of Dr. Fowler, I soon felt so deep an interest in its contents, that, by an easy transition from a work to its author, I could not help regretting that no memorials existed of so extraordinary a person. Subsequently, I found that several of the most distinguished of our British writers, partaking of the same feelings, had made frequent although ineffectual attempts to discover some particulars of his life. After being neglected, if not forgotten, for a long series of years, Dr. Reid, I believe, first called the attention of the public to Collier. He was the subject of a correspondence between Sir James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, and the late Dr. Parr. Mr. Dugald Stewart instituted inquiries about him (see Parr's Works, vol. i. 710; vol. vii. 522); and the search was subsequently continued, but all in vain; so that Stewart, in his celebrated Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Philosophy, after noticing the neglect with which posterity had treated Norris, was obliged to add: "Another very acute metaphysician of the same church,

Arthur Collier, has met with still greater injustice. His name is not to be found in any of our biographical dictionaries."—p. 111, n.

To supply this deficiency is the object of the following Memoirs; and as the reader may very fairly ask, how it happens that now, for the first time, there appears any biographical notice of him, and upon what authority it rests,—I proceed to satisfy his curiosity.

Upon Collier's death, in 1732, the rectory of Langford Magna devolved, as will be seen, on Corpus Christi College, Oxford. As he died in embarrassed circumstances, such portions of his effects as his relations deemed it indelicate to sell,* were sent, it is conjectured, to Salisbury, where several of them then resided. One of his sisters married the Rev. Richard Hele, of the Close; and to him, we imagine,

* Amongst such articles I include the drinking-glass mentioned p. 7, and a wood-block of the arms, which face the title. The latter were, doubtless, engraved for the coats of Collier empaling Johnson; but we learn from high authority that they are inaccurate, inasmuch as Collier ought to be sa., a cross patée, fitchée, or; Johnson, ar., five fusils conjoined in fess, between three lions' heads, gules.

the great bulk of his papers passed. Another sister married also a clergyman of the name of Sympson; and from that match sprung Anne Sympson, the wife of Harry Benson Earle, Esq., the second surviving son of Mr. Auditor Benson, and grandson of Sir William Benson, and who, in addition to his paternal name, assumed that of Earle, his mother's. Mr. Earle, owning large property in other parts of Wiltshire, often resided at Salisbury, where he purchased a house in the Close—for then country gentlemen more frequently visited their county town in the winter than the metropolis. On his death, this devolved on his only surviving child, the late William Benson Earle, Esq.; and the latter, after giving a life estate in the house to his aunt Jenevera Sympson, bequeathed it to my late father absolutely.

It is presumed that on the death of Mr. Hele, who survived his wife, the Collier papers were transmitted to the Earles, and passed with the house to my father. At all events, the MSS. from which the following Memoirs

have been compiled, were discovered in a lumber-room at the very top of the house; where they would still, probably, have remained undisturbed, had not some repairs on the roof, between five and six years ago, caused their removal. Upon this occasion they first attracted my notice. It was vacation time; and having long accustomed myself to seek amusement rather in a change of objects than in the suspension of mental activity, I set about examining them with alacrity, and was soon satisfied that they were the long-sought literary remains of Arthur Collier, as well as those of his brother William. My friend, Dr. Fowler, a living example of the truth of Sir James Mackintosh's remark, that Mr. Dugald Stewart's "disciples were among the best of his works," came to witness the discovery; and he urging me to arrange the papers, by degrees the Memoirs of Collier assumed the very shape in which they are now presented to the reader. The MSS. of the two brothers are about enough to fill a moderately sized trunk. Great havoc seems

to have been made among them. For many years prior to 1806 they were so conveniently placed for the housemaid who lighted an adjoining bed-room fire, that it is not easy to guess how many of them have been consumed. Arthur Collier's commentary on the Septuagint version of the Bible appears to have been her favourite, for only a few sheets have been spared of that. His MSS. form by far the smallest portion of the collection. It was his practice to preserve drafts of his correspondence, and from these the following letters have been transcribed. About fifty of his sermons remain, while probably there are two hundred of his brother William's. The sermons of both are perhaps too argumentative for ordinary congregations, — at least judging by the present day, when, so far from argument, even common sense is scarcely required of a preacher.

Of the original edition of the "Clavis Universalis" I know but seven copies now existing. The public libraries of Cambridge and Oxford do not contain one. A superb

reprint issued from the Edinburgh press last year, with an introductory notice and an appendix of letters, under the auspices of a few metaphysical amateurs of that distinguished University. The copies, amounting to forty in number, were, I believe, exclusively bestowed as presents; and I am obliged to the learned Editor for the handsome terms in which he has thought fit to mention my name, as well as for encouraging me in the prosecution of Collier's biography. The "Clavis Universalis" will now become easily accessible; for the publisher of the following pages has purchased the whole impression of the metaphysical tracts edited by the late Dr. Parr, in which work it is comprised.

The two great motives of a writer's labours are generally fame and money; but I look for neither from the present publication. Little fame can be earned by using scissors and paste, with more or less judgment; while my experience of the reading world forbids me to believe that the proceeds of this volume will be more than enough to pay the printer.

It will be sufficient for me if the metaphysician should deem what Mr. Dugald Stewart calls the injustice done to Collier's memory to have been removed by my instrumentality; at the same time, let me observe, that my satisfaction will be greatly heightened, should the following piece of biography be the means of diverting any of my readers from the all-absorbing pursuit of party politics to the study of Collier's great teacher, Plato, "whose writings," to use the words of Bishop Berkeley, "are the touchstone of a hasty and shallow mind; whose philosophy has been the admiration of ages, which supplied patriots, magistrates, and lawgivers to the most flourishing states, as well as fathers to the church, and doctors to the schools. Albeit in these days the depths of that old learning are rarely fathomed, yet it were happy for these lands if our young nobility and gentry, instead of modern maxims, would imbibe the notions of the great men of antiquity." He might have added, the works of Plato in particular attest "that excellent morality which

right reason picked up after the shipwreck of nature," and insensibly lead the philosophical student to the very confines of Christianity: where a far surer guide appears, to conduct him at once into the kingdom of God, and open to him the sublime scene of life and immortality brought to light through the Gospel.

# MEMOIRS

OF

# ARTHUR COLLIER, M.A.

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## CHAPTER I.

### THE AUTHOR'S FAMILY DESCENT.

THE family to which the author of the following fragments belonged first settled in Wiltshire at the beginning of the seventeenth century. They came, it seems, from Bristol.

Joseph Collier, of whom a monumental effigy is still preserved,* was presented to the rectory of Langford Magna, commonly called Steeple Langford, in the county of Wilts, in the year 1608; and as he also owned the advowson, the benefice was enjoyed by his descendants for several generations. The duties of country clergymen are generally too peaceful and uniform to supply objects to the pen of the biographer, which rather delights in bold adventures and striking contrasts; as the pencil of the artist prefers the wild and even desolating

* Sir Richard C. Hoare's Modern Wiltshire, vol. ii. p. 13.

mountain torrent, to the modest streamlet with all its fertilising influences. While, however, enough remains among the papers of the family to satisfy the compiler that the immediate ancestors of our author were abundantly competent to discharge their ordinary clerical functions as rectors of Langford, the life of one of them is not altogether barren of historical interest.

Henry Collier, who succeeded his father Joseph in the benefice, was doomed to suffer severely for his attachment to the Established Church. Early in the civil war, we are told, he was forced to abscond and fly for his life, leaving his wife and family to the sad fate which awaited them. Walker has preserved a minute account of their sufferings, which he received from the subject of these memoirs, the rector's grandson. "At the time of Henry Collier's ejectment," says the historian,* "he had eleven children, who, with his wife, were turned out in a very deep snow, and forced to stand not a little while in the open street, before any neighbours would, or dared, admit them into their houses. But even then they had but cold comfort; for they were forced to lie six nights in a barn, before they could procure any thing like a bed to lie on. This their misery was not a little aggravated by its being a time (which also held a great while) when wheat was at ten, eleven, twelve,

* Walker's Sufferings of the Clergy, part ii. p. 227.

nay, thirteen shillings a bushel, and even barley at seven or eight shillings; so that you may imagine they were happy if they could get barley bread. But this is certain, that they lived almost the whole time as poorly, and in as mean cottages, as any in the parish, or, I believe, any where else. Her children went daily to Grovely Wood, about a mile and a half off, for dry wood, which they brought back in bundles upon their shoulders. This lasted till they were dispersed, either to service, or to the lowest condition in the army, or to hard labour in Jamaica, except those who were bound to mean trades in London: of all which my father was the only one who met with friends (being the youngest of eleven), who placed him to Winchester school," &c. To such a miserable condition, then, was this inoffending family reduced; and how much might the picture be heightened, by considering that this deprivation of their whole property extended over the fifteen years that elapsed before the king's restoration, and the return of such of the clergy to their expectant flocks as survived the painful interval.

To illustrate that portion of the preceding statement which mentions the ejected rector's children as labouring at Jamaica, we must recur to a conspiracy against the Protector, which our historians have but slightly noticed. After Cromwell had usurped the supreme authority, and his ambitious objects were fully developed, considerable discon-

tent prevailed; and whatever were the different causes of this feeling, we can easily conceive the deep sense of hatred of the government which possessed the children of the late rector of Langford, when they thought of the outrage committed on their home, and their own destitution. As birds still hover round the spot where once their nest sheltered them from the cold, although it has been seized by the oppressor, some of the family appear to have lingered out a mournful existence in their native village, until the usurper's authority seemed to be fully established.

Now it was that the people of England were awakened to the sad consequence of their political dissensions. They had no longer a king restrained by constitutional checks to govern them; but a military chief, who, after dazzling the nation by his warlike prowess, waved his sword of victory over the heads of those who had even murmured at the mild sceptre of royalty. This state of things inspired the royalists with hope: their very enemies, at least those who had been honest in their opposition to Charles I., would, they conceived, feel the like hatred for this new form of tyranny; and they little thought how indifferent people become, after a long struggle for liberty, to the very object they have been contending for, if they can but insure domestic quiet. A general rising among the disaffected in different parts of the country was pro-

posed to take place in the early part of the year 1655. The open downs of the west enabled the royalists of that district, under the pretence of hunting parties, to arrange their plans; and Major-General Wagstaff arrived from Charles's miserable court in Holland to command this division of the conspiracy. Henry and Joseph Collier, two of the sons of the ejected rector, eagerly embraced the opportunity that now offered itself to display their loyalty to their king, and, at the same time, avenge the outrages inflicted on their home, and the brutal treatment experienced by their mother.* Colonel Penruddocke, who resided but a few miles from Langford, was to be second in command, and this was probably an additional inducement. A public race was first designed as the pretext for collecting their forces together; but regicide sanctity forbade such an ungodly recreation. The assizes for the county of Wilts were about to be held, and these supplied a fresh, as well as an available excuse for the conspirators to assemble in great numbers. Accordingly, on the 11th of March, before daylight, the judges and the sheriff were dragged from their beds into the open market-place of Salisbury, and Wagstaff would have executed them instantly on the spot, but for the entreaties of Penruddocke, who shuddered at the murderous design. The conspiracy failed; but

* Thurloe, vol. iii. p. 306.

the two Colliers were among the last to submit. At Southmolton, in Devonshire, worn out with the fatigue of a long and harassing march, they and three others gallantly defended a house for four hours against Captain Unton Croke and his troop, and only surrendered on being guaranteed their lives.* On their trial at Exeter, presuming on these terms, they pleaded guilty;† and Croke's letters, preserved in Thurloe's State Papers, display a laudable anxiety on his part that the condition of their capitulation should be inviolably maintained. The Protector, indeed, spared their lives, but banished them to Jamaica, where, with many beside, they were sold as slaves to the planters.‡

The landing of Charles II. at Dover occasioned a frenzy of joy throughout the country. The good-humoured monarch, amidst the apparent unanimity of the crowds which eagerly pressed around him, was received in London with the most ardent enthusiasm; and, as if sceptical of recent events, affected to reproach himself for having so long delayed coming amongst his loyal subjects. Nor were the clergy in their several villages welcomed in proportion with less delight. It is easy for the basest spirits, under the mask of patriotism, to move a people with professions of pity for their wrongs, and to excite them to combat for their

* Thurloe, vol. iii. pp. 281, 368. † Ibid. p. 395.

‡ For the sufferings of those transported to Barbadoes at the same time, see Burton's Diary, vol. iv. p. 255.

real oppressors as the champions of their cause: but facts speak louder than professions, and those who had been fascinated by the artful declamations of the parliamentary leaders, could also feel the grievous burdens imposed on them by tyrannous military exactions, and contrast the wild ravings of illiterate mechanics and profane soldiers, with the worth, the learning, and the charity of the pretended scandalous, ignorant, and insufficient ministry of their former teachers.

When Mrs. Collier and her children were harshly expelled from their home, as before stated, a small drinking-glass, now in the writer's possession, was one of the few articles that she managed to bring away; and this domestic relic, says a memorandum written by a near relation, she attached to her hat as she rode with her husband in triumph to repossess the rectory.* It is pleasing to dwell upon this joyful scene: we can fancy the villagers in groups gathering around their long-exiled pastor on his return, and the reciprocal greetings of the parties,

* Among the Collier MSS. the following toast occurs, popular, probably, at the restoration:—

"Sit Cæsar beatus,
Longævus, et lætus!
Votum hoc est divinum—
Per me funde vinum—
Nec febrim quis metuat,
Per totum ebriemus,
Rex vitam perpetuat—
Quid nobis curemus?"

animated by former associations: we see him, who had been silenced for a conscientious discharge of his duty, once more exercising his Christian functions, blessing those who had been misguided enough to persecute him, consoling others who had shared his sufferings, and beaming with charity on all. The bells, so long disused as popish, again break out in melodious cadences; the heathenish maypole replaced, is encircled once more by the dance; while the innocent laugh, which had been denounced by some of the puritans as antiscriptural, no longer brooking restraint, echoes throughout the village. On the other hand, when the novelty of this state of things had lost a little of its freshness, there was no lack of sorrow. The period of the rector's absence from his parish would have wrought considerable changes, in the ordinary course of human events; but now how great had been the vicissitudes endured by his friends, his neighbours, and his own children! In the interval, Colonel Penruddocke had died on the scaffold. Many other Wiltshire gentlemen had suffered severely in the royal cause. Lord Arundell had fallen in battle, and his castle of Wardour was in ruins. The episcopal palace of Salisbury had been converted into a tavern, echoing alternately with the profane oaths of the royalist troopers, and the enthusiastic ravings of the roundhead soldiery; while each man learned from his own exhausted resources, that ordinances could tax as severely as

privy seals, and that there was no magic in the name of a free commonwealth. But the dispersion of the rector's children was his greatest calamity, aggravated by the fate of those especially who were labouring as slaves in Jamaica, the price of their premature loyalty.

Henry Collier died in 1672, and was succeeded in the rectory by his youngest son Arthur, of whose life we are not acquainted with any particulars worth noticing; we therefore proceed to detail what we have been able to collect respecting his son and namesake, the principal object of these memoirs.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE AUTHOR'S BIRTH AND EDUCATION — HIS METAPHYSICAL OPINIONS.

ARTHUR COLLIER, the author of the "Clavis Universalis," was the third, but eldest surviving son of the preceding Arthur Collier, by Anne his wife, the daughter of Thomas and Joan Currey, of Misterton in Somersetshire. He was born at the rectory of Langford Magna; and the parish register, with unusual minuteness, states his birth to have happened at a quarter before five in the morning of October the 12th, 1680. We have no account of his childhood, or of his early youth; but as his mother, we are told, taught his younger brother William the rudiments of Latin, he probably commenced his studies with the same maternal instruction, and, like him, proceeded afterwards to one of the grammar-schools of Salisbury, then in a flourishing condition. It is certain, however, that he was entered at Pembroke College, Oxford, in July 1697, where he remained until the 22d of October in the following year, when, leaving Pembroke, he and his brother, now just arrived at the university for the first time, became members of Baliol together.

On the death of their father, which took place

on the 10th of December, 1697, his widow, in accordance with her husband's will, was desirous that the family-living of Langford should be held by a clergyman, until her eldest son was old enough to be in priest's orders, and to be inducted into the rectory; but the political feelings of Burnet, then Bishop of Salisbury, in strong contrast with those of the Colliers, appear for a time to have thwarted this object. At length Francis Eyre, a son of Sir Samuel Eyre, one of the justices of the King's Bench, and brother of Sir Robert Eyre, Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, whose Whig principles were sufficiently decided to satisfy his lordship, and whose character justified the confidence of the widow, was presented to the benefice. Thus the living was safely transmitted to the preceding rector's son, Arthur, who, in 1704, was instituted on the presentation of his mother, and became the fourth incumbent of the same family; and so continued till his death in 1732, discharging the duties of a parish priest, as appears by the dates on his sermons, extending throughout the whole period. And let us hope that his labours were not unproductive of those moral effects which alike exalt and adorn a nation, and confer so great a value on our parochial clergy,—a body of men to whom, under Providence, this nation owes a debt of incalculable magnitude. If we can turn our thoughts to the squalid hovel of poverty and wretchedness, and contemplate the subject of this memoir, with

food in one hand and the Gospel in the other, raising the sufferer from his bed of sickness, restoring his failing strength, and bringing him tidings of salvation and peace; and consider the mind of the teacher, fitted by nature and by cultivation for the highest employments of worldly grandeur, yet devoting it to the wants of the poorest classes of society in an obscure village—a scene not unfamiliar to the writer,—we may then duly appreciate the country clergy, and properly estimate their wholesome influence on our national prosperity. Nor is this all. It is, perhaps, not too much to attribute to their precepts and example the high moral character of the British people, which has in a manner sanctified their wars, inspired commercial confidence abroad, and nourished at home a taste for the arts of peace, and for a love of order, without which human society cannot flourish, or even long subsist.

While the Collier papers contain ample details of the studies and pursuits of William, the younger brother, we are driven chiefly to collect from the published works of Arthur the course of reading to which they are traceable, and which he must, therefore, have adopted. It is, however, highly probable that they both pursued a similar course of reading, as the writings of Descartes and Malebranche, and particularly the latter, were most minutely abstracted by William Collier; and these, as his writings evince, were at least as familiar to the former.

Indeed, it is natural that two studious brothers, brought up together in the same home, educated at the same university, and afterwards through their whole lives clergymen of neighbouring parishes, should also partake of kindred pursuits. These metaphysical studies seem to have produced a deep effect on the mind of Arthur Collier, so that, at the age of twenty-three, he came to the conclusion, which will probably startle most of my readers, that there is no such thing as an *external* world. It will be here proper to take a short view of those philosophical opinions which bear on this subject, and lead to so curious a result.

After premising that there is scarcely any metaphysical opinion, the germs of which at least might not be traced to the philosophy of the Greeks, and that which we are about to discuss to the writings of Plato in particular, it is to be observed, that Descartes, in his Principia, although by no means deficient in bold theories, taught, as the basis of science, a general scepticism of every thing but a man's own existence.* Malebranche, an ardent follower of Descartes, whose writings, as well as those of his master, were in high repute in Collier's youth and afterwards, constantly taught a mistrust of the senses. Instead of considering them as the avenues through which we must necessarily derive all knowledge, he urges their rejection as guides in the

* Princ. pars i. §§ vii. viii.

search of truth; while, as a substitute for them, he recommends what he calls the pure ideas of the mind, whereby, retiring into himself, man hears his unerring sovereign teacher in the calm silence of the senses and of the passions.* He observes, that things are often seen which never had any existence, and that they ought not to be concluded to be actually external from their seeming so; that there is no necessary connexion between the idea of an object in the mind and its absolute existence; and then, as Descartes had done before him, he instances the phenomena which present themselves to persons dreaming or delirious. To this doctrine he often recurs, and he illustrates it by a variety of examples. In another place, he says, as men are more sensible than reasonable, and rather listen to the testimony of their senses than to that of internal truth, they have always consulted their eyes to be assured of the existence of matter, without troubling themselves to exercise their reason: hence they are surprised when one says it is difficult to demonstrate it. They think they need but open their eyes to be satisfied that there are bodies; and if there then remains any suspicion of illusion, they believe it enough to come near and handle them; after which they can hardly conceive any possible reason to doubt of their existence.†

* De la Recherche de la Vérité, 12mo, edit. 1749, preface, p. xxii.

† Ibid. tome iv. p. 61.

But while Malebranche could not as a philosopher satisfy himself of the existence of matter, as a theologian he conceived the Scriptures were conclusive on the subject, inasmuch as they taught that God created a heaven and an earth,—that the Word was made flesh, &c., which established, as he conceived, the existence of a created world; and hence, he adds, faith verifies the existence of bodies, and all those appearances are actually substantiated by it;* a consequence in opposition to the very drift of his reasoning, and at variance with the principle which in another part of his work he lays down, of keeping theological dogmas distinct from metaphysical investigations.

The opinions of Locke on the subject, in different parts of his Essay on the Human Understanding, may be sufficiently collected from the following short extract:—"The notice we have by our senses, of the existing of things without us, though it be not altogether so certain as our intuitive knowledge, or the deductions of our reason, employed about the clear abstract ideas of our own minds; yet it is an assurance that deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves, that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical, as

* De la Recherche de la Vérité, 12mo, edit. 1749, tome iv. p. 80.

to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels. At least, he that can doubt so far, (whatever he may have with his own thoughts), will never have any controversy with me; since he can never be sure I say any thing contrary to his opinion." *

We must not omit to observe, that within a few miles only of Collier's home a neighbour-clergyman resided, whose society probably contributed not a little to form Collier's mind, and at least to nurture, if not to excite in him, a propensity to abstract inquiry. This was Norris the Platonist, rector of Bemerton. Collier speaks of Norris, in one of his letters, as "his late ingenious neighbour;" but we can produce no direct evidence of their intimacy. When, however, we consider that they were both clergymen of the same Church, living within a few miles of each other, on the banks of the same stream, at a time too when the want of roads rendered persons in the country so dependent on their neighbours; and in particular their kindred tastes and studies,—it is difficult to conceive them to have been personally unknown to each other. Undeservedly as Norris's writings have been neglected, it would be irrelevant to notice them generally in this place; but there is one work of his often mentioned by Collier in terms of great applause, namely, "An Essay

* Book iv. c. xi. § 3.

towards the Theory of the Ideal or Intelligible World," which bears considerably on the present question. The first volume of this book appeared in the year 1701, and the second in 1704, only about seven years before Norris died. By the ideal or intelligible world, he meant, as indeed Plato did before him, the mental original, of which the natural world is the image,—as the plan of a house exists in the mind of the architect before it is realised by the builder. For this ideal or intelligible world, Norris concluded that there were more and better arguments than for the material world.* With Malebranche, he thought that to argue,—I have a sensation within me, therefore there is a world of bodies existing without me,—was inconsequential; at the same time, he too feared that revealed religion would be endangered if the testimony of sense were altogether unfaithful, appealed to as it is by St. John in the very opening verse of his first epistle general.† Again; that God would not give us senses to abuse and deceive us in the due and natural use of them, he deemed sufficient to satisfy all sober and reasonable understandings of the real existence of bodies; and in this he agreed with Clarke.‡ These philosophical paradoxes seem to have deeply engaged the attention of Collier. So far, however, from rejecting the testimony of the senses, he invariably appealed to their

* Ideal World, vol. i. p. 186. † Ibid. p. 187.

‡ Rohaulti Physica, edit. Clarke. Lond. 1718, p. 10, note.

authority; he thought that the existence of the visible or seen world was capable of the most strict demonstration,—indeed, that nothing but our own existence could be supposed to be more simply evident; but then he argued, that because a thing was seen, it did not follow that it was *external* to the soul, or visive faculty, which perceived it. He denied that being, and being *external*, was the same thing; or, in other words, that a visible object which was not external, was therefore nothing at all; which he conceived to be the tendency of the foregoing arguments. Again; he guarded himself against being supposed to contend that all sensible objects were no more than imaginary, meaning by the word something opposed to real; and he concluded generally, that while the visible world existed, it did not exist absolutely, but only dependently, as in its proper subject, on mind or soul.

As early as the year 1703 Collier adopted, it seems, these sentiments; and as he adhered to and maintained them, with great pertinacity, throughout the remainder of his life, we shall here dispose of this branch of our subject, although by so doing we depart from the chronological order of his writings. Amongst his MSS., under the date of January 1708, there remains the outline of an essay, in three chapters, on the question of the visible world being without us or not. In 1712 he penned two essays, still in manuscript, one on substance and accident, and the

other termed "Clavis Philosophica;" and at length, in 1713, there issued from the press his "Clavis Universalis, or a new Inquiry after Truth, being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence or Impossibility of an External World." On this work Arthur Collier's reputation as a philosopher depends. It has been commended by Reid, Stewart, and by other high authorities; and has long been known in Germany by Professor Eschenbach's translation, which appeared as long ago as the year 1756. Here it is that he unfolds the system of philosophy of which we have given the preceding sketch; answering the objections, whether metaphysical or theological, which may be used by his opponents, at least ingeniously, if not satisfactorily.

Although Bishop Berkeley published his "Principles of Human Knowledge" three years, and his "Theory of Vision" four years prior to the appearance of the "Clavis Universalis," there can be no reasonable doubt that Collier arrived at the same conclusion as Berkeley on the subject of matter, without any communication with that great man. Indeed, we have his express authority for the fact,* besides the evidence of his MS. remains. But, while they concurred in the same metaphysical creed, the minds of the two philosophers were of a very different complexion.

Collier, after submitting his speculations to the

* Clavis Universalis, p. 1.

test of a severe logic, and clothing them in a most uninviting style, sent them forth into the world under a title as forbidding as could be chosen; Berkeley presented his to the reader in a form wherein we are at a loss which most to admire, the depth of the reasoning, the beauty of the illustrations, or the harmony of the language; so that the "Principles of Human Knowledge," and the "Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous," have been well said to convey to the mere English reader the best notion of Plato's writings. The importance of an attractive title-page, and of a graceful mode of expression, were, perhaps, never more clearly displayed than in the fate of the two works of Berkeley and Collier on the same subject, as well as of their authors. The "Principles of Human Knowledge" attracted readers both by its title and its literary merit; the writer was at once admitted on familiar terms by all who were distinguished for rank or learning in the glorious age in which he lived, and raised to the highest station in the Church; while the "Clavis Universalis," as if from the pen of a schoolman of the middle ages, was unpurchased and unread, and the author scarcely known beyond the limits of his own village. To those who have the courage to examine the work itself, the five following letters will be interesting, as affording a paraphrase and explanation of the doctrines contained in it. The first which we insert, although not in the order of

date, is addressed to a grammarian and critic of the name of Low, whose works, though voluminous, are now little known, if we except his "System of Mnemonics." He appears to have been intimate with Collier, and to have written to him on the "Clavis Universalis." Low's letter is unfortunately lost.

## TO SOLOMON LOW.

DEAR SIR, *Dec. 19th*, 1714.

I received both yours, as well your news-letter, some months since, as your last, but yesterday, without a date. I thank you heartily for both, and should have acknowledged your first much sooner, but that I have of late been more idly busy than ever I have been before; but your last must not be so used.

The title of my first section is indeed as you represent it: viz. that the seeming externeity of a visible object is no argument of its real externeity. I prove this by instances of certain visible or seen objects, which, though granted to be not external, yet appear or seem to be as much so as any objects whatsoever: the argument in form stands thus:—

If a visible object seen as external, is yet not external, then the seeming externeity of an object is no argument of its real externeity;

But this and that visible object is seen as external, yet is not external.

Ergo, the seeming externeity of an object is no argument of its real externeity.

To this you answer, that you have the same reason to suppose those seeming external objects (granted to be not external) to be indeed external, as those objects, which, for argument's sake, I allow to be external.

I answer. Very well, this is what I contend for, finally: viz.—that the objects which, for argument's sake, in that place I allow to be external, are indeed no more so, than those others which are granted or plainly proved to be not external: consequently, that a visible object, as such, is not external.

This, I say, is my final conclusion in the first part of my book; but, perhaps, I should do well to put you in mind, that this is not my conclusion in this place. My conclusion here is the very words of the title of the section, set down before; and my argument here is not designed to prove the point contended for in the first part, laid down in the latter end of the introduction (much less of the whole point expressed in the title-page), but only an introduction to it, as in answer to an assertion set down p. 8,* viz.—that an object's being seen as external is a simple and direct proof of

* The references to the "Clavis" throughout this volume have been accommodated to the edition contained in the collection of metaphysical tracts prepared for the press by the late Dr. Parr.

its being really external. Having removed this by several instances, sect. 1, I proceed, in sect. 2, to prove directly that a visible object, as such, is not external.

But how do I remove this assertion? Why, by giving instances of certain objects which are seen as external, which yet are, or ought to be, granted to be not external. Hence it immediately follows, that an object's being seen as external is no proof of its being external, which are the words of the assertion.

But let us survey the *three* instances you have pitched upon.

I. An object seen in, or as in, a looking-glass, or object which we call a looking-glass, is as seemingly external as the looking-glass itself, or any object whatsoever; but is proved, and should be granted to be, not external: ergo, the seeming externeity of an object is no argument of its real externeity. Still, the title of the section.

In answer to this, you tell me of rays reverberated, optic organs, and such like terms of art, which receive all their propriety from the supposal of an external world. What is all this to me, who make this supposition the question, and suppose no more, in this or any place, unless for argument's sake, than that I see, and that what I see exists; which no one can deny me, unless much at their peril, even to a contradiction of themselves.

But you'll say, I grant here, for argument's sake, that some objects are external.

I do so. In sect 1, I grant that some visible objects are external; for here I am only concerned to prove that an object's being seen as external is no argument of its being really so. So that though some visible objects are external, yet we must prove them so by some other medium, and not that of their being seen as such.

Again, sect. 2, I resume this grant, because in this place it is the question (as may be seen in the title of it), and grant only this simply, that there are such things as external (but not visible) objects. For here I am only concerned to prove that all visible objects, as such, are not external, or that no visible object, as such, can be external. Now, these concessions are made chiefly to free myself from an encumbrance of words, which would necessarily work confusion, if I had not used that manner. But then, lastly, in my second part, I resume this concession also, for the same reason as before, viz.—because it now becomes the question, and set myself to prove simply that external matter, as such, implies several contradictions, and consequently is a thing impossible; and here, and not before, I come up to the terms of the question laid down in the title-page.

II. Your words are these: "I see two moons when I press one eye, because my two eyes receive the rays."

*Ans.* 1. Here, again, I except against the terms of art which suppose an external world; which amount to begging the question.

2. What if my eyes do both receive rays from the same object? is this any thing to the point I am concerned for? My argument stands thus:

At this instant I see two (objects allowed to be called) moons; both equally seen as external. But, one of them is not so, that is, but one is supposed, or contended for, to be so; ergo, a thing's being seen as external is no argument of its being really so. In the hypothesis of this argument I am so far from being concerned to take notice of the word ray, (which cannot be used against me without taking the question in the title-page for granted), that I know nothing of the words eye, or pressure, or finger, there being nothing supposed in this argument but that I see, and that what I see exists.

Indeed, I use the words eye and finger, and am content to grant, in this place, that the finger which I see, and the eye which I press, are both of them external; and not only so, but also that one of the moons which I see is so, choose whether of the two you will; but I use these words, and make these concessions, only because I must submit to the necessity which is imposed on me by the words of this world, and because, in this place, my question remains entire, notwithstanding these concessions.

III. You say thus: "If imagining be only recollecting what I have seen," &c.

*Ans.* Who can tell me what is meant by the

hard word recollecting? Is it not enough that we all know what is meant by the word imagining, as well as by the word seeing? Or rather, is it not evident at first sight, that to imagine an object is to perceive an object, either more or less vividly? For my part, I can no more understand how we can create the objects we imagine, than the objects we are said to see; and yet this seems to be intimated by the word recollecting. God certainly is the true cause of both, though the act of perceiving be, in great measure, that is, on certain conditions, suspended on our wills. In like manner I explain the act which we call memory. This consists of two parts; viz. simple imaginative perception of an object, and a certain connotative sensible something superadded, (both by the ordinary will of God,) assuring us, at the instant of imagining, that the thing seen has been seen by us before. Well then, I imagine a full moon at noon-day; but I do not create this imagined moon. 'Tis God that does this: I only perceive it, only that its being perceived, is, on some conditions, suspended on the occasion of my will. One of these conditions is the act of my having seen or imagined the same, that is, the like, before. In either of these cases, I am said to remember, and not simply to imagine; that is, if, at the instant of my imagining, I feel within myself that sense or affection, whereby I am assured or strongly inclined to judge, that I have before now seen or imagined the same or like

object. All this, whether true or false, supposes nothing but that I see or perceive, and that the object seen exists; and on this only foundation, I erect my argument on the instance of a Centaur, which I suppose was in your eye at the time of writing this paragraph; and it stands thus:—

I (or Apelles) imagine a certain object so and so shaped and proportioned, which I call a Centaur. This, as truly perceived, (since to imagine is to perceive,) truly exists. But where does it exist? *Ans.* 'Tis supposed to exist only in the mind or soul which perceives it.

But how does it exist, either as within or without? *Ans.* As much, to all appearance, without, or external, to the mind which sees it, as any of those objects which are usually called visible.

True, but not so vividly. *Ans.* Right, it does not happen to be so, and this is that whereby I distinguish this act, which we call imagination, from the act which we call vision: but why is this, but because the common cause of both, viz. God, does not in the former act impress or act so strongly upon my mind as in the latter. If he did, both acts would become one, or require the same name; and there would be no difference between seeing and imagining. But is this a possible if, or is it not? Yes, certainly; it is possible that in the act of my imagining a moon at full at noon-day, God may, if he pleases, make me perceive it more and more vividly (or with colour), till I perceive it to the

full as vividly as I did last or any other night. Well, suppose this done. Is the moon which I now perceive (call it seeing, or imagining, or both) —is it external, or is it not? *Ans.* Plainly not external, by the supposition of the question.

This, sir, is some part of what the ingenious Sol. Low may at any time command from his

Friend and humble servant.

## TO THE SAME.

DEAR SIR, *March 8th*, 171$\frac{3}{4}$.

Saturday last I received yours, and I am obliged to you for the pains you have been at to transmit to me so long a letter. I also thank the gentleman, whosoever he be, for his labour of composing it. And now, if Mr. Balch will pardon me for not directing to him, and my friend Solomon will excuse me for giving him the trouble of it, I will now (on your request) sit down to answer this doughty disputant.

1. He grants (if I read right, for the wafer covers some part of this sentence,) that the seeming externeity of an object is not a sufficient argument for its real externeity. I thought, by this concession, he either designed to be of my side, or to prove the real externeity of all or any visible or seen objects from some other arguments besides the seeming externeity of them. But I find not a word of either of these. He is against me, and for this

very reason which here he so freely gives up, or acknowledges to be no reason; for his only argument for the externeity of the visible world is from the senses; whereas this is all that I meant, and I think he can mean too, by the seeming externeity of it. It is only by our sense of seeing that we know any thing of the *existence* of the visible world; and therefore certainly it must be by this only that we infer the extra existence of it. Its seeming externeity is therefore the same as its being seen *as* external. Either this is a good argument that it is indeed external, or it is not. If no, why does he build altogether upon it? if yes, why does he say that the seeming externeity of an object is no sufficient argument of any real externeity of it?

2. No, he will say, he builds on the united testimony of the senses. Very good; that is, he concludes the existence and even extra existence of a visible object, from the sense of feeling, hearing, tasting, &c. joined to the sense of seeing.

I have considered this objection distinctly page 35-6; but I will here add a word or two to refresh his memory.

The extra existence of an object is something more than its existence, and the extra existence of a visible object is something more than its visible existence; he grants me this, in that he says that the visible or seeming existence of an object is not a sufficient argument of its real existence: well now, and how would he prove so

much as the existence simple of a visible object? Why, he tells me, from the united testimony of all the senses.

But is not a visible object the object of vision only? Can he feel, or hear, or smell a visible object? May not he as well see a sound, or feel or hear a colour? First, therefore, let him shew me how any other sense but that of seeing gives us any the least assurance or intimation of the existence simple of a visible object; and then, and not till then, he can so much as fairly attempt to prove that any other of the remaining four, or all put together, are any argument of its extra existence.

3. But is there not a real difference between sense and imagination? Yes, that which he mentions, viz. the liveliness of the impression or sensation. By this, and this only, I call one moon, which I perceive, imagined,—another seen, viz. because in the one case I perceive a moon, viz. the same or a like intelligible figure, more vividly or with greater colour, than in the other; and on this difference I distinguish between an imagined and sensible fire. But what is this to the externeity either of the moon or the fire? May not an object be perceived, and very vividly perceived, without being external? Yes; he grants me this, as I have shewn in the beginning. I would gladly, therefore, know what he means by this argument.

4. But I will make bold beforehand to guess for him what he means, and I think the matter is too plain for it to be called a conjecture. He fancies that I affirm that all sensible objects are no more than imaginary, meaning by this word something opposed to real. On this supposition he sets himself to prove there is a great deal of difference between sensible and imagined objects, and proceeds hence to heap on me many absurdities, both in reason and religion, to convince me that the objects of sense are real, that is, truly existent. But, if he has read my book, I would be bold to ask him, who it is that denies the reality of the existence of the visible world, or of any sensible object? for surely he can have no room, or so much as pretence, to say that this is chargeable on me. He knows that in my first concession, page 4, I grant, and even contend for, the existence of bodies; and that both there and almost every where besides, I declare, in the most express terms I can think of, that it is not the existence, but only the extra existence of objects I contend against. I am so far, I think, from falling short of him, or any of the rest of mankind, in affirming and contending that the objects seen are real, or for the reality of the material world, that I declare for the existence of every *imagined* object, as he may see (p. 11) in my instance of a Centaur. Nay, I will proceed so far with him, if he still persists to charge me with the want of this, as to

uphold against him that he himself is the man who is guilty of the scepticism of denying the existence of all visible objects; nay, that he cannot shew another in the world, besides Mr. Berkeley and myself, who hold the testimony of sense to be infallible as to this point. But it is enough at present that I do not in fact deny the reality of the material or sensible world, but only the extra existence of it, which at once is an answer to much the greatest part of his letter, proving him to have done no more than fight with his own shadow.

Here, then, I will make a full stop for the present; for I am sure we can dispute but to very little purpose, till we are first agreed as to what we dispute about. If the gentleman pleases to lay aside for a time his rhetorical talent and every ornament of speech, and let me know, in the most naked terms, what it is he believes I hold or deny, and what it is which he would maintain against me, binding himself to turn whatever he calls argument (as I have done for the most part, and am ready to do always) into the form of a legal syllogism, he will wonder perhaps to find—— But I will say no more; for, between you and me, friend Solomon, I know (without the spirit of prophecy) that I make this request to him altogether in vain. I may indeed by this increase his former contempt of me; and, if the stars I have consulted are not much mistaken, he will directly call me names

to him that shall happen to inform him of this request.

But the sun will sooner change its course than the author of that letter will ever reason by rule, or depart from the method by which he has acquired his whole stock of reputation with regard to philosophy. As he has charity (as he says) for me, so I declare I have so much for him, that I do not even desire he would put himself but to half the pain and torture which it would cost him only to understand what is meant and not meant in the little book he opposes: this I am confident, that all those that know it will say the words are plain and distinct as words can well be. However, I will insist on this (from a little charity to myself), that whoever cannot make it plainly appear that he understands what I have written, shall never be understood by me to oppose any thing but my person; and in this case I think I may plead a liberty to be silent.

I am, sir,

Your most obliged and obedient humble servant.

Collier sent, it appears, a copy of his work to Dr. Samuel Clarke, and afterwards wrote to him the letter which follows. Butler, Berkeley, Hutcheson, and Home, in the same manner, used to address that remarkable man. Indeed, on this metaphysical patriarch, to borrow the language of Sir James Mackintosh, the young philosophers of

the day seem to have considered themselves as possessing a claim which he had too much goodness to reject.

## TO DR. SAMUEL CLARKE,

*Rector of St. James's, London.*

Sir,

I have been told by those that know you, that you are affable and courteous, apt to propose and apt to teach; and this encourages me (though unknown) to trouble you with the two following queries.

I remember, about two years ago, when an honest neighbour of mine, Mr. Fox of Pottern, put into your hands, at my request, a little book of mine, entitled "Clavis Universalis," at his return he told me that you received it smiling, using to him these or such like words: "Poor gentleman, I pity him; he would be a philosopher; but he has chosen a strange task, for he can neither prove his point himself, nor can the contrary be proved against him." This was related to me with a very friendly contempt, such, probably, as it was first spoken with; and he was very willing to interpret it in my favour, as if it was a good step towards the certainty of my point, to have the learned Dr. Clarke pronounce that it cannot be disproved. Sir, I confess it makes me cheerful to this day to remember with what an indolent serenity I received this censure. It neither pleased nor

troubled me, when I reflected that you had then read no more than the title-page of my book; and as for Mr. Fox, I was content to improve the good opinion of it which he had conceived from this your favourable saying, not believing it would turn to any great account to press my thoughts upon him, who has conversed, I find, but little in studies of that kind: but I must needs say that I had a secret thought and hope, that after you had perused it, you would have found some reason to alter your opinion; and I thought it not impossible but I should some way hear of it, as I have done from several others. But now believing, with some concern for so useful and even necessary a point, that you are still of the same opinion, and being greatly desirous of seeing it improved by some abler hand (for of hundreds of objections which I have had repeated to me, I have not hitherto met with one which has in the least shaken my assent to it), I have made bold by this to ask you, what it is you would have another mean or understand by that censure? My reason for this question is, because there are three distinct senses, in which a man may be supposed to say that there is or is not an external world. I think in my introduction I have taken sufficient notice of these differences, in order to guard my meaning from being misunderstood, and I have often repeated the same in other parts of the book. But what I am now about to say may

yet seem to be new to you. I affirm in general that there is no external world.

My first sense of these words is, that the visible world is not external, but exists dependently, as in its proper subject, on mind or soul.

In this proposition I am content to grant that there may be such a thing as external matter, but only I contend that visible matter as such, is not, cannot be external. The next is a resumption of this grant, as having proved my first point, and here I drop the word visible, insisting only on the predicate external. This, I say, destroys its subject when applied to matter; that is, I affirm simply (upon the consideration of these two terms only), that there is no such thing in being as external matter. Hence I conclude upon the whole matter, that there is no external world, visible or invisible.

The third sense of this same common proposition of no external world, may be expressed in this manner, that the external world does not exist. This proposition is very different from the two former, and I have often seen it managed with very great success, by some who I am certain have never thought of either of them.

Now, sir, give me leave to repeat my question. In which of these three senses is it you would be understood, when you affirm of this proposition, that it can be neither proved nor disproved?

If you say in the first or second, I may say,

perhaps, that I have proved them in my book; but so confident am I that you cannot indeed mean, what, for argument's sake, I suppose you here to say, that I could almost dare to put the whole question upon this trial, Whether you or any man else ever so much as heard of either of them before. I mean before Mr. Berkeley's book on the same subject, which was published a small time before mine. If so, the censure is gone over my head: you neither meant me, nor am I capable of being wounded by it; for I declare, with my whole heart, that only these two first propositions are the subject of my book. As for the third, I am so far from patronising, that I renounce and abhor it, as a sceptical, false, and self-contradictive proposition.

But now how shall I behave myself, whilst I am about to suggest to you, whether this may not be the proposition which you meant in your censure. I am confident, sir, you will find this to be the point doubted of by Des Cartes, pursued by Malebranche, and my late ingenious neighbour Mr. Norris, and now of late taken up afresh, and determined manfully by Mr. Green of Cambridge.*

* The work here alluded to by Collier is "The Principles of Natural Philosophy, &c. by Robert Green, M.A. and Fellow of Clare Hall. 8vo, Cambridge, 1712." Green seems to have been much alarmed for the safety of Christianity amidst the philosophical speculations of his time. He classes Halley, strangely enough, with Sir Isaac Newton and Mr. Raphson as orthodox

The question with them was not singly concerning the existence of external matter, from any difficulty they perceived from the connexion of these two ideas; neither did they ever put the question to themselves, whether visible matter, or the visible world was external or not; but only whether the external, meaning by it the visible, world does exist or no. For the truth of this I appeal to yourself, and leave it with you to produce, at pleasure (on peril of my confusion), any other author, since Adam, who has managed this question otherwise than I here say.

But now, sir, what a strange proposition is this, to be admitted into debate by such ingenious authors as the forementioned, and that the learned and penetrating Dr. Clarke should pronounce so favourably of it, as to say that it can be neither proved nor disproved! Well indeed might you say, that it cannot be proved that the visible world does not exist; but it is wonderful, on the other hand, that the testimony of sense should not be admitted as demonstration that it does exist. For can any proposition be more simple and evident than, that what I see exists, or that such or such a thing is seen, *ergo* it exists; and is not this what we mean by the visible world, namely, such and such material objects, which are supposed to be seen? and can we doubt of their existence, on

philosophers; while he places Locke, with whom he is much displeased, on the same level with Hobbes and Spinoza.

the concession of their being seen? This is scepticism with a witness, and perhaps a higher degree of it, than has ever been avowed on any other subject; as carrying with it a manifest contradiction in terms. For what can I be supposed to mean by the external, natural, or visible world (all which terms have been hitherto confounded, or made synonymous), but the world which I see, and which is supposed by all to exist? and can I after this make a doubt whether it be real or not, that is, exist or not? This may be the subject of a metaphysical flourish, a kind of legerdemain art to shew the vulgar how far the most evident truths may be puzzled and obscured by a confusion of terms, but must needs be a point unworthy of any serious debate.

Hence, sir, I presume you will acquit me of any sceptical design or leaven, it being so plainly on my side to turn the tables, and retort this charge on all others. For the evidence of all perception, whether intellectual, imaginative, or sensible, for the existence of its proper object, is with me so incontestable a principle, so every where justified, so absolutely necessary to the conclusion which I drive at, that I dare challenge him as my convert, who is able to stand by it.

My other query, is concerning that point of Christian doctrine, for the opinion about which you have of late been much spoken of. I am not out of hope but that a small matter may be sug-

gested, which may serve to reconcile your opinion with that of your most reasonable adversaries, on terms honourable to you both; but the measure of my paper makes me now wish, but in vain, that I had begun with this, having only room to ask your pardon for this trouble, and to assure you that I am, &c.

*Langford, February* 14, 171$\frac{4}{5}$.

On November the 8th next after the date of the preceding letter, Collier informs Low, that, about the 26th of September, "he was taken ill of the small-pox, which he had to a very great and dangerous degree, but that he passed through it without any considerable damage; unless that, from that time, his eyes had been so far weakened, that the letter which he was then writing was the first penned by him since his recovery." But, what is of greater moment, he also tells Low of his correspondence with Clarke on the subject of the "Clavis," and encloses a copy of his own letter, as well as of what he calls the doctor's "learned and civil answer." So that there can be no doubt that Clarke replied to the foregoing letter, although his answer is not now to be found.*

* I have taken considerable pains to discover Clarke's letter, but in vain. Thinking that there might be some trace of it among his MSS., I have examined them thoroughly. It is curious that these should be in a house only a few hundred yards from the resting-place of those of Collier. They are the property of

Dr. Waterland, in a volume of sermons on the trinitarian controversy, having reflected very ignorantly on some of the philosophers of his time, Collier prepared a letter on the subject for Mist's Journal, but afterwards enclosed it in another addressed to the doctor himself. It is subsequent in date to several which follow; but the compiler departs from a strictly chronological arrangement, that the reader's attention may not be distracted. This letter and the next close Collier's metaphysical correspondence.

MR. MIST,

Amongst the many good offices you have done the world since the setting up your weekly paper; it is none of the least, that you have been willing to lend your helping hand, to the introducing such persons into the public, who, though desirous to see something of their own in print, have not stock or something else enough to launch out in their own strength. Accordingly, this comes to desire

my highly-valued friend, H. Jacob, Esq. of the Close, Salisbury. That gentleman, who is a descendant of Dean Clarke, allowed me the fullest access to all the MS. remains of his great collateral ancestor, but unfortunately they refer exclusively to Clarke's Homer and to his Sermons. If any papers of Low exist, they might contain the very letter in question, as well as throw much additional light on Collier's history; but I know not whether he left any family. Low was, it seems, the master of a school at Brook Green, Hammersmith.

leave, by your means, to acquaint the most ingenious and learned Dr. Waterland, whom all the Christian world knows, or should know, that, having read to page 90 of his volume of sermons, I could proceed no farther till I had advertised him that his instance there, does not speak him to be so accurate in his philosophical studies, as he is in his theological.

His assertion is, that there are many things not capable of strict demonstration, and yet so evident and undoubted, that a man would forfeit the very character of sobriety and common sense, that should seriously make the least question of them; and his instance is the existence of the world about us; which, though in his own and the opinion of other good philosophers, not capable of a strict demonstration, is yet so evident on the whole matter, from the testimony of sense (meaning, from that very topic which is granted to be not sufficient to demonstrate it,) that a man would hardly be supposed well in his wits who should seriously entertain any the least doubt or suspicion concerning it. As to his assertion, I have nothing to say against it; and I make no doubt but there are infinite instances in the world to confirm the truth of it. But as to the instance he has been pleased to pitch upon, I cannot help thinking myself qualified to inform him,

*First,* That the existence of the world about us, (meaning, as I suppose he means, the visible or seen world,) is capable of the most strict and

evident demonstration; nay, that nothing but our own existence—unless we add that of the great God—can be supposed to be more simply and directly evident. If the doctor thinks otherwise, I would only desire him to reflect with himself (for I presume not to desire his answer), whether he can recollect or invent—I do not say an argument or demonstration—but so much as any the least appearance, whereon to found any doubt or suspicion of it. If not, (for I am sure he cannot,) he will immediately perceive, that he has mistaken his instance; and, that instead of a point which is not capable of a strict demonstration, he has pitched upon a most evident truth, which is not so much as capable of a philosophical doubt. Here, then, I am very ready to grant with him, that a man would hardly be supposed to be well in his wits, who should, either seriously or otherwise, entertain any the least doubt or suspicion concerning the existence of the world about us. And, consequently, if he has not a mind hereby to condemn himself, amongst those whom he reflects on, he has nothing left to do, but to retract his instance, and acknowledge, with his sober neighbours, that the existence of the world about us is too evident to be doubted of, and so cannot fall under the head of things which are not capable of a strict demonstration. But, however he may be disposed or able to provide for his own security in this case, I may, with greater assurance, inform him,

*Secondly,* That he has also mistaken his men; for that the philosophers whom he so freely reflects on—at least those who have written most directly and at all consistently on this subject—are entirely free from so much as the wind of his blow. Their business, or design, has not been to prove that the existence of the world is not capable of a strict demonstration, or, to speak more according to fact, that it does not, or cannot, exist; but, on the contrary, they affirm and contend, that it does and must exist, supposing it to be seen; and, in a word, that *what we see exists* is a proposition of the most infallible and indubitable verity. There have been some, indeed, who have endeavoured seriously to demonstrate, that because a thing is seen, it does not follow that it is *external,* viz. to the soul or visive faculty which perceives it; and even farther than this of late, viz. that a visible or seen object is not, cannot possibly be, external. But this, I think, is very far from saying that the visible world, (or, as the doctor is pleased to express it, the world about us,) does not exist at all; at least, I leave it with the learned doctor to make it out, that being, and being external, is one and the same thing; or, in other words, that a visible object which is not external, is therefore nothing at all. If he thinks he can prove this, he will soon be convinced where the scepticism of the matter lies; for he cannot want instances (at least if he has ever seen a looking-glass) of visible objects, which are plainly not

external, and consequently he will find, that it is not the philosophers he speaks of, but somebody else, who makes a serious doubt of the existence of visible objects, or would break the connexion between the principle and the consequence in this short enthymeme—*quod video existit.* But if he would rather grant this connexion, than break his faculties by denying it, I must needs desire him to acquit those whom he has condemned of madness, for denying the existence of the world about us. In a word—(I speak it for his information, as supposing that he has never read, or but very slightly considered, what has been written lately on this subject)—it is not the *existence* simple, but the *extra-existence* of the visible world, which is denied by those whom the doctor has reflected on: not the existence of the external world (the very expression of which is all over nonsense and contradiction in terms), but the external existence of the world about us. Once more: it is not said, that the external world does not exist, (which is neither true nor false, but all over contradiction as before,) but that the world which is seen, and consequently does exist, is not external. Let but the doctor find time and abstraction of mind sufficient to consider this, (which yet is no other than a matter of fact, to the full as subject to his senses, as the point he is so very sure of, if he will be at the pains of seeing, with his own eyes, what has been written on this subject), and I need not press

him with the consequence of retracting his censure of distraction, &c. on poor harmless persons, who have never said or thought the least of, but indeed just the contrary to, what he charges them with.

But perhaps, after all, the doctor will choose to acknowledge a slight mistake (as he may think) in words, in representing the sense of those whom he reflects upon; but may still be of opinion, that they are very little short of being besides their senses, who seriously contend that *the visible world is not external.* If so, let him first remember to do justice to the public in acknowledging this mistake; and after that, it may not be improper, at his leisure, to remember his poor brethren who lie under his censure; either, by answering the arguments by which they maintain their point, or, honestly acknowledging that they are not so mad as he has hastily given them out to be.

Yours,

*June* 23, 1720. A. C.

The last letter which I insert on Collier's metaphysical theory, is addressed to the Rev. Mr. Shepherd, Fellow of Trinity College, Oxford.

Sir, *July* 23, 1722.

Supposing that by this time you have read my little book, if such a trifle may be had in your renowned University, I cannot choose but hope that your six objections are either answered

or prevented. But because of the respect I bear you, for your candour and other good qualities, which, in the little time of our conversation, I was glad to discover in you, and also for my word's sake, I am now sat down, with an intent to give you the best satisfaction I am able, with regard to your paper now lying before me.

And, first, for your state or representation of the question. Your words are these: "It seems that the non-existence of an external world is not true." This, sir, if I may be allowed to know and express my own meaning, is not exactly right. I affirm, indeed, in my title, that an external world does not exist; that the existence of an external world is not true; that it is an impossibility; because I was not willing, as the manner of some is, to put my whole book or subject in the title-page; but you will find, in the introduction, that I have divided this general proposition into two; and have, accordingly, made two distinct books of it. One is, that the visible or seen world—that is, visible or seen matter, body, or extension, as visible or seen—is not external. The other is, that external matter, as such, is not, cannot be, as implying several contradictions in the whole idea of it.

Both these, indeed, come under the general proposition or negation, that external matter, or an external world, does not exist; but as I found it necessary to divide it into two, in order to the

demonstration of it; so, I presume, upon second consideration, you will find the same, in order to an answer to, or confutation of it. This would make any controversy between us on this subject, much more easy, simple, and intelligible, and would serve your own sincere desire after truth, as well as my ease in answering you, much better than the method you have taken. But as I am sat down to answer you in your own present way, I will endeavour to tell you, in as few words as I can, what my principles direct me to respond to your objections.

*Obj.* 1. If external matter, or world, does not exist, then body exists in spirit. Then extended being exists in unextended being. But this is absurd. Ergo, external matter does exist.

*Ans.* 1. Instead of saying, that external matter does exist, or does not exist, if you would speak my language, which here you are concerned to do, you should say one of these two things. Either that visible matter is, or is not, external; or, that the complex idea called external matter, does not imply such or such contradictions.

*Ans.* 2. Granted to be true, that, on my principles, body—that is, visible or seen body—does exist in mind or spirit; where is the absurdity of this? You say, it is absurd to say that extended being can exist in unextended being. How do you know this? But do not you know the contrary? For are not the objects seen in (as we say) a look-

ing-glass extended—that is, visibly extended? And do not these exist in mind, viz.—the mind which sees them? And have not you yourself granted me, that the visible or seen world—that is, every visible object, as such, is no more than an image, viz. of another world which is external, and consequently, as such, invisible; and on this foundation have also granted, that external matter, or an external world, is a thing not to be demonstrated?

For surely if the very world which we see were external, that is, if we actually saw an external world, you would not have so little regard to the testimony of sense, as to say that vision alone is not a sufficient demonstration of its being. If, therefore, it cannot be demonstrated, it cannot be seen; and if it cannot be seen, that cannot be external which is seen; and if that which is seen is not external—that is, to the mind or faculty which seeth it—does it not plainly follow that it exists in the mind or faculty which perceiveth it? And will you after this say, that it is absurd for an extended (visible) being to exist in an unextended being?

*Obj.* 2. My body exists in my soul. Equally absurd; and also contrary to Scripture.

*Ans.* If by my body you mean any mere visible object, this objection is the very same with the former. But if you take it in its whole complex idea, of being the object of several senses or modes

of perception, such as seeing, hearing, feeling, &c.; as an argument from pure reason or reflection, it is not capable of being answered in the lump, but must be divided into as many propositions, as the thing spoken of is object of sensations or perceptions; which is a work too long at present. But as an argument founded on authority, viz. the manner of speaking used by St. Paul, &c., I can say no more at present (and need say nothing at all, when you have thoroughly understood my meaning,) than that the Scripture expressions which you allege, are such as I would use myself, and do frequently use, when it is not the very point in question, whether the proposition which I advanced, in my little book, be true or not; which, I am sure, was not the case of St. Paul.

*Obj.* 3. If no external world, the heavens, &c. could not be created before man; but the heavens were created before man. Ergo—

*Ans. Negatur minor.* The heavens which I now see were not created before me, neither was the tree which I now see created before me; because both, as seen, exist in me. But there were men created before me, in whose mind or soul a tree existed, but not the same tree which I see. And before the first man there were created minds; and before these created minds, there is, or was, an uncreated mind, in which a whole heaven and earth existed, and does exist; and therefore *negatur major* also.

I thought, when I began, to have gone through your objections; but when I reflect again, that they are every one answered in the book itself, except the last, which I take rather as a test of your pleasantry than philosophy, I must beg leave to conclude here at present; assuring you, that if, after you have read the book, any one objection remains with you, you may at any time command,

Sir,

Your very faithful humble servant,

A. COLLIER.

My service to all friends with you, particularly Mr. Stockwell, with mine and Mr. Johnson's thanks to him, for all his late favours.

I should think I need not tell you, that the way to answer a book is, not first to form arguments against the conclusion, or deduce absurd inferences from it; but to answer, or shew the invalidity of the arguments, whereby the said conclusion is attempted to be demonstrated. I wish you would be pleased to confine yourself to this method; and I am sure you would find the benefit of it.

From the preceding observations and correspondence, and especially by a perusal of the "Clavis Universalis" itself, the reader will, it is hoped, obtain ample information as to Collier's metaphysical opinions on matter. By some they have been

deemed the very acme of scepticism, and as tending to the most dangerous results; while by the author they were, and perhaps truly, considered not only to be consistent with, but as ministering to the most exalted piety, and, indeed, supplying the readiest of all answers to those who would contemplate the world as independent of a divine intellectual agency. To adopt Collier's own words, he thought them "of the greatest moment imaginable with regard to every thing called science, whether philosophical or theological." And here I cannot resist inserting the opinion of Dr. Johnson, an early American convert to the same philosophy, as contained in the words of his elegant biographer, Dr. Chandler. After stating that Johnson often visited Berkeley, at Rhode Island, he proceeds: "Many difficulties that had attended his theological inquiries were by this means removed, and he became an entire convert to the dean's philosophical system. It appeared to him to be the most effectual method for precluding scepticism, whatever use some writers may since have made of it; and that it left no room, like other systems, for endless doubts and uncertainties in any matters of real importance. The denial of the existence of matter at first seemed whimsical and romantic, but it was for want of understanding the sense in which it was denied; for he found that it was only the idle, unintelligible scholastic notion of matter, as essentially consisting of such

a substratum as no human creature could conceive, the dean meant to oppose, substituting in the room of it a stated union and combination of sensible ideas, excited from without by some intelligent being. This scheme, in his opinion, was attended with this vast advantage, that it not only exhibited new and incontestable evidence of the existence of the Deity, but also tended to impress the mind with a much stronger sense of his perpetual presence, and immediate agency in the production of events, and, consequently, of our dependence upon him, and our obligations to him, than any other system."*

In conclusion, we may observe, that the early progress which Collier made in these curious inquiries affords a remarkable instance of mental vigour; for at an age when few have thrown aside the fopperies of youth, he, it seems, had reached a point which Sir James Mackintosh calls "the touchstone of metaphysical sagacity."†

* Chandler's Life of Samuel Johnson, D.D. pp. 56, 57.

† Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy, edit. Whewell, p. 208.

## CHAPTER III.

### HIS THEOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS.

COLLIER'S metaphysical studies, which, we have seen, led him so early to the conviction of the non-existence of matter independent of perception, exercised a most powerful influence over his intellectual character, and indeed seem to have invested his mind with a mysticism, apparent in almost every subject which he examined. Acute, and, at the same time, devout, he penetrated into the depths of the Platonic philosophy; employing that philosophy, however, merely as the subordinate minister of his Christian profession. And if he gathered some of the sweetest flowers that grew in the garden of Academus, it was only to adorn the altar of the unknown God of the Athenians; but who has been made manifest to us by that very divine revelation for which Plato looked in vain. Collier maintained that the visible world existed in the mind of man, the latter in Christ, and Christ in God; and these sublime opinions he deduced as well from his abstract reasoning as from the language of Scripture. Indeed, he often called in aid the latter to confirm, as well as to enlarge, his metaphysical creed. That man lived,

moved, and had his being in the Godhead, was one of Collier's favourite maxims;* and to shew the reader how he explained that connexion, we extract some of his remarks on the first verse of Genesis: a text that seems to have employed his pen, judging from his MS. remains, more than any other in the Bible.

He says, "There is an infinite fulness of meaning in this text. I will offer some few of the most remarkable particulars in it; as, taking the words heaven and earth to stand for all things except God, we may learn from this text that God only is without beginning, or that every thing else in nature began to be or exist. Hence we must infer, that if time, and space, and matter, are not God, they are neither of them eternal or without beginning. If time therefore is a creature, it is not proper to say of all things that they were made in time; for this form of expression supposes time to be before all things: that is, to be eternal, which implies a contradiction. In like manner, if space or place is a creature, it is not proper to say that all material things were made in space; for this supposes space to be antecedent to all bodies, that is, to be eternal. And, lastly, if matter, or what we call matter, is not God, it is absolutely false to affirm it to be without beginning, which yet I believe is an error more frequent amongst men than is commonly observed."

* Acts, xvii. 28.

Afterwards he proceeds: "Though we usually say in general that all things were made by God, as if nothing in this proposition was to be considered but what is either mere God or mere creature, yet the Scriptures of the New Testament have supplied us with a third idea, which ought not to be omitted in considering the great work of the creation. For, besides God and mere creature, we are told of a πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως,* a first-born of every creature, who is the Ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ Θεοῦ,† the beginning of the creation of God, and neither God nor creature simply in this respect, but a μεσίτης,‡ or middle being between God and his creatures. This is he who is since called the man Christ Jesus. This God-man, then, is the Ἀρχή, in and by whom we are to believe that God made the worlds. When, therefore, we read that God made all things, ἐν Ἀρχῇ, we are to understand the same as if it had been said that God made all things in and by his Son. There is therefore an order after which things were made: Christ the first-begotten, after that mere creatures, such as angels, men, &c. And this work of creation may be considered either as in him or by him, or rather in both these respects together. It was God in him that made all things; it was also by or through him that God made all things: as if we should say, in other words, that he only is the immediate crea-

* Col. i. 15. † Rev. iii. 14. ‡ 1 Tim. ii. 5.

ture of God; but as for all other creatures, they were made immediately by the Son." Having thus mystically interpreted the word Ἀρχή to mean the second person of the Godhead, he elsewhere observes: "We are not to understand that all things exist equally or immediately in this Ἀρχή. He indeed, under God, is the common substance of all things; but as all things exist not immediately in pure God, but mediately through the Son, so there are some creatures which exist more immediately in the Son than others. Thus visible qualities (such as colour, for instance, or this colour which is called whiteness,) exist in visible bodies or extensions; that is, the white or whiteness which I perceive or see exists immediately in this piece of matter which I am used to call paper. Thus, again, the thing which I call paper exists (as I have elsewhere proved all visible and material things do) immediately in mind—that is, in my mind which perceives it—which mind is that which I am taught to call self. But as for my mind or self, this exists immediately in an Ἀρχή, as much distinct from and superior to me, as I am from and to the thing which I call paper, or as paper is from whiteness. And this Ἀρχή is the Son of God in the capacity before spoken of. This, then, is the order of being from God; and this, I think, if it be true, ought to pass for one of the mysterious meanings of the text, which says that God created all things in an Ἀρχή."

The preceding extracts, although by no means consecutive in the original MS., express Collier's view of the human soul in connexion with the Godhead; but if the reader is desirous of a fuller development of this doctrine, it will be found in "A Specimen of True Philosophy," now published amongst Dr. Parr's collection of Metaphysical Tracts.*

For a person of Collier's intellectual character to keep the narrow path of orthodoxy, without swerving to the right or to the left, was scarcely to be expected. Indeed, by the motto from Malebranche, which he prefixed to his "Clavis Universalis,"† he seemed to consider the common assent of mankind to a doctrine as a certain badge of error; and it is almost needless to add, that if he adhered to this maxim in theological inquiry (and such seems to be the case), he had but a small chance of escaping from heretical conclusions. On the momentous subject of the Trinity, therefore, if he was not an Arian, strictly speaking, his opinions did not greatly differ from those of that sect. Arius believed, we apprehend, that the Son had been created out of nothing by the Father, before all things, but that he was neither co-eternal nor co-essential with the Father; and though immeasurably superior in power and in glory to the highest created beings,

* See p. 105.

† Vulgi assensus et approbatio circa materiam difficilem, est certum argumentum falsitatis istius opinionis cui assentitur.

that, nevertheless, he was subordinate in both these respects to the Father. Collier, it seems, had been written to by his correspondent Low on the subject of the Trinity; and we insert a portion of the letter which was penned by the former in reply, as it contains the most authentic record of the writer's sentiments on that matter.

TO SOLOMON LOW, Esq.

*Dec.* 12, 1715.

* * * * *

"1st, I believe an eternal Trinity, called in Scripture, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; and this not only from Scripture, but the most evident principles of reason.

"2d, Notwithstanding their eternity, it seems very easy, and indeed necessary, to conceive them in an order of first, second, and third, together with supremacy and subordination, greater and less, &c., which might be made appear and illustrated from a thousand parallel instances amongst creatures, which I forbear to mention till demanded.

"3d, I believe also, that he whom we call our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the eternal Son particularised or created, was the very first creature which God ever made, or, I may say, can make—it being impossible, in my conception of things, for a mere creature to be made or exist but at second hand, or as in relation to a first creature—such a one as I conceive Jesus Christ, as creature, to be; consequently,

"4th, I don't think myself obliged to hold, that when our Lord Jesus Christ (who, by the way, in his created capacity, is really our Lord God, and even Creator, though, with relation to the eternal three, no more than a creature himself,) took flesh of the Virgin Mary, he began then to exist as creature; for I believe that, as such, he existed before all ages, worlds, or times—his creaturely existence being the very first point or pulse of time, and the beginning of all that we call age or world.

"I cannot here stay to prove to you the particulars of this system; neither is any more necessary in this place than only to hint to you, how, supposing it to be true, it reconciles the differences between those whom the present Arians call orthodox and themselves. And this is very easily done.

"1st, The orthodox hold an eternal three, but not rightly so; for that they hold such an equality between them as to exclude all supremacy and subordination, greater and less, &c., which the Arians contend for, and, for this reason, deny the eternity of the two last. Here, then, they may agree with honour, and without any victory on either side, as being both partly in the right, and partly in the wrong, which is done by subscribing my two first articles, provided they are first made good.

"2d, Whereas the orthodox contend for the

divinity and eternity of the Son of God from certain texts of Scripture, which speak of his pre-existent state to his incarnation; and the Arians, from those same texts, can conclude nothing but his pre-existent creatureship; they may both shake hands in some truth and some error, if it be true, on one hand, that he was the first creature, and, on the other, that he is God eternal.

"This, sir, is, in short, my system, which, if you think worthy of being any farther explained or proved, you may at any time command, &c.

"A. COLLIER."

Several years prior to the date of the preceding letter, the Arian controversy had again arisen, with almost its ancient vigour, to disturb the tranquillity of the Church; and the awful subject of the Trinity was debated by the churchmen and even by the laity with no slight degree of acrimony. Whiston and Clarke, both correspondents of Collier, were at this time especially hateful to the orthodox. The former, an honest, wrong-headed man, was an ardent champion of what he called primitive Christianity—in other words, Arianism—which he employed every means to diffuse. But the latter, by the publication of his "Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity," in 1713, caused far greater alarm to the Anglican Church. This was a more dangerous antagonist than Whiston, for he possessed greater learning, and reasoned more closely. But then

Clarke had not, like him, the courage of a martyr, nor was disposed to sacrifice his preferment to his opinions, although he declined further advancement in the Church, which might render necessary a fresh subscription to the Thirty-nine Articles.

Among the clergy of the Established Church there were many who, like Collier, embraced, if they did not publicly avow, the same opinions, or, at least, partially declined from Athanasian orthodoxy; and it is discreditable to some who, after having openly concurred in Whiston's views, could yet silence their scruples as they rose to places of ecclesiastical dignity or profit. Collier, it has been seen, thought it feasible to reconcile the notions of both parties; but his creed, as contained in the letter which we have adduced, could hardly satisfy his clerical brethren. That any but the learned should be concerned in the controversy, seems to have vastly annoyed him; for when Chubb, who lived at Salisbury, within seven miles of Langford, first appeared among the Arian writers of this period, Collier did all in his power to expose his ignorance, or at least his want of erudition. In truth, Chubb possessed considerable abilities; but they were so little cultivated, that he could not write his mother tongue grammatically. The clergy of the neighbourhood were naturally enough surprised that such a work as "The Supremacy of the Father asserted" should proceed from the pen of a tallow-chandler; and Collier took the

pains to make a large collection of Chubb's letters written on business, and these, full of errors, he often exhibited to the curious.*

Now authors sometimes rise with their subjects above the mediocrity of an ordinary style; but it was incredible that one who could not write on soap and candles without blunders in spelling and syntax, should yet, unassisted, produce such a work. The matter was inquired into, and it was more than hinted that "The Supremacy of the Father asserted" was corrected, if not revised, by John Hoadly, afterwards primate of Ireland, who, by Bishop Burnet's patronage, was then rector of St. Edmund's, Salisbury, the very parish in which Chubb lived. Thus it was, while this controversy was at issue, that Low wrote to Collier for advice, or rather for his opinion on the subject of it, and which has been already laid before the reader.

The fate of Whiston and Clarke—the one reduced to live almost wholly on the precarious bounty of his friends, the other effectually barred from further advancement in the Church—was well calculated to dissuade the clergy from any very elaborate study of the Scriptures. They had been taught, indeed, that the Bible was the religion of Protestants; but still they seemed to have forgotten, that while the Church of England disclaimed infallibility, she was yet but little tolerant

* Memoirs of Thomas Chubb. London, 1747, 12mo, p. 20.

of those who differed from her interpretation of Scripture; and that if she failed in argument, she had whole troops at her command, who could at least silence any opposing voice with the drums and trumpets of orthodoxy. However, Dr. Hare, afterwards Bishop of Chichester, had the courage to espouse the cause of biblical criticism in a tract, entitled "The Difficulties and Discouragements which attend the Study of the Scriptures, in the way of private Judgment, represented in a Letter to a Young Clergyman." In this publication he dissuades his correspondent, in a tone of the most delicate irony, from searching into the original records of Christianity, for reasons precisely analogous to those used by the Roman Catholic clergy, and which, therefore, every Protestant ought to oppose with all his might. He cites Whiston and Clarke as examples of the danger of scriptural studies carried to any great depth; and the portraits of these persons, both of whom were Collier's correspondents, are so admirably drawn by their learned and pious contemporary, that we venture to extract the portion of his pamphlet containing them, although the quotation is a lengthy one.

He says,*—"There are, you know, *two clergymen* of the town who have studied themselves into *heresy*, or at least into a *suspicion* of it: both of them men of *fair unblemished characters*. *One* has all his

* Hare's Works, vol. ii. p. 20.

life been cultivating piety, and virtue, and good learning; rigidly constant *himself* in the public and private duties of religion, and always promoting in *others* virtue, and such learning as he thought would conduce most to the honour of God, by manifesting the greatness and wisdom of his works. He has given the world sufficient proofs that he has not misspent his time, by very useful works of *philosophy* and *mathematics*. He has applied *one* to the explication of the *other*, and endeavoured by *both* to display the glory of the great Creator: and to his study of nature he early joined the study of the *Scriptures;* and his attempts, whatever the success be, were at least well meant; and, considering the difficulty of the subjects he has engaged in, it must be allowed, that, in the main, they are *well aimed:* and if he has not succeeded, no more have others who have meddled with the same subjects. Nor is he more to be blamed than they. To be *blamed*, did I say? I should have said not less to be *commended;* for sure it is a *commendable* design to explain Scripture difficulties, and to remove the objections of profane men, by shewing there is nothing in the sacred writings but what is true and rational.

"But what does a life thus spent avail? To what purpose so many watchful nights and weary days? so much piety and devotion? so much mortification and self-denial? such a zeal to do good, and to be useful to the world? so many noble specimens of a

great genius and of fine imagination? It is the poor man's misfortune (for *poor* he is, and like to be—not having the least preferment,) to have a warm head, and to be very zealous in what he thinks the cause of God. He thinks prudence the worldly wisdom condemned by Christ and his apostles; and that it is gross prevarication and hypocrisy to conceal the discoveries he conceives he has made. This heat of temper betrays him into some indiscreet expressions and hasty assertions. Designing to hurt nobody, he fancies nobody designs to hurt *him;* and is simple enough to expect the same favourable allowances will be made to *him* that he sees made to those who write against him. As to his learning, it is his misfortune that he is not skilled enough in the learned languages to be a great critic in them, and yet seems not to be sensible of his deficiency in this respect. And what advantage is taken of this, that he has not *less heat* and *more criticism?* His *learning* is treated in that manner, that you would think he did not know the first elements of *Greek,* though even in that he is much superior to most of those who make so free with him; and you every day hear his performances run down as whimsies and chimeras by men who never *read* them, and, if they did, could not *understand* them. Nor does his *warmth of temper* come off better: it is all over *obstinacy, pride,* and *heretical pravity*—a want of *modesty* and due *deference* to just authority. They that speak

most favourably look upon him as *crazed*, and little better than a *madman*. This is the poor man's character; and, low as he is, they cannot be content to leave him quiet in his poverty: whereas, had he not been early possessed with a passionate love for the *Scripture* and *philosophy*—had he not thought it his duty, above all things, to promote the *glory of God*, and been persuaded that could no way be so well done as by the study of his *word* and *works*, it is more than probable he had at this time been *orthodox;* and then, instead of his present treatment, his faults would have been overlooked, the learning he excels in would have been extolled, and no defect would have been found in other parts of it. He would have been cried up as an ornament of the age, and no preferment would have been denied or envied him.

"This you know to be the case with *one* of the *new heretics;* the *other* is so prudent in his conduct that he comes under but a *suspicion* of favouring the same notions. How now is *he* treated? *Prudence* in *him* is as great a crime as the *want of it* in the *other*. The *imprudent* man is treated as a madman and a rank *Arian;* the *prudent* one is *less a heretic*, but *more dangerous—sobrius accessit ad evertendam Ecclesiam;* and therefore the greater alarm must be raised against *him*. And what has he done? Why, he has, with a great deal of pains, brought together, in the best manner he could, all the passages in the *New Testament* relating to the doctrine of the

Trinity. And so far his work is what those who differ from him *should* be pleased with, since he has brought the *materials* together to enable men to form a right judgment of the question in dispute; and has put into their hands, if he be in the wrong, the best weapons against himself. But he has *interpreted some texts* in a manner that is not liked. It is true he has so; but not once, that I remember, has he given an interpretation that is purely of *his own head.* He brings *great vouchers;* and if he errs, it is always in *good company.* This is his offence: he has maintained, with many others, particularly the late Dean of St. Paul's, in opposition to *Sabellianism,* that the *three persons of the Trinity* are *three real distinct beings;* and the belief of three really distinct beings *perfectly equal,* he maintains, with Dr. South, to be *Tritheism;* and that there *must* therefore be a *subordination.* Now, whether this notion be right or not, if he cannot escape *ill treatment,* give me leave to say, that if your study should lead you into any opinion contrary to what is generally received, *you* can with no reason expect *better quarter.* He is a man who has *all the good qualities* that can meet together to recommend him—he is possessed of *all* the parts of *learning* that are valuable in a clergyman, in a degree that few possess any *single one*—he has, joined to a good skill in the *three learned languages,* a great compass of the best *philosophy* and *mathematics,* as appears by his *Latin* works; and his

*English* ones are such a proof of his own *piety*, and of his *knowledge in divinity*, and have done so much *service to religion*, as would make any other man, that was not under the suspicion of *heresy*, secure of the friendship and esteem of all good churchmen, especially of the clergy. And to all this *piety* and *learning*, and the good use that has been made of it, is added a *temper* happy beyond expression; a sweet, easy, modest, inoffensive, obliging behaviour, adorns all his actions; and no passion, vanity, insolence, or ostentation, appear either in what he writes or says; and yet these faults are often incident to the best men in the freedom of conversation, and in writing against impertinent and unreasonable adversaries, especially such as strike at the foundations of virtue and religion. This is the *learning*, this the *temper* of the man whose *study of the Scriptures* has betrayed him into a *suspicion* of some heretical opinions; and because it has, he must be *blackened* and *defamed*—he must be worried out of the great and clear reputation he is possessed of; and he that has so many shining qualities must be insulted by every *worthless wretch*, as if he had as little learning and virtue as the lowest of those who are against him. What protection now can *you* promise yourself from your virtue, when a man of *such* a character cannot be safe in his good name? Whatever, therefore, you do, be *orthodox: orthodoxy* will cover a *multitude of sins;* but a *cloud of virtues* can-

not cover the want of the minutest particle of *orthodoxy.*"

Dr. Hare's tract was highly approved of by Collier, as appears by the following somewhat mysterious letter:

TO THE REV. DR. HARE,

*Residentiary of St. Paul's.*

SIR, *October 10th*, 1719.

Having lately, and now a second time, read a little piece, entitled "The Difficulties and Discouragements," &c., which is generally held to be (and which, for the excellency of it, I am strangely confident must be) yours, I can no longer refrain the earnest desire I have held for some time of making known to you the exceeding great esteem of, and gratitude towards you, which arises in my mind upon the reading or reflecting on it. And I am the more encouraged to give way to my presumption in the making you this acknowledgment, because the many marks of candour, benevolence, and ingenuity, which shew themselves in every line of your book, assure me, almost invincibly, that the presumption of this address will be totally overlooked or pardoned by you. I flatter myself also with believing, that, considering the singularity of your argument or conclusion, and the bitter zeal of the multitude, whether

learned or unlearned, against every thing which is new *to them*, I shall pass with you as a fellow-sufferer in a righteous cause, and so be more entitled to your favour and kind acceptance than if I joined with you in an opinion, how important soever, which you held in common with many others. Glory, therefore, be to God on high, and on earth peace and good will towards men! And may the peace and good will which you have shewn in your treatise to be so absolutely necessary to the establishment of truth, and the true interest of the Church of Christ, once more revive or return from heaven, by the blessing of God, in propagating and increasing that little spark of heavenly light and love which you have ventured to strike out amongst us.

But in this, sir, I must needs confess I pray but with very little hope: partly because I think I am assured by the word of God that the Church will grow worse and worse till the second coming of Christ, and partly for that I know not which way to reconcile it, with any degree of probability, that the present governors of the Church in my part of Christendom (and which are like to continue of the same kind always) should ever come to be prevailed upon, by any human argument or persuasion, to submit to a reformation in this point, which, in my way of understanding it, is so contrary to the fundamental interests of their several headships over the Church. But my way

of understanding it may be different from yours, and, indeed, I believe it is, as from every body's I have yet met with, except the word of God; and therefore I expect, that at least the latter part of my conjecture will be received but very coldly by you. But I can only say, that as I can make no doubt but that you have in yourself that entire freedom of judgment with regard to the Scriptures, which you so justly and excellently recommend to others, I can as little doubt or question but the point or system which I here suppose, notwithstanding its novelty, would find as easy an admission with you, in proportion to its proof from Scripture, as any other of like evidence, which also happens to be defended by ever so great a multitude. But, perhaps, my crabbed way of writing may give you occasion to think that I am endeavouring to hook you into a controversy with me on some darling nostrum which is wholly foreign to your subject. But this, sir, is not the case, or any part of my intention; for that in which I apprehend I differ from you seems to me to be a truth of absolute necessity to the right establishment or understanding of your conclusion. And therefore, now it is to no purpose to conceal it any longer from you, that, though I infinitely admire your performance, and entirely hug your conclusion, yet, for want of a right notion of the authority which Christ has left in his Church (which, I am sorry to say, for want of, even after the reading your late excellent

visitation-sermon), I cannot heartily say that I wish the governors of all Christian societies, as they are at present, would come into your opinion, and remove the discouragements which you so justly complain of. For unless, amongst all other opinions or proposals, founded, or pretended to be founded, on the word of God, they would also tolerate mine, or suffer it to be freely and impartially canvassed (which I cannot think they will ever do), I can see with half an eye, without the least tincture of prophecy, what would be the effect of the liberty you contend for: I mean, the worst of evils that ever happened to the Church of Christ, commonly called at present the Bangorian system, which yet, as I suppose, you heartily detest. But I freely grant it to be too early for me to expect that you should enter into a sense or expectation of any great matters, on this or any other subject, from one so utterly unknown to you.

But, however this be, I know not why I should suspect my common right of proposing my objections against, or rather exceptions to, the treatise I am now upon, and which especially I so much admire. If, therefore, you will be pleased to give me a hearing on this point (and Dr. Clarke will inform you I use to covenant beforehand), I shall desire no more at present; and so, waving the mention or expectation of any novel system, till time and occasion shall make the mention of it necessary, I shall now only, with the greatest sub-

mission and veneration, withdraw from your presence, as,

Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

A. C.

The visitation-sermon to which Collier alludes in the preceding letter, was preached at Putney, the 5th of May, 1719, and called down the vengeance of Hoadly. In it Hare advocated the necessity of a visible Church, consisting of teachers regularly ordained, to whom the power of interpreting the Scriptures has been uninterruptedly transmitted by the imposition of hands: and the sermon, with very trifling alteration, might safely be preached in any part of the papal dominions.

From the subject of the Trinity, Collier, by a natural and easy transition, passed to that of the Incarnation; and on this question, judging by the vast collection of scriptural texts which he accumulated, and which remain among his MSS., he seems to have spared no pains to arrive at a correct opinion. Here also we must assume his conclusions to have been heterodox, since they correspond with those of Apollinaris, a bishop of Laodicea towards the latter end of the fourth century, who, after having strenuously opposed the Arian party, became in his turn himself a heretic. His heresy consisted in holding, that, as regards the second person of the Trinity, "the

Godhead was united or mingled with the body of a man, and that the Logos, the eternal Wisdom, supplied in the flesh the place and office of a human soul."* To express Collier's position in his own words,—"That the pre-existent Word, or Son of God, was not united to a created human soul or spirit, but was himself the man called Jesus and the Christ." This point he conceived to be provable as well by Scripture as by reason and authority; and he deemed it to be of the utmost importance, inasmuch as, upon any other hypothesis, the doctrine of the atonement could not, he thought, be satisfactorily established. From the resemblance between the opinions of Collier and Apollinaris, the former has been termed by Dr. Parr an Apollinarian. It should be here observed, that one of the last acts of his life was to embody these doctrines in a volume, entitled "Logology; or, a Treatise on the Logos or Word of God, in seven Sermons on the 1st, 2d, 3d, and 14th verses of the first chapter of St. John's Gospel," a book of great rarity. An analysis of this work will be found in Dr. Parr's Metaphysical Tracts;† and I owe to the labours of that learned writer the following abstract of its contents, which I insert entire, although it in some degree repeats what has preceded.

"Upon the two first verses of St. John he says, 'It is apparent from them that Jesus Christ was,

* Gibbon, vol. viii. p. 274. † Page 129.

according to our translation, before the incarnation, in the beginning, and even before the creation; that he was with God, and was God.' 'But the word Ἀρχή has *other* meanings in the word of God besides the relation that it bears to *time;* and its meaning here is, that Christ is the preserver or upholder of all things (Heb. i. 3). All things exist and have their being in him' (Acts, xvii. 28). 'There is an order and manner in which creatures have their being in the world; they were made to exist in Christ as in their *principle;* all created things exist, not all at the *same distance,* but at several distances or *projections.* Men and angels have their existence *immediately* in the Son, whom St. John calls the Word.' After this illustration of Gen. i. 1, which may be found also in the specimen subjoined to the 'Clavis,' Mr. Collier says, that, according to St. John, in the beginning was the Word—that is, the Word himself was *in a* beginning; that the article τῇ is not in the original; that though the Word is the principle of all *created* things, yet he is not *absolutely* the beginning of being, but exists himself in a principle, as the creatures exist in him; that the text of St. John should be thus translated, '*And the Word was with* God, and the Word was God, and He, the same, was in a beginning with God;' that πρός, commonly translated *with,* also signifies *to,* or *concerning;* that in Heb. i. 7, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἀγγέλους λέγει, πρός is translated *of,* or *concerning,* and in the next verse,

πρὸς τὸν υἱόν, *to* the Son; that it signifies both or either indifferently, as it happens to be spoken of, or directed to, the persons concerned, viz. the angels or the Son of God; that it signifies both or either indifferently, because in its first signification it means *with respect to;* that *such* is its signification in the first verse of St. John; that God is the immediate principle of the Word; that there is a *distinction* in the *sound* or *name* of God; that in the text we have *God the Word* existing in a *beginning* with respect to God—that is, God *existing* and God *inexisting,* God *absolute* and God *respective;* and that the distinctions into which this may be varied, as *pure* and *mixed, abstract* and *concrete, simple* and *complex, one* and *manifold,* are equivalent to the common distinction of God the Father and the Son, which runs throughout the New Testament, and that in each there is some *peculiar denotation,* expressing the *same relation* under *different conceptions,* or, as we may say, *abstractions;* that Christ *is not,* and *cannot* be, God in the same *sense* of the word in which He with whom the Word is said to be in the beginning is called God; that a distinction is to be made between God *existing* and God *inexisting,* God *absolute* and God *respective;* that from the words, *being with God* before all time, it does not follow that the Word is absolutely or universally *consubstantial* or *co-equal* with him; that of *consubstantial* there are *two notions,* first, as one thing exists *in* the other, and, secondly, as

both exist *jointly* and *immediately* in a *common* or *third* substance; that in the *last* sense of the word all material things are consubstantial with *each other*, and such are the souls of men and angels; and that as *matter exists* in *mind, so minds exist in* the one Ἀρχή, or beginning of the creation, the only begotten of God; and that in the first sense of the word every soul that exists in *him* is *consubstantial* with him, as he is our *immediate* principle or substance; that he is content to call this by the name of consubstantiality, though it be a word of our *own creation;* that in the second sense of the term, viz. that God and the Word do exist jointly and immediately in a common substance, the Antiochian fathers, half a century before the Council of Nice, rejected it; that though, according to Bishop Bull, the Council of Nice established the term in a different sense, his own explanation is the very *same* with that which the fathers of Antioch had rejected, illustrated by the very *comparison* which Mr. Collier uses, namely, *the consubstantiality of souls or spirits with each other;* that, though in *one* possible sense the Word or Son is consubstantial with the Father, little can be done to save the credit of the attribute *co-equal;* that to say the Son is absolutely supreme God, is not the language of the *New Testament*, and, as he particularly contends, not of the text; for 'how can He be said to be absolutely the supreme God, whose *existence is inexistence*, and whose being or nature

is *respective* to another, who, by way of distinction, is *absolutely* called God.'

"I have stated, with all possible fairness, the peculiar opinions and reasoning of Mr. Collier, though I am neither convinced by the one, nor much enlightened by the other.

"In sermon the second he enters into an explanation of the proposition that the Word *was with* God. He had endeavoured to shew, in the first sermon, that the Word was immediately united to God, inasmuch as God was his immediate principle or substance. But that He who is called the Word with respect to God, is that Word of God by whom *the heavens were made,** and by whom the Father *made the world,*† is equivalent to the language of St. John in ver. 3, where it is said, '*all things were made by him, and without him was not any thing made that was made.*' He then, as our immediate principle of existence, is or was our immediate Creator, so *truly and universally* the Creator of all things, that there is not any one thing excepted, either in heaven or in earth, of which he is or was not the immediate Creator. He would render the words *made* universally, in their relation to every thing that has been done or is called the work of God, as well *since* the beginning as at the time of the creation—'*all things have been done by him, and without him has not any thing been done that*

* Psalm xxviii. 6. † Heb. i. 2.

*has been done.*' The proof of this proposition he reserves to a separate discourse upon the declaration of St. John that *the Word was God.* The rest of the second discourse is employed in proving what he calls the '*mystery of strict creation,* contained in this proposition, that the Word was the immediate Creator of all things, or that God made all things, without exception, by his Son.' While he is endeavouring to establish this proposition, he refers to the opinion maintained in his 'Clavis,' '*that matter necessarily exists in mind, or in the soul of him that seeth or perceiveth it, and so may, in some sense, be said to be caused or created by it* (*as depending, in some measure, on our particular wills, which is as much as to say, that it is too near to nothing to exist, or be caused immediately in or by any higher principle*); so,' says he, 'may not the same be applied to us, that our natures and essences are too vain and empty to be capable of being the immediate creatures of pure God?'

"'Since we are here, it must needs be true, that there is a mean proportional between pure God and us; because if there were none, we could not exist at all, but were as absolute nothings as he is absolute being.'

"'But *what* is this mean proportional between God and us? Why, the answer to this is the truth of the text, which saith, that all things were made by the Word of God—that is, not *immediately* by God himself, but immediately by his Word or Son;

and therefore, *consequently*, by pure God; because he, our immediate Maker and Creator, is the Son of the Father, and the Word of pure and absolute God.'

"Now this, as he observed before, is, he thinks, *all* that is *revealed* to us concerning the manner or mystery of creation. He does not say that this is the *whole* truth of the matter. 'But still, if it is all that God hath told us in his word, it may justly be called *our all*, as we are not capable of proceeding any farther.'

"The third discourse is upon these words, 'And the Word was God;' where he would shew how 'this our immediate principle and Creator, was the doer and disposer of all things that had been done, or said to be the work of God, in all the periods of the Old Testament dispensation—that is, from the beginning of the world to what is said in the 14th verse, that 'the Word was made flesh, and dwelt amongst us.'

"He founds this proposition upon the authority of the text, 'And the Word was God;' and he again unfolds the import of the same proposition by saying, that 'the person called the Word was he that was called God before his coming in the flesh, and that he was the God who was called Jehovah, and the Lord God, Elohim, and the Lord of Hosts, in the writings of Moses, and of the prophets who came after him; that is, in a word, the God revealed of the Old Testament.'

" In explaining Heb. i. 2, he says, that *αἰῶνας*, which we translate the *world,* is properly to be rendered *ages,* and that the ages or periods of the Old Testament are from Adam to Noah, from Noah to Abraham, from Abraham to Moses, and so on to John the Baptist, who was the introducer of the present, and the finisher of all the ages of the Old Testament. In answer to the question, whether 'it was not true that the Father was at the same time the God of Israel,' he says, 'Yes, certainly, it was as true as that he was *then* the God and Father of his *Word* and *Son;* which is not an *historical,* but an *absolute* and *eternal* truth. But still we find it to be true (in the historical way) that the Son, and *not* the Father, was the God of the Old Testament. And what can be the truth of this, but that the *name* of the Father was not at *that time* revealed; and so the person of the *God revealed* was *not* the Father, but the Son.'

" In sermon four, he interprets John, i. 14, 'And the Word was made flesh;' and of this assertion, in connexion with what he had before said, he 'takes the whole meaning to be this, that he, the same who was the Word of God, by whom the heavens were made—who was also the very person who had once been in the form and majesty of a God, and was the God revealed of the Old Testament—he, lastly, who had been called the Angel of the covenant, and of the presence of God, and was indeed an angel, both by nature and office

(though we believe that by inheritance he obtained a more excellent name than all the rest of the order, Heb. i. 4-9), did, at a certain time, come down from all his glory, power, happiness, and perfection, and become a son of man, in the ordinary method of being born of a woman; thereby making himself subject to all the miseries and infirmities of our present human nature, state, or condition.'

"He observes, that, in 'all the accounts given of our Lord, or the Word, we find not a syllable of any other or third idea besides the Word and the flesh;' that when God is said 'to be manifested in the flesh,' that the 'second man is the Lord from heaven;' that 'forasmuch as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, so also Christ likewise took part of the same;' 'we find not the least mention or intimation of any human soul or created spirit, which was united to the Word at the instant of the incarnation, and created for this end to be the bond of union between the Word and the flesh.'

"After remarking that 'a time has been, when, during the sleep of the watchmen of the Church, so very a tare as the belief of a human soul united to Christ, and created at the instant of incarnation, had been sown in upon the Word, during the sleep of the watchmen of the Church, as it is expressed in our Saviour's parable of the tares;' he supposes that 'there are yet a certain few who are not yet

fast asleep, and those few he desires to consider, that it is not pretended by the patrons of the opinion which he opposes,' 'that there is any one passage to be found in the word of God, which has any such expression in it as that the Word did assume, or was united to, a human spirit; notwithstanding that they have imposed it on themselves and others, as the principal test and trial of orthodoxy; that we are absolutely and frequently forbidden to add to or diminish the word of God, and that the addition of a human spirit to the pure tradition of the text does diminish the force, and even deny the truth, of what is plainly taught as concerning the mystery of our Lord, the God of Israel, being manifested in the flesh, and suffering for our redemption.'

"He observes, that it is 'possible for those who hold this addition so to contrive that they may not contradict themselves in the same breath, but at different times, as they speak upon different subjects. That thus, in speaking of the incarnation, they may take no notice of the sufferings of Christ, but only the constituent parts of his composition; and so here they may insert their doctrine of the human spirit, without expressly denying that it was God the Word who suffered death on the cross; and that, on the other hand, in speaking of the sufferings and death of Christ, they may drop the mention of the human or created spirit, and then may freely tell us that the Word, the Son of God,

was made partaker of our infirmities, and may expatiate upon the infinite value of his sufferings: that this is exactly the very management of the affair whereby they deceive themselves into a fond opinion that they do not really contradict either the Scriptures or themselves; but that in one particular instance the contradiction is so very flagrant, that they can hardly choose but see it, because the opposite assertions are most commonly found together; as when they tell us, that at the incarnation of our Lord, he assumed or was united to a particular human spirit which was united to the flesh, they seldom or never fail to hold us down to that form of words as the language of pure antiquity, namely, that our Lord, the Word, did assume the human nature, but not any human person, as a human spirit united to a human body was not properly a person, even in their own sense of the words.'

"In sermon the fifth he takes a view of what 'is commonly urged in favour of the addition from reason, as that, whereas our Lord assumed the frailty of our flesh, he would not certainly omit to assume a human spirit, which is by much the nobler part of our composition; and that without a human spirit he could not have been a man.' To the first he answers, 'If this had been the fact of our Lord's incarnation, it cannot possibly be imagined that the perfect Word of God should only tell us that he became flesh, or omit to inform us that he also

assumed a human soul or spirit, which is so much the more noble part of our composition.' Upon the second he asks, for 'what reason should he not be called a man, even if he did not assume a human spirit?' 'It is supposed, by consent between all parties, that he had something at least equivalent to what is called a human spirit, or (according to Collier's notion) that the place of human spirit was supplied by another spirit, namely, the Word and Son of God,' as formerly he had been man or angel-god. 'He formerly had been an angel; but after the incarnation he could not justly be called by the name of angel, because, by this very act, he quitted that name or character to become the Son of man; and if a proper name be demanded for him now, he might be called *θεάνθρωπος*.' Collier objects to his adversaries their disuse of this ancient and proper way of speaking —'to which disuse they were compelled, in consequence of their addition of the human spirit, and were farther compelled to divide the Word from the man, and to call him God and man instead of God-man.' After objecting to the term *human nature*, in its common acceptation, as including all the essentials of our composition, he allows, that 'the Word so far took our nature upon him as to be born of a woman, and so, by natural consequence, became subject to all the miseries and infirmities of our human state.'

"Having discussed the arguments drawn from

reason in the fifth discourse, he proceeds, in the sixth, to examine the scriptural proofs adduced in favour of the opinion, 'that our Lord had a human spirit; as, that Jesus increased in wisdom and stature; that in his prayer to the Father he had said, 'Not my will, but thine be done;' that his soul is said to be exceedingly sorrowful, even unto death; that he commended his spirit into the hand of God; and that if he had not a human soul together with the flesh, they who maintained he had not, should be challenged to explain in what sense he could be said to die?' To these arguments he replies with his usual acuteness and vivacity.

"In the seventh sermon he states, and endeavours to refute, what 'is commonly urged in a more direct opposition to that which he considers as the Scripture account of the incarnation of our Lord.' In repelling the charge of absurdity and blasphemy, he makes some sharp remarks upon his antagonists, who, 'when Christ is said by himself to make atonement for our sins, own that, in strict propriety, the terms do say that the Word did suffer in the flesh, but maintain, that instead of standing upon the propriety of the expressions, we must interpret them so as to make them agreeable with the principles of reason.' 'These, by the way,' says he, 'are your great defenders of mystery, who are continually telling you that you must not use your reason in matters of faith—that

is, when you call in question any mystery of their own inventing. But you see how they change their note when you offer them the word of God. But since we have begun, let us end the controversy with them. And so I answer as followeth: You say you believe the word, but would fain reconcile all its sayings to reason. But have you never tried to reconcile your reason to the word of God?'

"He supposes that 'his antagonists will call himself, and others who deny the union of the human spirit, by the name of heretics, either Arian or Apollinarian, but most probably the last, because, according to church history, and the manner of these times, Apollinaris was condemned as a heretic for peaceably (as Collier supposes) maintaining that the Word was made flesh in the proper and obvious sense of the words.'

"In the conclusion of the seventh sermon we have these striking, and, in one respect only, I must confess, offensive words: 'How necessary it is to believe the word, in order to be a just interpreter of it; and yet how rarely this necessary qualification is found amongst us! Secondly, how dangerous a thing it is to speak of the truths of God in unscriptural terms or phrases; and how naturally the use of these does involve us in the guilt of adding to the word of God! Thirdly, how exceeding baneful are the rudiments of philosophy,

when applied to the word of God; and so much the more pernicious, when we use them to explain the fundamentals of our faith!'

"The appendix consists of thirty-three pages. It is written with great vigour, and contains what Collier calls 'Plain and short Answers to a book entitled "Plain and short Arguments from Scripture, proving the Lord Jesus Christ to be the supreme God, or one and the same God with the Father, notwithstanding his acknowledged inferiority to the Father with respect to his human nature and mediatorship."'

"The reader will do me the justice to believe that, in stating Mr. Collier's opinions upon the language of St. John, I have not the smallest intention, directly or indirectly, to insinuate my own. I mean to *describe*, not to *vindicate* or *recommend*, those opinions; and surely they who are struck with the peculiarity of Collier's metaphysical system, cannot be wholly incurious about those theological tenets which he held with so much apparent sincerity, and defended with so much dexterity, and so much ardour. The resemblance between his philosophy and his faith is manifest from what he says upon the distinction between existence and inexistence. The similarity of his opinions to those of Apollinaris was not unsuspected by himself, and may be illustrated by the following quotation from Lord King's History of the Creed. 'The heresy of Apollinaris was, according to St. Austin's expres-

sion, that Christ (De Hæres. cap. lv. p. 182,) assumed flesh without a soul; or, as Cassian words it, (De Incarn. Christ. lib. i. p. 1241,) that he had not a human soul, or a rational soul; for he allowed him a sensitive soul as in brutes, but denied him to have a reasonable one, as Vincentius Lirinensis writes (Comment. cap. xvii. p. 50), that Apollinaris affirmed that there was not in our Saviour's body a human soul, at least not such a one wherein was mind and reason; but that (Epit. Hær. Fab. lib. iv. in Hær. Apol. p. 167), instead thereof, his divinity supplied its room and place. So that, in short, the error of Apollinaris was this: that though Christ, in his becoming man, was ἐνσαρκός, that is, was incarnate, had real flesh and a substantial body; yet he was not ἐμψυχός, that is, he had no reasonable human soul, but his divinity performed all the actions and offices thereof.'*

"They who wish for farther information upon this subject would do well to consult the article 'Apollinaris,' inserted in volume the second of the 'General Dictionary,' and written with great ability by the Rev. John Peter Bernard.

"When the reader reflects on what Mr. Collier says about 'the danger of speaking in unscriptural phrases of the truths of God, and the banefulness of applying to God's word the rudiments of philosophy,' he cannot fail to observe, that Collier's

* See p. 247 of King on the Apostles' Creed.

interpretation of the text in St. John is founded upon his own philosophical distinction between existence and inexistence; is illustrated by reference to his peculiar hypothesis, that matter necessarily exists in mind; and is expressed in language which bears little resemblance to the simple unadorned phraseology of the Gospel."

We have thus displayed the theological speculations of Collier, either in his own words, or in those of an expositor on whose fidelity we rely. Should they afford but little satisfaction to the reader, it is, that the subjects of them are far above the reach of human comprehension. Not only are our minds inadequate to the task, but language itself, often but an imperfect interpreter of our thoughts, here becomes one calculated to mislead. The terms Father and Son at once suggest ideas of earthly generation, which are, of course, foreign to spiritual beings. Again, as the doctrine of the atonement is the keystone of the whole fabric of Christianity, and that can only be sustained by acknowledging the divinity of Christ, we run the risk of trenching on the unity of the Godhead: to say nothing of the third person of the Trinity. In these and many more perplexities, when considering the lofty subjects of this chapter, the wisest and the most learned have been alike involved with the meanest inquirers after divine truth. It is for us to derive, at least, a lesson of

humility from their unsuccessful labours; and, yielding ourselves up to the practical duties of religion, to live, as regards others, in the bond of peace—as respects ourselves, in righteousness of life; and then to look forward with holy awe, mitigated by a pious confidence in Christ's merits, to that time when the veil of doubt shall be removed from our eyes, and we shall be received into the mansions prepared for the just from the foundation of the world.*

* Since the preceding chapter was printed, an additional MS. of Collier, on his religious opinions, has been discovered; and which we insert in Appendix A, more as a curiosity illustrative of the writer's mysticism, than from any idea that it will enhance the fame which the "Clavis" has obtained for him in the estimation of metaphysicians.

## CHAPTER IV.

### CHURCH POLITICS, &c.

In the two preceding chapters we have briefly stated the peculiar notions of Collier as a philosopher and a divine; we here intend to glance at his opinions on some of the politico-theological questions which were agitated during the time of Collier's ministry, and in which he appears to have taken considerable interest. The debates on the bill against occasional conformity, in the early part of Queen Anne's reign, and which excited so much angry feeling throughout the nation, seem first to have engaged his pen in political controversy. We have lying before us the fragments of a MS. dated December 1705, entitled "Moderation not a Virtue; or, the Principles of all Low Churchmen reduced to a system, and confuted." As far as can be collected from these, it appears that he agreed in principle with William Higden, one of the party writers of the day, that occasional conformists should not be admitted to the sacrament until they had renounced their schism, or, in other words, their dissent from the Church of England. Collier, however, in this, and in all other matters, proceeded by a system of reasoning entirely his own. The

subject has now lost so much of its interest, that, even had we the means, we should hardly be justified in giving a lengthened detail of his argument. But we insert a single extract, to shew that, while the title of his projected work seems to promise no very scrupulous adversary, he was not deficient in candour towards the party to which he was opposed. Nearly at the opening of his treatise, he says: "As for that now very numerous body of Low Churchmen in the world, far be it from me to fix any general character upon them, which will reflect upon their morals, honesty, or sincerity, as some have lately done, since the unhappy dispute about the occasional bill, and other things, have raised such a dust amongst us; for I judge this manner to be neither charitable nor prudent. Not charitable, both because all those who charge the whole body with formal hypocrisy, trimming, double-dealing, &c. assume the judgment of men's hearts, which does not belong to them; and also, because it is too apparent to be denied (at least openly by any man or body of men who are not altogether blameless themselves), that there are many, even very many, of that name, and who also profess it, whose lives are in every respect as regular as any of those who are distinguished by any other names.

"Neither, secondly, is this way of charging men's practices at all prudent in my judgment; and that because it is very reasonable to suppose

that the generality at least of our Low Churchmen have principles, and act according to them. But if so, then it must needs be very unsuccessful to charge them with their practice under odious names, as if they were all men who acted either without principles, or against their own rational convictions, for some base or worldly end, since 'tis impossible to persuade a man out of his own experimental knowledge of himself."

Collier had, in a manner, been born a Tory and High Churchman; but he reasoned on all matters with too much freedom, and weighed whatever doctrines came under his notice in far too nice a balance, to be a mere party man. And in after-life he required too much indulgence for his own opinions to be intolerant of those of others; so that if he began his professional career in the ranks of the High Churchmen, there was hardly one of that body who would subsequently have recognised him as a brother. Unless a few of the party, after slumbering at Oxford since the reign of Queen Anne, have lately awakened from their miraculous sleep in that illustrious University, the features of the Tory High Churchman of the early part of the last century are so completely lost, that, to render some of our subsequent remarks intelligible, it will be necessary to describe the two parties into which the Church of England was then unfortunately divided.

An hereditary, indefeasible right of the monarchs

of England to reign over these realms, and, consequently, a passive obedience due from their subjects, comprised the substance of the High Churchmen's political creed. In ecclesiastical matters they claimed an authority conferred by Christ on the apostles, and regularly transmitted to the clergy, and of which they could not be divested by any lay deprivation. Indeed, the importance they attached to the questioned validity of Archbishop Parker's ordination in the reign of Elizabeth, sufficiently evinced their desire to possess the powers, as well as the dignities, of their Roman Catholic predecessors. Besides this, they were greatly intolerant of all who, in however trifling a degree, erred from their path of orthodoxy. These opinions led them to countenance, if not to espouse, the cause of the exiled Stuarts, as well as to deprecate the Revolution and the Act of Settlement; and if they did not openly avow the doctrines of the Church of Rome, their principles rendered them obnoxious to the same arguments as had formerly been urged by the early Reformers against the unyielding claims of the Vatican. It may also be added, that the High Churchmen neither affected a decorum of dress nor of language; and an oath from the mouth of one of them was considered to be a proof of the speaker's freedom from sectarian preciseness, rather than as attesting an impious or even a vulgar character. "An honest parson," says a contemporaneous pamphlet, alluding to a High Churchman,

" was one who would be company, give his parishioners a short sermon in the morning, and after prayers in the afternoon go and take his bottle freely, and be merry amongst 'em."

The Low Churchmen, on the other hand, were friendly to the principles which placed the Prince of Orange on the throne; looking upon the monarchy as a trust for the benefit of the nation, rather than a property; valuing the rule of hereditary descent only so far as it was conducive to good government, and therefore fairly to be departed from, at least in extreme cases. As regarded the Church, they neither claimed for themselves, nor pretended to value the notion of, an uninterrupted succession of the priesthood. They did not think it consistent with the Christian scheme, that the salvation of mankind should depend, not on a faith and practice in accordance with the Gospel, but on a nice question of Church authority, resting on a pedigree open to endless objections. Again, the Low Churchmen, while they were tolerant of the opinions of their dissenting brethren, adopted occasionally their practice of extemporaneous prayer; were more scrupulous in their dress and language than their opponents; and indeed equalled the Dissenters themselves in an abhorrence of the papal see. To those who have not dipped into the pamphlets of the time, it is difficult to conceive the violence, as well as acrimony, of party-spirit which raged—not, as of old, between Chris-

tian and Infidel, or, in more recent times, between Protestant and Papist, or Churchman and Dissenter —but between clergymen of the same common creed, and who had subscribed the same articles.

At length the contest arrived at its crisis. Dr. Sacheverell, who maintained the High Church opinions to the very extreme of their absurdity, was deemed worthy of a state prosecution; and thus a weak, vain-glorious Churchman was raised to the height of popularity, and a strange fanaticism ensued in favour of doctrines which tended to the servitude and debasement of the very persons who adopted them. That Collier was no inactive spectator of these transactions, his MS. remains sufficiently attest. It would be a tedious and unprofitable task to enter into a detailed account of his opinions on the Sacheverell controversy. On the other hand, we might be accused of neglect, did we not notice the mass of papers before us, at least in a general way, so as to convey to the reader a notion of the part which Collier took in the contest. It was his opinion that, on Christian principles, all men were obliged to submit to the higher powers for the time being; and who those higher powers were, was a mere question of fact; and that Christians had nothing whatever to do with the title of the gubernant authority. This opinion he collected from the New Testament, and more particularly from the often-cited 1st verse of the 13th chapter of St. Paul's epistle to the Ro-

mans, "Let all men," &c.—a text on which he published a sermon hitherto sought for in vain.

It is surprising how much time and labour he seems to have expended on this subject, generally approving the conclusions of Higden, although seldom satisfied with his mode of arriving at them. We should add, however, that while, on Christian principles, he was an uncompromising advocate of obedience, he yet strenuously opposed the patriarchal scheme, and indeed the other systems by which the High Churchmen covertly advocated the claims of the exiled Stuarts. Out of the remains of an elaborate discussion on the duties of subjects to their rulers, perhaps the following quotation presents the best abstract of his views.

"God wills that I should be subject to the regnant power over me.

"This or that person is the regnant power.

"*Ergo*, God wills that I should be subject to this or that person."

And he adds,—"Here the major is the ground and reason of the conclusion; the minor is uncertain and variable, and, at best, but a matter of fact, and is not therefore capable of being a law or rule to found an obligation on. The reason of my observing this is, first, lest any one should from hence judge that mere possession can give a right to government; secondly, to oppose a vulgar error, as if the sole or chief ground of the

subject's obedience was some inherent, proper, and antecedent right in the governor to command."

Such were Collier's notions, elicited by the trial of Dr. Sacheverell.

On the Trinitarian contest, which next followed, we have already remarked; but this had hardly subsided before the Church was involved in a fresh dispute, commonly known as the Bangorian controversy. Dr. Benjamin Hoadly, Bishop of Bangor, preached in the Chapel Royal at St. James's, the 31st of March, 1717, on the 36th verse of the 18th chapter of St. John's Gospel, "Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world." Hence arose one of the warmest debates that ever disturbed the Anglican Church; and Collier here, as in former cases, undertook to act the moderator between the disputants. Bearing in view the doctrines of Hoadly on Church authority, contained in his celebrated Sermon and other writings, as well as the arguments employed by Dr. Snape in answer, Collier first critically examined the text in the original; whence he concluded that the passage referred rather to the title of Christ's kingdom than to its powers; and that the bishop had been misled by adopting the popular use of the word "of," which, by the fluctuation of the English language, had nearly lost the sense of "from," a particle more accurately expressing the Evangelist's meaning. He next drew a distinction between what he called the

primary and secondary laws of Christ. Among the former he considered the declarations made by Christ, and the inspired penmen, contained in the New Testament, and which, in their own nature, relate to the favour of God, and eternal salvation. These, he maintained, were neither to be diminished nor increased by any authority; for which he cited various texts of Scripture, at the same time stating that, in his opinion, the Church of Rome, by their unwritten traditions, had added to the primary laws of Christ, and by their councils had even gone so far as to set several aside, and substitute others in their place. He, however, considered it to be one of the primary laws to obey Church governors, relying on the 17th verse of the 13th chapter of the epistle to the Hebrews; observing, that this text did not relate to civil governors, since it was evident, from the persecutions subsisting at the time it was written, and long afterwards, that the passage could only apply to ecclesiastical authority. But while he recognised the authority of the Church, he asserted that it extended only to subordinate or secondary laws, in accordance with the preceding distinction; since the primary ones had been expressly determined by Christ, and our obedience was pre-engaged. After a short analysis of human actions, he explained the secondary laws to mean those in themselves indifferent, but rendered of consequence from being enjoined by a competent

ecclesiastical authority: and he instanced regulations for the greater order and decency of God's worship, and the better edification of the worshippers. Having proceeded thus far, he argued with the greatest ingenuity that there is nothing in its own nature so indifferent but what may become matter of conscience; adding, in opposition to Hoadly, "we ought to be very cautious how we so far limit the authority of the Christian governor, as to say that he can make no law in what pertains to conscience and eternal salvation."

During the progress of the Bangorian controversy, much stress was laid by the Low Churchmen on the sincerity of the Dissenters, even allowing them to be in error. On this point both Collier and his brother William, judging by their MS. remains, appear to have written very largely; and I here refer to their papers indiscriminately, for they seem to have followed the same process of reasoning, and to have arrived at the same conclusions. After analysing the terms "error" and "sincerity," one of the fragments proceeds thus: "The question, therefore, is this, Whether it be sufficient for a Christian, in order to fulfil the conditions of the Gospel covenant, and by virtue thereof to be accepted with God, to be governed only by the persuasion of his own mind—that is, to follow the apparent rule only—when it happens that the points he is persuaded of have no real

ground in the word of God? To say it is sufficient, is to set a belief of divine truths, and a disbelief of them, upon the same footing; and provided a practice equally sincere follow upon either the belief or the disbelief, each party is equally entitled to the rewards of the Divine favour. Whereas it appears evident to natural reason, that the condition of the true believer differs from that of the erroneous believer; the former is conformable to the will of God, the latter is dissonant from it; and consequently that the acceptance of the former with God must be founded on quite different and much nobler grounds than the acceptance of the latter." After much more to the same purpose, the MS. goes on: "To say, therefore, that a sincere non-belief of Christ's truths is equal, in respect to the favour of God, with a sincere belief of them, is to set our receiving or not receiving Christ on the same basis. The consequence whereof would be, to make the whole tenour of his Gospel, by which we are continually commanded to hold fast the truth and the true faith, of no effect."

At the very outset of the controversy, Collier wrote, it appears, a letter to the Bishop of Bangor on the subject of it, and two years after published a Sermon on the points in dispute; but which we have hitherto sought in vain. The letter, which seems to have accompanied a copy of his Sermon sent to the bishop, we insert.

My Lord, *July 11th*, 1719.

The following Sermon, being the same in substance with the letter which I made bold to trouble your lordship with about two years ago (and which was not ill received, as I have been more than once informed by a verbal message from your lordship), seems, of course, to fall under your lordship's patronage, or more immediate consideration. I will not pretend to guess at the reason why I have not yet had the honour of an answer from your lordship; with regard to the point I am in both concerned for, it shall suffice that, by the publication and success of this, it will easily be known to all whether it can be answered or not.

For my own part, I am not conscious of having any thing at heart in this matter, but what I take to be the truth; neither would this affect me very much, if it seemed only to regard the circumstantials of religion, or only some speculative point of what we call divinity.

But, as I take it, this is not the case; neither, I suppose, will it so appear to your lordship, whenever you shall be at the trouble of pursuing the present difference between us into any number of its consequences. To this end I can do no more than honestly profess and promise, that I will appear before your Lordship, or any other honest and fair disputant, naked-breasted and unarmed, neither falsifying in hopes of favour, nor concealing my real

sentiments for fear of the displeasure of any power upon earth. And this, my lord, if we would but all resolve the same, would soon put an end, not only to the present controversy, but to all the differences and divisions that are amongst us.

Nay, to give your lordship a little proof of my sincerity beforehand, I mean of what I may be supposed to own to your lordship or any other, rather than deny the truth, I will here voluntarily give it in as my opinion, that if but one side or party only would come into the resolution of arguing only in this manner, or had done so in times past, we should not at this time have known any such things as sides or parties amongst us. For there is a power in truth and right reasoning which is not to be resisted; and this observation has so often proved itself to me, by consideration of the particular controversies which have been amongst Christians, that whenever I see a dispute carried on without success, I conclude, of course, that both parties are in the wrong.

And this I freely own to be my opinion with regard to the present controversy, as I have more than intimated in the following discourse; and here, by your lordship's leave, I will make a short repetition of the case.

The first false step, by common consent or inadvertency, was a false reading or understanding of our Saviour's words to Pilate: "My kingdom is not of this world." Here the particle

*of* came in place of *from*, which was but a light error of itself, because *of* signifies *from*. But the article *from* soon lost its place for good, by being in partnership with a new idea; and so the first and most proper sense of the word *of*, which is *concerning* or *belonging to*, was easily received as sole proprietor of the text. Now, then, it runs thus: "My kingdom is not concerning or appertaining to any worldly matter; that is, the business of my kingdom or dominion over men does not relate to any thing in or of this world, but only to things spiritual and eternal."

And now who, after this, can wonder that the kingdom of Christ is become altogether spiritual? And what should hinder us, after this, from saying that a spiritual kingdom must consist of spiritual subjects, and therefore that by the kingdom of Christ in this place, Christ must mean his Church; and consequently in that our Saviour said his kingdom is not of this world, he must be supposed to mean, that the subjects of his kingdom or his Church are not the outward persons, but the souls of men?

Now, thus far, or very near, we have gone by general consent; and I think I have shewn in the following discourse, that, having gone thus far, we are bound to follow your lordship in all the consequences which you deduce from hence.

But this is thought by some to be beyond the line; and at the same time your lordship thinks

you have just reason to complain, that those who appear your friends in principle are yet your adversaries in the genuine consequences which are implied in them. But here I freely own, and even contend, that you complain with just reason.

But what is all this to the resolution or decision of this unhappy controversy?

Your lordship will probably say, what should hinder this good effect, if men would but be content to abide by their own principles, or not disown the consequences which are plainly implied in them? But then, on the other hand, how obvious is it to reply, that these consequences must needs be false, as being directly contrary to several of the plainest texts in the word of God, which you do not pretend to answer or disown.

Here, then, is error on both sides, though of different sorts, which places the controversy at an eternal bay, which can never be removed or transcended whilst it is managed in this manner. This, perhaps, may serve the ends of some who have never yet been losers by the divisions amongst Christians. But, as I willingly believe and hope much better things of your lordship, and many others, of your lordship's system, I would fain persuade myself that the attempt which I have made (however managed or mistaken), in the following Sermon, to rid the controversy of this perplexity, by proceeding in a different manner from any other, will appear to your lordship to be of some con-

siderable moment—at least worthy to be refuted. If not, I have known the time more than once before, wherein the Truth has not chosen to dwell with the many, nor yet with the great; which, till I am otherwise convinced, will be no manner of hinderance to whatever satisfaction I may be inclined to take from believing that the great and many of the present age are not much more in her favour than they have been in former times.

But I check myself in this reflection, which, indeed, ought not to be comfortable till we have no other to fly to; and so resuming my former hope of seeing the merits of this cause debated (and I have told your lordship already on what grounds I expect success), I shall only assure you that I am, with all respect,

Your lordship's
most obedient humble servant.

We insert the following letter, on the Bangorian controversy, addressed to Mist's Journal, because it seems to imply a personal conference between Collier and Bishop Hoadly, and affords a specimen of his casuistry.

*Κρῆτες ἀεὶ ψεῦσται.*

MR. MIST,

When I review in my mind the new system of religion now of late distinguished by the name of Bangorian, it appears to me not unlike the huge Colossus of old, which, as I remember, stood sentinel before the haven of Rhodes, but yet

was wide enough to admit a ship of the largest size to sail between the legs of it. But 'tis no business of mine at present to pursue this comparison. All I mean to observe is, that as that mighty monster was supported by *two* pillars, which I just now called its *legs*, so the system I am speaking of (which, probably, in *another* age had been the greater monster of the two) seems to stand entirely on the *same* number of *principles;* which therefore I would beg leave to call by the same *name.*

One of those feet or legs (which only for my humour's sake I would call the *right*) is the late celebrated text of Scripture, John, xviii. 36: *Jesus answered, My kingdom is not of this world;* from which, and which alone (there being no other text in the whole Bible that, with any pretence, can be urged to the same purpose), it is inferred, with great ease, and almost general satisfaction, that the kingdom of Christ, which is his Church, is not *visible* but *spiritual,* and, consequently, the Lord knows what; which shall serve at present instead of an enumeration of the innumerable particulars which have been of late deduced from this fruitful principle.

The other, which, for no better reason than before, I call the *left* leg or foot of this huge Colossus, is the notion of *sincerity in error,* which is made to bear a mighty weight in the frame of this stupendous system; but which seems to be founded not at all on *Scripture,* but only on *reason,* or in the

nature of the thing, as we usually speak; and herein is rather appealed to as a point of common consent, than as a thing capable of being *proved* by any thing more evident than itself.

Now, you must know, Mr. Mist, that the spring now coming on, or for some other such weighty reason, I have a mighty mind, for one, to try my strength with this unwieldy giant, desiring only a clear stage of you, and no favour of the spectators.

And here the method I design to take is, to cut it off at the *legs*, by shewing every indifferent person that they are but *sham* supporters! And, consequently, you know that the whole frame or body which stands built on those supports, can be of no better make or metal than the legs it stands upon. And here—

The *first* blow I shall make will be at the *left*, either because it stands next at hand, or for what other reason you please. And the word of battle is *negatur*, which, for the benefit of my English reader, I translate thus: I deny that there is any such thing in being as sincerity in *error;* it is a *complex* term, and *may be* a contradiction; and I suppose it were no difficult point to prove that it is so. But that is no business of mine at present: all I say is *negatur*. I deny your *supposition:* prove it if you can, &c. But perhaps your reader would be better pleased to see the tale or history of this way of reasoning, which, therefore, he may take as follows, and depend on for certain truth.

About three or four years ago (not to recur to my diary for the very year and day), I had the honour to converse on this subject with a person too eminent on the stage of life to be mentioned without great respect, and therefore shall not be named at all. His lordship, after saying many eloquent and handsome things in exaltation of sincerity (meaning still, by a side wind, the sincerity I am speaking of), was pleased at last to utter this strong conclusion, *That Almighty God is obliged to reward sincerity wherever he finds it.* "How," said I, "my lord, sincerity in *error?*"

*Lord.* Yes, I say, in *error.*

"I suppose," said I, "my lord, you mean no more than this, that the goodness of God is such, that we may reasonably hope, &c." Here I was taken off short, and told, "that is not the foot I put it on; but what I say is this, that God is obliged in justice to reward sincerity wheresoever he finds it."

*Ans.* And does your lordship still mean *sincerity in error?*

*Lord.* Yes, I say, in *error.*

*Ans.* Why, then, my lord, you force me to say, what before I did not think so necessary—I deny your supposition. There is no such thing as sincerity in *error.*

*Lord.* How? you may as well deny that the sun shines at noon-day; and one as *singularly* as the other.

*Ans.* That, my lord, may be; but still I stand my ground, and deny your lordship's supposition.

*Lord.* Did you ever see such a man? (speaking to another present.) But what have you to urge against my supposition?

*Ans.* Nothing, my lord, at all; only that I don't like it, because of its *consequences.* But I humbly conceive your lordship will take it as your proper business to make good or prove your *own* supposition; at least a supposition of this *cardinal* or *fundamental* nature, which is given us as one corner-stone of so vast a fabric of religion as is now-a-days made to stand upon it.

*Lord.* But let me hear what you have to say in exception to the ground I go upon; for, perhaps, we may be found to differ only in terms at last.

*Ans.* That may possibly be, my lord; but that will only prove to the peril of those who build doctrines of religion on mistaken terms; *i. e.* realities upon nothing. But I will tell your lordship, in few words, what it is I mean, and also what I do not mean; and then I hope you will agree with me, that there is no such thing as sincerity in *error.* By error, in the first place, I do not mean *ignorance,* which is a mere harmless negative, but some positive act of the mind or judgment; and here I guess we are agreed. And now, if your lordship will be but pleased to tell me what you mean by *sincerity,* we shall soon see whether it can consist with *error* or not.

*Lord.* But you said you would tell me what it is you mean by denying that they can consist?

*Ans.* I have told your lordship this already, in explaining the word *error;* that is, in other words, my denial comes to this, that no man can be called sincere, or is so really in the sight of God, who judges without evidence, for he may suspend his assent or judgment; and if he has sufficient evidence, he is not then in error, and so is out of our supposition.

*Lord.* By this rule you are obliged to call every one an *hypocrite* who differs from you in opinion, which ill becomes the charity of a Christian.

*Ans.* By this rule, my lord, I think I justify the truth of God, though by reason of its being *straight* (as every rule should be) it may happen to shew the crookedness and perverseness of man. But there seems to be no necessity of calling names in this case, for many reasons I could name, but especially if we were but every one mindful of our own lusts and passions, prejudices and such like; and so might hold our *charity* without the loss of our *faith.*

*Lord.* Well, you are a strange man at holding novelties. But let us call another subject.

They were amazed, they answered no more, they left off speaking. Job, xxxii. 15.

*Whose mouths must be stopped.*

MR. MIST,

Having so well disabled my gigantic adversary in his *left supporter*, I come now to begin my assault on his *right*. But you'll say, what can be done with a text of Scripture, but to receive and believe it? I answer, this, I own, is my disposition; but when I meet with a text of Scripture which is made to speak things utterly *inconsistent* with all the rest of the Bible, I will be sure to *examine* that text to the bottom. For as all men are not sincere even in holding the *truth*, and therefore much less in *error*, I may possibly find the text in dispute to be many ways *corrupted*, or perhaps *wrong* translated; and then my bare *negatur* will come in as properly and as successfully *here* as it did in the *former case*.

But, not to detain the reader with all the flourishes I could shew him, I come immediately to the point, and say, as before, *negatur suppositio;* there is no such text of Scripture, or, Jesus never answered, *My kingdom is not of this world.*

The words in the original are precisely these—ἡ βασιλεία ἡ ἐμὴ οὐκ ἔστιν ἘΚ τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, "My kingdom is not *from* this world;" and therefore, if *from* this text you have a mind to prove it to be *spiritual*, those are the words you must prove it from, and not those you have been used to build on.

And now, why halt ye between two opinions? If *this* be the word of God, follow *it*. But if the *other*, then follow *it*. And here I expect, as in the case of old, to be answered only with the profoundest silence.

But what can possibly be answered to the evidence of this assertion? Will any one pretend to say, that the kingdom of Christ may as well be proved to be spiritual from the text as *I have given* it, as from the *usual* version? If so, let him try the force of his *logic*, and he shall fairly be allowed to try it at the peril of my confusion upon his success; if, on the other hand, he will be content to be ashamed but a very *little* if he finds the work to be impossible.

Or, has he courage enough to *give up* this text, and pretend that there are *other* passages of Scripture which suffice to prove that Christ's kingdom is spiritual? If so, let him *name* that text which he now takes to be for his purpose, and he shall call me his disciple, or whatever else he pleases, if he does not fail in the attempt.

In the meantime, if the kingdom of Christ be *therefore* spiritual because it is from heaven, or is not from this world, then was also the kingdom of *David* as much spiritual, for the same reason. But as, on the other hand, the kingdom of Christ is expressly said in Scripture to be the same with the throne or kingdom of *David*, if *David's* king-

dom was *not* spiritual, we may safely infer that neither is *Christ's* kingdom spiritual.

Let *kingdom*, therefore, stand for what an adversary pleases, yet still he must be obliged to make sense at least of what our Saviour saith of it, and not change his words to make room for his own private meaning. And if he does but this, he will find that, however in a second sense the word may stand for his *Church*, yet its *first* and *principal* meaning will be the same as if our Lord had said, My *authority*, or *right of sovereignty*, is not from this world. And this I freely give up, to be made the most of by the party.

Thus, how are the mighty fallen! fallen wounded in their strength, not very much unlike the fate of the mighty *behemoth* in the wilderness, who runs mad and dies with the scrabbling of a little *mouse*, which happened to come by by chance, or perhaps in sport was taken up into his trunk.

And now, Mr. Mist, to return to my *first* similitude. If the huge Colossus, whose legs I have here so plainly cut off, should yet be found to stand so erect and formidable as ever, either as being held up under the chin by the hand of him who is called the *strong man* in the Gospel, or as supported in its seat or fundament by a certain *scarlet-coloured beast*, which serves him as his palfrey; or whether, by reason of his own natural levity, he be not sustained by the *many waters* he stands in; or,

lastly, be the cause what it will, yet I am sure you will bear witness with me, that the *man* who will neither *argue* nor *answer,* who will neither be *convinced* by reason nor give his *own* reason for his *refusal,* has no manner of ground whereon to boast of his *sincerity;* and yet even such a one I will not call an hypocrite.

And so, like an humble snail, I voluntarily withdraw my poor harmless horns, and shut myself up till the storms be overpassed, which I seem at present to foresee.

Your most obedient
humble servant and subscriber,
PHILOLOGICUS.

That Collier was satisfied of the apostolical authority of the Church of England, and the validity of her ordinations, there is no doubt; but what were the precise grounds of his opinion, we have been hitherto unable to find. It is clear, however, that he did not consider her defection from the papal see as schism, any more than a person may be said to separate from a stream, which had become muddy and impure, who only seeks to quench his thirst higher up in its course, where the water bursts from its parent rock in all the brightness of crystalline purity. Again, he objected to the term national Church, as derogating from her catholic authority; besides that it was a term unauthorised by Scripture language. But, unlike most controversialists, he was not contented if persons came

to his conclusion, unless they pursued the same course of reasoning; indeed, he seems to have preferred an adversary to an illogical supporter. This will appear from the following ingenious letter to the Père Le Courayer, on that writer's "Dissertation sur la Validité des Ordinations Anglicanes," and with which we gladly terminate our sketch of Collier's Church politics.

*Fas est et ab hoste doceri.*

REVEREND SIR,

After you have reflected, how *you* must needs have surprised us of the Church of England, by your publishing a defence of *our* ordinations, you will be less surprised yourself, on the receipt and reading of *this*, which is designed to tell you, in short, and without farther ceremony, how the reading of yours affected me. I no sooner surveyed the *title* of it, but my imagination transported me to Rome, and made me *head of your Church.* On the instant of this, my zeal apostolic began to flutter about my heart, which gave birth to this soliloquy. "How is this?" said I; "can a member of the Roman Church, with his name at length in the title-page, write a book in defence of the English ordinations? But doubtless he is gone off, and is no longer one of us."

Here I rested for a time, till *curiosity* led me to the fourth page of your Preface, where, after quoting St. Austin's saying, *there is never a just*

*reason to break union,* you declare in open words, that the Church of England is guilty of *schism* in separating from the Church of Rome. "How," said I again, "can this author possibly hold, that the Church of England is guilty of schism in separating from the Church, *i. e.* the Pope of Rome, and yet defend, at the same time, the validity of their *ordinations,* and consequently of all their sacraments? What, I wonder, are the things he calls *essentials* of ordination?"

Here I was at a stand again, till I came to your sixth chapter, where I found, that your essentials were only these *two,*—imposition of hands, and prayer. "How!" said I again to myself, "is there *nothing* essential to ordination *besides* these?" Then, any man may ordain, who has but a *tongue* and a pair of *hands.* Is the faith of Father Courayer dwindled at last to *this?* At this rate, we may expect to hear of *receipts to make a bishop!* But how is this *consistent* with his *former* tenet, that the English Church is guilty of schism in separating from the Church or *authority* of Rome? For what makes the Church of Rome to be *what it is,* or *pretends* to be, but the divinity of its *authority* to administer sacraments, of which *ordination* is *confessedly* one? And can that ordination be a Christian sacrament which is not performed by divine *authority?* And will Father Courayer pretend to say, that *such* ordinations as these are *valid,* and have *all the essentials* belonging to that

sacrament? Either, therefore, this author is an *English schismatic in disguise,* or he must own that the *authority of the administrator,* or *consecrator,* is the *first essential* in ordinations. And can he say, *after* this, that the *English* ordinations are *not* destitute of this essential? If he takes this for *granted,* as he seems to do, by only offering to prove that those who consecrated Parker had *themselves* been consecrated by the ordinal of the *Church of Rome,* he takes for granted, or forgets, the *main point* in question. For what is it to *us of Rome,* by *what* ordinal or authority *they* were consecrated bishops, who joined with Henry VIII. in his *rebellion* against the Church of Rome? Can *that* authority *subsist,* or be held as *valid,* after they have *renounced* it, and *submitted to another?* or, if this was possible, can it yet be acknowledged by a *member of the Church of Rome,* after they have been formally *deposed* and *excommunicated? "Offer it now to thy governor,"* saith God in Scripture. Let Father Courayer go to the court of France, and ask the *king* this question, "Whether a general of his army, or any other civil officer, who should renounce his commission, and take another from his enemy, does not, *ipso facto,* make his commission void?" And if this is not enough, let him put the case of an *attainder* upon his person; and he will easily perceive that *schism* in the *Church* is exactly answerable to *rebellion* in the *State.* Will the author, to evade this, say, that the sacraments

of the Church, or ordination in particular, is not an act or commission of *authority*, but of the nature of a *charm*? Why, truly, he may as well *say* this in open words, as *mean* it in all he says. For what *else* is the notion of an *indelible character*, —according to the vulgar *proverb, once a bishop, and always a bishop*,—which is the ground and foundation of all his book? which, if it means any thing at all besides an empty *name*,—as when we say, once a *captain*, and always a captain,—is *not otherwise* to be accounted for than on the foot of a *charm*. But, however, let him not *suppose*, but at least endeavour to *prove* this; and, should he happen to succeed, we of the Church of Rome are not quite undone yet; for even the heretics won't deny but *our pontifical* may challenge a right of passing for a *better charm* than any ordinal *they* have placed in the room of it.

In *fine*, can Father Courayer be so *ignorant* of what passes in the Christian world, and particularly in England, as to think *this* a proper season to publish *such* a book as his? Has he never heard of the prevailing doctrine of *sincerity in error*, which is now become almost the *universal* doctrine of the Protestants, and is their *last retreat* to avoid the batteries of the Church of Rome? And is *this*, I say, a time to *grant*, much less to attempt to *prove*, that their sacraments are *really* valid, whether they or their forefathers were *sincere* or *not*—that is, to grant them the privilege of *truth*, (wherein

we cannot deny them the *other* privilege of *sincerity,*) when they *themselves* were reduced so *low* as to be contented to take up with sincerity in *error?* In a word, should the opinion prevail in France, and other Catholic countries, that Father Courayer's *book* contains a proper method to reunite the Protestants, or the Church of England in particular, to the Church of Rome, I declare I will be Pope no longer. So, adieu, *Father Peter Francis Le Courayer, Canon Regular, and Librarian of St. Geneviève at Paris.*

P.S.—When you answer this paper, or before you throw it into the fire, (for I don't much presume you will *retract* your book,) pray let the world know, or at least ask yourself the question, what it is you *mean* by a *national* Church; and whether you find any such *name* or *thing* in the *New Testament.* You would do well also to inform us here in England, or satisfy yourself at least, why the same defence which you have made of the power of the Church of England, considered as a national Church, is not *as* good in *our* mouths to *justify her separation,* or acquit her *wholly* of *schism,* as it is in *yours* to make her sacraments valid.

Although these matters have now lost much of their interest, we could not venture to omit what appears to have so deeply engaged Collier's

attention. Indeed, such a course would have been the means of suppressing a part of his intellectual character. Besides, if the subject of a contest does not much engage us, one may be at least gratified by contemplating the athletic vigour and versatile skill of the combatants. And, injurious as the disputes before noticed must have been to the welfare of the Church of England, if not to the cause of Christianity itself, still the hostile pamphlets and tracts that have survived the times in which they were written, display, in the strongest light, the erudition of the churchmen, as well as their earnestness in the cause of religion; facts which would have been little known, had they contented themselves with silently enjoying their tithes, and advancing their families.

The preceding letters we have classed according to the subjects to which they respectively relate; there are, however, a few others, which we could not before conveniently introduce, but which perhaps are not unworthy of being preserved.

On Collier's moderation as a controversialist we have already remarked; it was repugnant to his nature to deal in personalities, and he could not endure it in others, even when applied to those who were of an opposite party to his own. His opinion of the proper language for anonymous criticism, not only where an episcopal adversary is concerned, but generally, may be collected from

the following letter, which he sent unsigned to Mr. Sewell, the historian of the Quakers, in consequence of that writer's three letters to Bishop Burnet.

SIR,

This comes to tell you, that there is one person in the world who reads your most ingenious writings (if the late letters to the Bishop of Sarum are yours) with great pleasure and some pain. He approves of your cause, admires your reasoning, and is much pleased with your wit: but there is an air of contempt shed throughout these writings, which he thinks might well be spared towards so great, and learned, and reverend an adversary. On this score he wishes that you had chosen any other form besides that of an epistle inscribed directly to himself, as believing that, in any other, even those passages which now savour of the greatest contempt would have lost much of their offence: but yet he believes not all,—for there is a generous, grave, and compassionate manner of expressing contempt; and there are several manners somewhat different from this. Doubtless you have read your brother Gregory Misosarum: I hate his unchristian surname, but I am much mistaken if he is not at least ten years older than you. I guess this from his manner of treating the same person. Sir, you are as wise, if I may judge, as

he; you are desired to be as old, also, against the next time you appear in print: to which end, perhaps, the following queries may be of use.

1. Whether the gratifying a party, how great and honest soever as to the main, be a rule at all to be observed, in treating a person whom we own to be a bishop of the Church of Christ?

2. Whether (if to write at all against such a one be not of itself a crime within the law) an author without a name may fairly take advantage from his obscurity, to say any thing which he would not say were his name prefixed?

3. Whether, in writing against a person, it be not indecent to offer any thing which would not be decent (were you admitted to speak) to say by word of mouth against the same person, in the presence of his peers; as, supposing you were called to make your answer in the House of Lords to the pamphlets you have written against?

Lastly. Whether, in writing both against and to a person, as you have done, it be not indecent to offer any thing which would not be decent to offer (were you so admitted) to the same person by word of mouth; as, supposing my Lord of Sarum should be desirous or content to hear from you, in his own hall or chapel, whatever you had to object against his books?

I will add no more, but to assure you, as far as my word will go with you, that these are not the sly wounds of a Whig, but the most tender admoni-

tions of a friend—one that will be your friend, however this may succeed; though he cannot, for certain innocent and honest reasons, so far prevail with himself as to aspire to be known to correspond with the ingenious Mr. Sewell.

*March* 17, 171$\frac{3}{4}$.

Amongst Collier's MSS. there is no trace of his having made any proficiency in mathematical studies, nor even that the mathematics formed a part of his education. The following ingenious letter, however, in answer to a scriptural objection then often urged against the Copernican and Newtonian systems of the world, shews that he was not indifferent to the progress of natural philosophy.*

* Sir David Brewster, in his Life of Sir Isaac Newton, has endeavoured to vindicate Cambridge from the charge of tardily adopting the Newtonian philosophy, in comparison with the Scottish universities; but I think without success. That it was taught there by Newton himself, as Lucasian professor of mathematics, even prior to the publication of his immortal work, and uninterruptedly afterwards by his successor in the Lucasian chair, there is no reasonable doubt; and Sir David, not being himself a Cambridge man, has deemed that circumstance as conclusive of the point in dispute; whereas neither then, nor subsequently, did the Lucasian lectures ever form a part of an undergraduate's necessary studies, any more than lectures on botany, mineralogy, &c. The question is, what the college tutors taught. They appear to have stuck to Descartes, as expounded by Rohault, at least till 1742,—so I understand Bishop Hoadly to say, in his edition of Clarke's Life of that date. It is unusual for a Scottish writer to disclaim a title to respect which really seems to belong

## TO DR. CLARKE,

*Rector of St. James's, London.*

SIR,

Though it is not, I confess, for any great encouragement that I can boast of from you, that I now venture to break silence with you, yet I fondly hope that this second essay may prove more agreeable to your judgment or leisure than the former. I confess, also, that to write with some degree of assurance, especially to a superior, is not the received, nor at all a probable method of gaining the favour or benevolence of the reader; and this I suppose was the chief impediment which stood formerly in my way, and withheld from me the benefit of a most valuable correspondence.

But whether it be because I have seen my error, or only changed my subject, I cannot choose but hope that both the matter and manner of this present paper will prove somewhat more agreeable to you. The matter, though of no great importance, especially in my system of things, is as follows:—

'Tis an usual objection against the Copernican system of the heavens, that it is contrary to the words of Scripture, particularly to Joshua, x. 12, 13:

to his own universities, for having first generally adopted the Newtonian philosophy; and feeling, as I do, an affectionate regard for Cambridge, and for Newton's college in particular, I regret exceedingly that I cannot arrive at Sir David Brewster's conclusion.

" Sun, stand thou still," and " the sun stood still," &c.

But now, besides the usual answers that have been made to this argument, this, methinks, has something in it,—that it is said in the same place, that the moon also stayed her course.

Now, here I suppose or beg that the motion of the moon may possibly be the natural or immediate effect of the motion of the earth, supposing that the earth does move; and consequently that the cessation of the moon's motion is the natural effect or consequence of the cessation of the earth's.

But I think I need not beg this, on the other hand, that the motion of the sun, supposing that it does move, cannot be any natural cause of the motion of the moon; and therefore, that the cessation of the moon's motion cannot be the effect or consequence of the cessation of the sun's. Now, light, we all know, and nothing else, was that which Joshua wanted; but I do not see how it contributed at all to this end for the moon to stand still, together with the sun. If not, yet we know for certain that the moon did actually stand still, or stay its course at this time; and therefore we must either say, that this phenomenon was the effect of the cessation of the earth's motion,—which is thus the whole question gained on the side of the Copernicans,—or that God in this did something unnecessary, or to no purpose, which is the greatest absurdity.

Perhaps, sir, I need not inform you, after this, that I am no great astronomer. However, in my present mood of thinking, I am strangely apt to fancy that there is some solidity in this argument. Whether there be any or no, or whether this manner of arguing has at any time been used before, I leave for you, sir, to determine for me; and it is because I think I am now writing to the best philosopher of the age, that I have singled you out to bear the trouble of these inquiries.

And now, sir, I would beg leave to remember to you, that I have had the honour of one or two verbal messages from you since I thought I had been forgotten by you, wherein you condescended so far as to say that my hypothesis, with regard to the Arian system (as it is called at present), would not be unwelcome to you. If, therefore, after the shortest answer possible to the two inquiries of my present paper, you will be pleased to assure me that I shall not write in vain on that other subject, which is of so much greater importance, I shall think myself highly honoured to be admitted thus to subscribe myself,

Sir,

Your most faithful and obedient humble servant,

A. COLLIER.

*Feb.* 18, 1718.

The following letter, on Steele's popular play of the "Conscious Lovers," we insert because it is

the only example of dramatic criticism which exists amongst Collier's papers.

MR. MIST, *Feb*, 14, 1722.

Observing your impartiality in publishing a letter last week from one of your country subscribers in *favour* of the late famous comedy, I am encouraged to desire to appear in print on the same subject, by giving you a detail of *all* that I have to say *against* it.

And, first, I must tell you for news, that the said play takes mightily in these parts; but particularly, as good luck will have it, amongst the virtuous and sober part of mankind, and especially the clergy, neither of whom are allowed by any but themselves to be proper judges in a case of this nature. But I cannot conceal an unlucky accident herein, which I fear, with some, will add a dignity to their present judgment, and make it seem to be the effect of pure rational conviction; and that is, that there is scarce one of the aforesaid who, as well as Mr. Dennis, has not, for other reasons, a kind of personal dislike or prejudice to the author. But this difficulty, I think, is easy to be removed, by only considering that their prejudice to the author's person cannot be supposed to be so great as what is common to all men in favour of their own profession, and especially their means of livelihood, which is plainly the present case. But to set

the question about the merits of this play out of all dispute, I will here tell you, in short, after many readings, and the most impartial disquisition, what I take to be the faults of it.

And, first, I affirm that it is no play at all; which I prove thus. The author himself will not pretend it is a tragedy; and it is plain, from Mr. Dennis and all the world (except the last week's correspondent), that it cannot be a comedy, because its chief design is not to make us laugh. Ergo, &c. Q. E. D.

Secondly, I do not heartily like the title. The word Conscious, of late, has sustained so many senses, that in a short time it is like to stand for nothing. And I suppose, in this place, its sense may be expressed full as well, and therefore much better, by the word honourable.

Thirdly, I am as little pleased with the wild behaviour of Tom: he seems to be too much a rake and rattle—not, I mean, for the stage, but for the servant of such a master; and, which is the worst of this matter, it is not easily conceivable how he can be what he is, in his own way of description, (viz. by attendance at taverns and chocolate-houses,) without drawing his demure and sober master into some suspicion, at least, of keeping late and irregular hours.

Then, again, his part with Phillis seems to be too affected, light, and trifling,—at least, too long.

But there is a fault in the last act, which is by

no means to be forgiven; and at the same time so obvious, that, did not we all know the author to have been born, or at least educated, beyond the water, one would be apt to suspect that he left this blunder there on purpose to try the sagacity and temper of his opposers; and, indeed, were it not that by good fortune Mr. Dennis has actually referred us to a second part, he would be in danger of being ashamed of his quick-sightedness in overlooking it. It is in page 82, where, after the discovery of Indiana to be Old Sealand's daughter, he sends his sister Isabella to acquaint young Bevil with the joyful news, adding these words: "Tell him I have now a daughter to bestow, which he will no longer decline."

Indeed, if the old gentleman had said that he himself would now no longer decline marrying his daughter to Bevil, and left it to the next minute to discover what daughter he meant, or if he had sent the naked truth at once, he might have done either as he pleased. But 'tis evident, at first sight, that he, of almost all the persons in the play, was the least qualified to send this message, as being almost the only one in it who did not know or suspect that Bevil declined to marry his other daughter Lusinda.

This, I say, is an unpardonable fault or inconsistency on any terms but amendment; and therefore, in the name of all his English or British readers, I here demand an acknowledgment of it

in the next edition of this play. And the more to bind him to the performance of this piece of justice, I would here inform him that I have not met with one (even of those who most admire the work, and are ready to overlook or pardon all the other particulars mentioned, as slight and inconsiderable peccadillos) who is not ready to declare with me, that this last is unpardonable.

Pray insert this in your next journal, and then you will oblige another of your subscribers and constant readers,

Yours,
TERENTIUS PHILOMEIDES.

We have before said that Whiston was one of Collier's correspondents. Their epistolary acquaintance, if the expression may be allowed, commenced only about six years before Collier's death. From the remains of his letters we learn that Collier gave little credit to the apostolical constitutions, so warmly espoused by Whiston; but sought for divine truth either in the words of the authorised canon of the Scriptures, or in what, at least in his opinion, was deducible from them. He says, in his first letter to Whiston, "I don't intend to tell you that I am one of your thorough-paced disciples, though a great admirer of many things in your writings, and especially of what I call the moral spirit of your works,—I mean the freedom of the manner of your inquiry after truth." The

letters from Collier to Whiston, except that inserted below, relate to the discrepancies between St. John and the other Evangelists as to the mode of computing time,—a point since satisfactorily explained, —together with some remarks on the second book of Esdras, which Whiston conceived to be genuine.

Rev. Sir, *July 22d*, 1726.

You do me a great honour in answering mine without any inquiry: not that I have any reason to apprehend you could hear any thing to my disadvantage from any one who could pretend to know me; but because I flatter myself that you found something in my letter only which convinced you that I am one of those few inquisitive persons who do not measure truth by numbers, nor set out with this guide or maxim, that the generality of mankind are always in the right: on the contrary, I need not scruple to declare to you (as indeed I declare to all), that, as I renounced the world in my baptism, I think myself concerned to do the same still; and as I believe the Scriptures to be the word of God, I take the words of St. John, that the world lieth in wickedness, to be a proposition of some sense and meaning; and never fear that I believe too much, when I lay all my weight on that divine maxim of our Lord himself, that whatsoever is highly esteemed amongst men is an abomination in the sight of God. Those, sir, are some of my

principles of science, by the guidance of which I have particularly examined all the opinions of men that ever came in my way, and have generally found them to be just as I expected them; *i. e.* either plainly false, or grossly inconsistent, or lamentably defective: by which you may guess, that that system of my own, which I gave you a hint of in my last, does not only relate to the question you have lately been concerned in, but extends to every thing which I call religion or science. Sir, I open my heart thus freely to you, because I think I remember to have seen somewhere in your writings that you profess to be in quest after primitive Christianity; by which I suppose you do not only mean the precise truth of the point concerning the nature or perfections of the Son of God. And if herein I take you right, I will venture to add my own opinion as to this point, which is; that though I myself believe that I hold all that is revealed concerning this abstruse speculation, still I have so little opinion of the importance of it to salvation, that I cannot forbear thinking that, provided we would content ourselves to use no other but Scripture terms, it would never be inquired of us in the next world, what we meant by those terms, or indeed, whether we believed any thing by them *distinctly* or not. Hence, then, you may infer, first, that I have not laboured mightily to draw up my faith into a system in writing on this particular subject; which I mention with regard to the papers

you suppose I may have ready to send to you. Secondly, that whatever I have thought or written on this subject is founded wholly on the word of God, as interpreted by my own honest spirit (if it be as I believe it is), and not by that of any other person, whether ancient or modern, who, not pretending to any other but an honest spirit, may have ventured to express this mystery in any human words, or words different from the words of God. And this, I choose to observe to you, as not knowing whether, by the original records of Christianity, which you mention in your letter, you mean only the word of God or not. Thirdly, that I have not so good a notion as I would have of what you mean by notions and hypotheses with regard to this subject, concerning which you say you have left off all inquiry; since, according to my opinion of this matter, the very best end a man can attain to, if he will needs labour on the point, is to acquire such a system or hypothesis of the nature and relation of the Son of God as is most agreeable to the word of God, or which, as you express it, he can best accommodate to the Scripture expressions. But, lastly, I desire you would infer this above all the rest, that I have but very little zeal to give you any trouble at all to answer any objections of mine on a point which I believe to be of so little moment to salvation, as I have before expressed it.

And now I guess you are ready to say aloud

to yourself, What would the man have? Why, sir, I will tell you plainly, and in short, I would fain have the happiness of about a month's conversation with you; as finding, by much experience, that there is more labour than profit in all paper controversies; not to mention, what I know too well of, my own defects and infirmities, of which I am never so sensible as when I endeavour to write in order. But how is this to be brought about? I need not tell you there are but two ways; but I am sorry to observe one of them is almost impossible.

But what should hinder the other from being both practicable and hopeful? It is a time of vacation, the town empty, and the country pleasant. But one day's journey by the flying coach to Sarum, thence but seven or eight miles to a comfortable retreat, the most hearty welcome, and whatever else is in the power of,

Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

A. COLLIER.

P.S. The coach sets out from the Angel, behind St. Clement's in the Strand.

To Mr. Whiston, in Great Russell-street,
over against Montague House, London.

## CHAPTER V.

COLLIER IN HIS PARISH; HIS ASSOCIATES; HIS BROTHER WILLIAM COLLIER; HIS MARRIAGE; ENGAGED IN A CHANCERY SUIT AGAINST SIR STEPHEN FOX; HIS DEATH AND ISSUE.

We now enter upon the most interesting part of our task,—the survey of Collier in his parish and in his home. He was instituted to the rectory of Langford Magna in the year 1704, as we have already stated, and this family benefice he continued to enjoy, without any additional preferment, till his death. Of his general conduct in his parish we have no evidence; but the studious habits of his life, and the nature of his speculations, preclude the idea of at least any glaring misbehaviour. His sermons that remain, probably but a small portion of those originally composed by him, bear the stamp of at once an honest and laborious teacher. Instead of treating his congregation as poor ignorant rustics, fit only to be frightened into Christianity, as the practice of some is, he appears to have endeavoured to convince their understandings, as the best possible method of laying a solid foundation for the religious character. That the reader may, however, judge for himself of Collier's parochial dis-

courses, we insert one of his sermons at the close of the present chapter. It was written for Easter-day, at his very entrance on the ministry; and we have selected it rather from the interest of the subject, than as affording the best specimen of his pulpit eloquence. Although he allowed himself, as we have before shewn, great latitude of speculation in theology, the sermons of Collier intended for his parish, and which we have hitherto read, are free from any of his peculiar notions; and it will be observed, in particular, that, in the subjoined sermon, he most earnestly inculcates that the son "was really and truly God, or essentially one with the Divine nature."

While we regret the deficiency of our materials to display Collier's character as a parish priest with any minuteness, we must not omit to notice, that amongst his letters there is one by which he appears in the amiable light of an intercessor for the life of Mary Clifford, a young woman of his parish, who was about to be tried at the Salisbury assizes for the murder, it would seem, of her illegitimate child. After urging her former good conduct, he adds, "I would say also, that, considering the difficulty of her condition, as being young and friendless, and in the hands of an old sinner, and he her master too, something might be offered towards the lessening her fault, when taken in its whole bulk. After this manner, I say, I would

plead, were my word of any value in the presence of those who have the disposal of her life; though I would urge, at the same time, to have her soundly punished."

Of the society which he frequented we have but scanty information; but it is easy to supply the deficiency. He tells us himself that he was intimate at the palace of Salisbury during Bishop Burnet's time; and we learn that he occasionally filled the cathedral pulpit; and this, for a person not a member of the church, judging by the present practice at Salisbury, must have been an extraordinary compliment. From these circumstances we may collect that he was well known to the clergy of Salisbury, his contemporaries, of whom many were alike distinguished for their piety and their learning. The bishops during his ministry were Burnet, Talbot, Willis, and Hoadly, all Low Churchmen except Willis, if his exertions against Bishop Atterbury do not entitle him to a like appellation. The deans were Young, the father of the poet; Younger, a personal friend of Collier, and also of Norris and John Clarke, the brother of Dr. Samuel Clarke; while amongst the resident clergy occur the names of the celebrated commentator Daniel Whitby, and of John Hoadly, afterwards Archbishop of Armagh. Nor must we omit Collier's brother-in-law, Richard Hele, a prebendary of the cathedral, and master of the Close Grammar School, who published, in 1717,

a volume of Select Offices of Private Devotion,—a work which has, we believe, been highly commended by the present Bishop of London.

With the learned and laborious Dr. Thomas Bennet, vicar of St. Giles's, Cripplegate, a native of Salisbury, he appears to have been always on terms of great intimacy. They were probably school-fellows together at Salisbury in early life, although Bennet was seven years Collier's senior. But amidst all his correspondents, his friends, and acquaintances, his younger brother William, by nature, by vicinage, by kindred studies, seems to have been his most constant friend and companion; and the character of each is illustrated by being contemplated in connexion with that of the other. He was rector of Baverstock, about two miles and a half to the south of Langford; and his MS. remains form by far the greater portion of the Collier papers. Traces of the frequent intercourse of the brothers appear in the diary kept by the latter: from which, preceded by a slight autobiographical sketch of the writer, we have inserted extracts in the Appendix. We learn from the same source of information, that they often submitted to each other their different compositions. Indeed, William Collier, if not equal to his brother Arthur as a metaphysician, seems to have been much his superior as a practical divine; and his writings, including nearly two hundred sermons, display, amidst great powers of argumentation, a gracefulness of style

to which at least the other was a stranger. If we are not mistaken, a judicious selection from William Collier's MSS. would be a valuable addition to the theological library. On his entering into the ministry, he wrote in one of his pocket-books the following scheme of clerical duty :—

" He must endeavour to raise his own reputation, and that of his function.

" He must convince his people that he has a true design to save their souls.

" His course of life must combine public functions and secret labours.

" He will for these be more severely accounted with than any others.

" He must not only abstain from evils, but from the appearance of them.

" His friend and his garden ought to be his chief diversion.

" His study and his parish his chief employments.

" He must employ great part of his time in sin-searching and error.

" He must have a lively sense and impression of divine matters.

" He takes upon him a trust, for which an account must be given.

" He must endeavour to act above man, more like the angels.

" He is a fellow-worker with God, an ambassador of Christ.

"He is a savour of life unto life, of death unto death."

He seems to have accustomed himself to write short reflections on most of the occurrences of life; and one of these little meditations, on a rose new-blown in the spring, we insert as a specimen:—

"How beautiful is this rose! how delightful to the senses, pleasant to the eye, and grateful to the smell! and how does its novelty strike the fancy! Oh! my soul, if a fading flower is capable of affording thee some kind of satisfaction, consider what will be thy entertainment when thou shalt be admitted within the fence of Paradise, to behold the beauty and reap the sweets of every plant in that celestial garden. Think with what transport thou shalt be entertained in that blessed state, where every truth is surprising, and every speculation ravishing, to eternity."

Some fragments of an heroic poem, called Christeis, a few metrical translations from Horace, as well as scriptural paraphrases in verse, from the pen of William Collier, also remain in MS. We merely mention the fact, as none of his verses amount to poetry: besides, we think that no translation can express the beauty, the grace, or the wit of Horace; and as to poetical devotion, we agree with Johnson that it rarely pleases. "Omnipotence cannot be exalted; Infinity cannot be amplified; Perfection cannot be improved." The notes from the diary, in the Appendix, while they

indicate the frequent communication of the brothers with each other, afford some insight into their habits of private life. From the same source we learn that they were quite free from any of those small superstitions by which, in modern times, persons with a tenth part of their acquirements can cheaply earn a reputation for sanctity. They seem to have often shared, and in a manner hallowed, the diversions of the people: the diary proves that they attended the races of the villages around, joined sometimes in the dance, played occasionally at cards, and in their own homes enjoyed the performance of music. But these matters were not peculiar to them. The clergy of the period appear to have entertained, in many respects, far loftier notions of the great Being who presides over the universe, than some of their successors of the present day. The grovelling spirit of puritanism had not debased their hearts, and fooled their understandings into the idea, that a petty warfare against the amusements of social life could be acceptable to the Almighty. Their writings, abounding in piety and in learning, prove how often and how deeply they must have reflected on the Divine attributes; while their lives, for the most part, displayed a pattern of unostentatious obedience to the precepts of the Gospel; thus affording examples worthy of imitation by those of the present day, who, first humanising God, and then deifying themselves, strike at the root of all that is ennobling in

religion; and, what is still worse, minister to superstition on the one hand, and to intolerance on the other.

According to the Langford register, Collier's eldest child was born October 13th, 1707; so that he must have been married at least not later than the beginning of that year. His wife was Margaret, the daughter of Nicholas Johnson, Esq., paymaster of the army,* by a sister of Sir Stephen Fox; and thus he became allied to the founder of one of our most illustrious Whig families. The MSS. of Collier here supply a curious piece of domestic history. Sir Stephen Fox, by his will, dated May the 25th, 1716, amidst a most bountiful disposition of his estate amongst those who were in any degree related to him, excludes his nephew Charles Johnson, a brother of Mrs. Collier, from any participation in it, on the score of his ingratitude.† Mrs. Collier's name is omitted altogether. What was the ingratitude of Charles Johnson, and why Mrs. Collier was not remembered by her opulent uncle, we proceed to explain; as the best introduction to a letter from Collier to Sir Stephen Fox, which combines the utmost acuteness of perception and mastery of reasoning, with a tone of severe yet respectful reproof hardly to be matched, it is presumed, in the whole range of English literature.

* See Memoirs of Sir Stephen Fox. 12mo, p. 76. London, 1717.

† Ibid. p. 103.

Nicholas Johnson, Mrs. Collier's father, was a clerk to Sir Stephen Fox, when the latter held the situation of paymaster of the army, to which he had been appointed by Charles the Second, at the Restoration. But Fox resigning the office in 1679, and Johnson having married one of his employer's sisters in the interval, Sir Stephen managed to obtain the place for his brother-in-law, upon his retirement. Johnson enjoyed it, however, but a few years; for he died in 1682, leaving an only surviving son, Charles, and two daughters, of whom Mrs. Collier was one. By his will he appointed Sir Stephen Fox the guardian of his children, and also an executor and trustee, in conjunction with a Mr. Richard Kent. Sir Stephen Fox, it appears, considered that, by various acts of bounty and advances of money to his nephew and nieces, he had far exceeded the amount of their father's property; at the same time he exhibited no inventory of the testator's effects, nor, indeed, came to any regular account of the estate. Of this the children naturally complained; and Charles Johnson was at length obliged to prefer a bill in Chancery against Sir Stephen Fox, to which Mr. and Mrs. Collier were parties. Kent, the other executor and trustee, had died many years prior to the institution of the suit. It seems that the bill was no sooner filed, than Sir Stephen Fox, instead of insisting that he had advanced more than was due to his nephew, and that in point of fact the plaintiff, Nicholas Johnson, was his debtor rather than creditor, acted at least a very unadvised

part, by alleging, in private letters, what he did not venture to assert in his answer to the bill in Chancery, that Kent had been alone active in the disposition of Nicholas Johnson's property; and urging that he ought not to be deemed responsible for the misconduct of his deceased co-executor and co-trustee. Sir Stephen Fox wrote to Collier, in the hope, through his agency, of averting the suit: and it was in this state of things that the following remarkable letter was penned in answer:—

## TO SIR STEPHEN FOX.

Honoured Sir,

Though your last, of the 14th of the last month, assured me neither the one way nor the other concerning the payment I desired of you; yet having said in my last, that that should be the last trouble I would give you on that score, I did not think of being worse than my word to you; and that I might not so much as seem to do otherwise than I said, I have thus long omitted purposely to acquaint you, that your last came in order to my hands, which indeed I ought to have done sooner.

At the same time, sir, I should here stop short, as having done my duty, did not some other particulars in all your late letters, more especially your last, create a new obligation on me, and make it now unjust in me, as well as rude, not to return you my answer to them.

You have been pleased, sir, more than once, to mention to me the late suit commenced against you by my brother Johnson. This you call a mark of his ingratitude to yourself, and an effect only of desperate fortune in him. You observe and believe, that had we known the truth of the case, and the great injury offered you by this suit, we had not suffered our names to have been inserted in the bill, but had done all in our power to put an early period to it: that our late mother, Johnson, was all along made believe that the suit was begun by you against her son; and was so disappointed, that she could not believe it, when she was told the contrary. And having thus condescended to vindicate (as you are pleased to say) your justice, you do me the honour to believe that I might yet be instrumental with my brother (if I were there present with him) to put a stop to his expense, and his ingratitude towards you.

Sir, I had ere this time dissuaded my brother, even on my knees, to let drop his action, and might also have prevailed too, if any one thing in all this time had occurred to me, sufficient to raise the least scruple concerning the justice of it. Whereas, as I have hitherto received it, both from his and all other hands that have conveyed it to me, it has seemed to me to be one of the fairest suits that ever was commenced. Pardon me, sir, whilst I relate to you what I have heard on both sides; and in a manner too, which, though ever so

willing, I have not yet been able to suspect the falsehood of.

Sir, it has been delivered to me thus. That Charles Johnson, your nephew and pupil, being of age, moved you his trustee (or executor in trust for him) to give him an account of his father's estate, and of the disposal of it. That what incited him principally to desire this, (besides that it is the most usual case in the world, and what is usually offered, before it is demanded), was, that he perceived, even from your own books of account, that his father died possessed of an estate in the East India Company, sold afterwards for almost 4,000*l.*, and never brought to account. Of this sum he desires you to tell him how it was disposed of, or whether it was ever given to him, or any of his father's children, as his last testament directs and requires? For this a great while he solicits both yourself and Mr. Fox; but all account is denied; and he is told, that he has already had more than his share, and that he ought to rest satisfied. But this not satisfying the orphan, and he desiring that it might be referred to indifferent judges, he is told positively by Mr. Fox, that you would agree no further with him than you could be forced by law.

Upon this he resolves to prefer a bill in Chancery, to require an account of you; and a little after doing so, indeed upon notice of it, and whilst your answer was preparing, you send many letters into

the country to his friends and relations,—viz. to my late uncle Kent, my wife, and others,—wherein you utterly disclaim the receipt of the aforesaid money, saying that you meddled with no other of the testator's accounts than what belonged to his office. That your co-executor, Mr. Kent, if any body, must stand chargeable with that fund; nay, that it appears upon the East India books that he actually sold and received it. Hence you argue, that your case is hard indeed, if you must suffer for his dishonesty; that you were mistaken in the man, and are heartily concerned for the poor children's loss, but know no reason why you should make it up to them. Accordingly you charge it home to my uncle Kent's conscience, as executor to his brother, to make up the said loss by larger legacies than he might otherwise design for them, &c.

Being thus assured of the justice of your cause, you judge all advantages lawful against your enemy at law, to secure yourself from being forced to reimburse what you never received. Accordingly you attempt to nonsuit his bill (as your first answer), by endeavouring (and that by threats to one party, namely, your nephew and pupil, Captain Fox), to get the partners in his bill to sign a remonstrance against his proceeding, thereby thinking, as it were, to crush your poor adversary through the expense of furnishing out a second bill. This failing, you sue the court for longer time, as

knowing that every term brings fresh expenses with it. In the mean time, Charles Johnson, knowing what you had written, viz. all the topics of your complaints made to his friends in the country, prepares himself in a legal way to obviate and answer all your particulars. Whereas, how were we all mistaken! For when needs must that your answer could be no longer delayed, you are so far from pleading any of those things that you affirm but just before in your letters, (and by which you desired to convince us here in the country of the justice of your cause, and the injury of late offered you), that you deny it at full length. As, for instance, in your answer to his bill, you acquit your co-executor, acknowledge your own name and action in the sale, and receipt of the money; that you received it for your own use; and so, in a word, drawn all the lamentable loss, and cry of the orphans, wholly to your own door.

And now, why, sir, should their cry be stopped, till such justice be done them as they require? To this your answer is twofold. First, that you have some reason now at length to believe that that estate was purchased with your money, and consequently that it was your own estate. Secondly, that, however this be, you have been a constant benefactor both to him and his family, as well before he was born as since. Upon this foot you desire the Lord Chancellor, that if he does award the sum required to the orphans, he would

be pleased to allow you, and deduct the sum of all those kindnesses and benefactions which you have formerly done and made to him and his family.

Thus far, sir, I have heard of this matter; and I dare say you will believe me, when I say that I have been an eye-witness of the most part of these things. This, sir, is the sense of some of your nearest and dearest friends, who are most prejudiced in your favour; and this is the report the whole country in these parts have taken up for truth.

And now, if this be indeed the truth, who can forbear judging? For, sir, is it not your own sense and saying, that the person who indeed received and converted this money to his own use ought to restore it to the orphans; nay, that his executor after him (notwithstanding the known loss of his executorship) ought, in conscience, to make up the loss to the poor children? But, sir, is this kind of reasoning good only in yourself against another, and not equally so (when rightly applied) even against yourself? And can we desire to apply it otherwise than you yourself have done, by owning, even upon oath, that you did indeed receive and convert it to your own use?

Sir, we were willing to acquit you, when you professed to acquit yourself: but how shall we do so now, when we profess to say no more than what yourself have sworn to?

But perhaps it may be true indeed (though it

be so lately discovered), that the estate was your own from the beginning; for the truth of this we appeal to God and your own conscience: not to ask a very pertinent question, viz. how it should happen that Mr. Richard Kent's name and act should be necessary to the sale of an estate properly your own?—and we desire to be put upon no other issue than your own readiness to make proof of it.

Let it be admitted, then, that you know for certain, and can prove, this your right. Do you indeed endeavour to make it appear in the shortest and fairest way? Do you hasten to judgment, and for the benefit of your expected decree in Chancery?

Let God and the world, let your own friends and children, let your distressed adversary, and even yourself be judge in this case: for is it not evident, to the last degree, that from the very beginning of this suit you have used all means to delay and protract the sentence of the court? That you multiply answers, threaten by your counsel expensive bills to your poor antagonist, sue for longer and yet longer time, and even draw an attachment upon your person for your neglect to make answer. Have you not, sir, from the beginning, done all within your power to distress the plaintiff; partly by accusing him to, and inciting his best friends and supporters to withdraw their kind thoughts towards him; partly by endeavouring to alienate (as now of late), even to yourself,

the best part of his present subsistence; and partly by pursuing him with actions of debt both from yourself and others?

Are these, sir, arguments that you have not puzzled and perplexed the cause; that you are assured even of your own justice; that you indeed think yourself to be injured; that you desire peace, and an end to the unhappy controversy; or, lastly, are such as these proper motives to persuade a legal adversary to withdraw his suit, and rest satisfied with your goodness?

I need not, sir, observe to you, that all is not justice in the sight of God that may be done by course of law; and that there are at least two other ways of putting a period to the proceeding, besides that of Charles Johnson's laying down his suit in plain ground, and crying *peccavi:* one of those is, to hasten judgment and sentence; the other, to admit of an equal and fair reference.

But now, sir, both those methods of peace depend altogether on yourself: the first, as you are defendant at law; and the last, that you have been already more than once solicited to do this by your adversary himself and his friends.

And now why, sir, should not such a case as this be referred even to the meanest capacities? What need of lawyers and their quirks to understand and decide it? Surely we may hope that the true reason, on neither side, why it has not been referred before this time, has not been

because darkness in some causes is more beneficial than light.

But perhaps, for want of knowing all, I may be as good as wholly ignorant of the true state of the case; for this, sir, I appeal and submit myself to yourself. In the mean time, and presuming at present upon the truth of those facts which I have related to you, I should shew myself the worst of all your enemies (or of those you may look upon as such), if I should pretermit the present occasion (so unexpectedly offered me even by yourself) of reminding you (in the way of my divine office and calling, and by the authority of the same), that you wait another's pleasure (and that, too, you know not how soon) to be tried at a court of justice, where neither fame nor riches, neither friends nor dependents, neither the good nor the evil opinion of yourself, will prevail to have the least weight or consideration, either to force, bias, or protract the great and final sentence, and where ten thousand visible acts of charity will not amount to one grain or scruple towards lifting up the dead weight of one sin unrepented of.

Let me then, sir, beg and conjure you, as you value the credit of your past excellent life, and of the infinite good deeds for which the world sounds your praises; for the sake and welfare of your happy posterity; for that of truth, justice, and honesty; and as you wait and hope for a happy immortality; let me beg you, I say, in the meekness

and the bowels of Jesus Christ, and even by your own tender and compassionate temper, to admit a speedy and impartial reference, wherein your adversary may be as much as possible upon equal terms with you; and thus far I dare engage to prevail on the other side.

I hope, sir, I have in no degree laid by the respect I always had, and ought to have, for your person and high character in the world; if not, I may presume and hope for your kind thoughts in this, as well as your certain thanks when we shall meet in the next world; and on this confidence I am now more assured than ever that you believe me sincere when I subscribe myself,

Honoured sir,
Your most faithful friend
and obedient humble servant,
A. COLLIER.

*Langford, October* 10, 1710.

The preceding letter displays in some few respects a want of technical skill in the language of Chancery proceedings; but while the professional reader can easily supply the defect, to the ordinary one it will not be less intelligible from that circumstance.

The cause came on for hearing before Lord Harcourt the 14th of May, 1712,* when the Lord Keeper pronounced the usual decree for a reference to the Master to take an account of Nicholas John-

* Lib. Reg. A. 1711. 688, b.

son's estate, with liberty to the plaintiffs to examine Sir Stephen Fox, the defendant, on interrogatories. Sir Stephen Fox died the 28th of October, 1716, before the suit was terminated. Although the registrar's books furnish particulars of the cause subsequent to the original hearing,* we have in vain sought for the final decision of the court, so that the suit was probably compromised. It should be observed, that from the humble station of Nicholas Johnson in early life, Sir Stephen Fox had probably been the real founder of whatever fortune his brother-in-law possessed, and that Fox positively asserts, upon his oath, in his answer, that he had paid £1,187 17*s.* 8½*d.*, on behalf of the testator and his family, more than he ever received of the estate; and as for the delay of Sir Stephen in filing his answer, which Collier so much dwells upon, we must remark that, according to the practice of the Court of Chancery, until very recently, a defendant, unless prepared to answer a bill in eight days after he appeared to the suit, was obliged to apply for what was technically termed orders for time, and these were granted, as of course, not for purposes of vexation, but to afford him sufficient opportunity to meet a case, often framed with much art, and, as in the instance before us, requiring long and complicated accounts. At all events, it would be unfair to the memory of Sir

* Lib. Reg. A. 1712, 484. A. 1716, 120. A. 1717, 166.

Stephen Fox that the preceding letter should be implicitly relied on, in the absence of any judicial opinion on the merits of the suit.

Mrs. Collier's fortune, under her father's will, was 500*l.* with accumulated interest. As she was born before his death in 1682, she must have been at least twenty-five years of age when she married, and was perhaps several years older. Independently of her dowry, Collier seems to have gained little by this union; for we are told that her habits were those of extravagance. At all events, the letters upon Collier's private affairs which remain, attest the fact of his being generally subject to great pecuniary difficulties; a state of things which could only have arisen from mismanagement,—for the tithes alone of Langford yielded him 300*l.* per annum; a considerable income at that time. The two following letters at once attest his poverty, and the means by which he proposed to extricate himself from his embarrassments. The first is to Bishop Talbot, who had but lately succeeded to Burnet's vacant throne.

TO THE LORD BISHOP OF SARUM.

SIR,

Though I have not yet the honour to be known to your lordship, I am encouraged by what I know, and have heard, to interrupt your lordship with a small request. It is, to obtain your

lordship's leave to be resident at Sarum for a few years. My reason for this petition is too good, else I should not think of leaving so good and convenient a place as I am now in. But it has happened, and so it is, that it has been too handsome and convenient for my income, which yet is none of the smallest of the sort. My lord, I speak with confusion of face and with great reluctance, that this is the only feasible method which occurs to me of extricating myself from the difficulties I am in at present; and I humbly hope that nothing herein urged will prove a bar to your lordship's favour to me. My parsonage is but seven miles from Sarum, from whence it will be an easy thing for me to go and do all the Sunday's duty myself; and I will engage to your lordship to see all other parts of my calling fulfilled in their season. If it will be of any moment to your lordship to make any inquiry into my character or behaviour, I can boast to have been very well known at the palace in the time of your lordship's excellent predecessor, and generally in all Sarum.

I am, sir,
Your lordship's most dutiful son and servant.
A. COLLIER.

*Langford Magna, Jan.* 27, 171$\frac{4}{5}$.

The request was complied with, it seems, from the following letter addressed to Lady Fox.

## TO LADY FOX.

MADAM,

It was with the greatest pleasure that I received the honour of your last, which was not a little increased by the assurance it gave me of your and Sir Stephen Fox's recovery from two the most painful of all distempers. Yet my modesty would scarce have permitted me to have given your ladyship the trouble of this return, if I had not thought myself obliged in justice to acquaint your ladyship with a late considerable turn which has happened to mine and the sensations of my little family. It is, in short, this, that, for about this month past, we are all settled in lodgings in the close of Sarum, where we eat once a-day with our landlady, and in all other things find ourselves. From this strange account of our way of living, your ladyship may perhaps guess that we either fear or hope for the coming of Prester John; and, to speak the truth, there is something in the present times which did not a little incline us to this resolution; but whether the coming of that mighty hero would confirm us in our present, or restore us to our former dwelling, for want of intelligence we are not yet thoroughly resolved. However, this I am sure of, that if our good lord the bishop (who, in consideration of something, has been pleased to permit me, under his own hand, to reside in this place) would bestow on me one of the prebends of this church; or if my good lady, to whom I now

write, would be pleased once more to think of her interest with the old gentleman in Amen Corner, in favour of a poor honest servant, who is troubled with the infirmity of desiring to wear a scarf, as well as his uncle at Warminster,—it would contribute mightily to the relief of my pilgrimage, and in some measure reconcile me to the present times.

I am,
With all duty and submission, madam,
Your ladyship's most faithful and
Obedient humble servant.
A. COLLIER.

*Sarum, March* 28, 1716.

The preceding letter to Lady Fox produced no advantageous result; what he had before written to Sir Stephen operated probably as an effectual bar to any preferment from that quarter. Unpalatable advice addressed to superiors is as rarely pardoned as it is followed: but Collier had done more; his letter to Sir Stephen, by its reasoning, its cutting irony, its assumption of ecclesiastical authority, must have inflicted too deep a wound on his correspondent to be ever forgotten, even if it was forgiven. While his endeavours to obtain promotion in the Church were fruitless, his residence at Salisbury seems to have been alike ineffectual to restore his shattered circumstances.

The letters of a subsequent date which touch on his personal affairs attest a continued, if not an

increasing, pressure of pecuniary demands, and his inability to meet them; till at last he was obliged to extricate himself from further importunity by selling the reversion of Langford rectory to Corpus Christi College, Oxford, for the small sum of 1,600 guineas, after it had been nearly a century and a quarter in the family.

Arthur Collier died in 1732; we know not the precise day; but he was buried in Langford church on the 9th of September in that year. Of the disease which occasioned his death we are uninformed: at the same time, as the preface to his Specimen of True Philosophy, published in 1730, implies that he then meditated a long course of literary labour, and his Logology appeared in the very year of his death, we may fairly conclude that he died somewhat suddenly. His wife, two sons, and two daughters, survived him; and if he was unable to leave his children in easy circumstances, he seems, at all events, not to have neglected their education. His eldest son, Arthur, who is described, in Coote's Lives of the Civilians, as an ingenious but unsteady and eccentric man, practised as an advocate at the Commons, where he died in 1777. The other, Charles, entered the army, and rose, it is believed, to the rank of a colonel. Of the daughters, Jane was the authoress of a clever work, called "The Art of Ingeniously Tormenting;" and the remaining child, Mary, derives some little celebrity from

having accompanied Fielding in his interesting voyage to Lisbon. There are, it is presumed, no descendants of Arthur Collier at present alive.

The reader has now been made acquainted with such particulars as we have been able to collect of Arthur Collier; and while enough, perhaps, has been said to satisfy the curiosity of the metaphysical student, his biography it is hoped may not be wholly unacceptable to the general reader, nor indeed unprofitable to those who are fitting themselves for the sacred office. Endued with intellectual powers superior to those which commonly fall to the lot of man, it is impossible not to admire the earnestness with which he employed them in exploring the depths of mental philosophy, in endeavouring to reconcile Scripture difficulties, and in protecting the Church as well from indiscreet friends as from open enemies. On the other hand, it is painful to dwell on the absence of worldly prudence which seems to have marked his character. His favourite speculations were fitted rather for the seclusion of a cloister than for the practical business of human life; and although bodily sensuality is doubtless one of the chief sources of man's degradation, still, intellectual indulgences may also be pursued to excess, and induce a neglect of domestic affairs, as fatal to his comfort as the former. This seems to have been fully exemplified in the character of Arthur Collier. He knew, indeed, as an

old writer expresses it, "how to spell heaven out of earth, to knit his observations together, and make a ladder of them all to climb to God;"* but, at the same time, forgot, that, while the earth is our temporary resting-place, our social duties demand that by over-spiritualising we become not unfit to discharge them. Thus, he who was the greatest ornament of his family, in one respect became their greatest misfortune. The advowson of Langford Magna, which for three generations had been the means of supporting a clergyman's family at least in respectability, was in his hands sacrificed; not, indeed, to habits of debasing immorality, but to their very antagonists,—to habits of abstruse speculation, which seem to have unfitted him for all considerations of worldly prudence, and to have displayed, in his fate, a fresh proof of the propinquity of extremes.

The mental energies of the English nation were never more actively employed than during the period in which Collier lived; but the subjects to which they were directed were not equally capable of illustration. Christian theology was hardly a topic for discovery; for where is there a shadow of doctrine which might not be traced to some writer within a few centuries of our Saviour's death? In metaphysics there was nearly as little scope for novelty. Mind and body being a necessary union to make up man, the utmost stretch of

* Bishop Earle's Microcosmography, edit. Bliss, p. 94.

metaphysical science could not extend beyond an accurate investigation of the phenomena which every person experiences. Indeed, those who have leisure and industry enough to examine the opinions on this subject, scattered about the writings of ancient philosophy, will find that there are few, if any, mental principles which owe their origin to modern discovery. Berkeley and Collier present, perhaps, the best title to metaphysical originality; and it is certainly a curious fact, that while, from a strange passion for paradox, certain philosophers reluctantly admitted the existence of matter, they, at almost the extreme limits of the British empire, should simultaneously arrive at a conclusion which, at the same time that it upholds the existence of matter, still so indissolubly connects it with mind, that the one necessarily implies the other, thereby annihilating the strongest hold of atheism, and affording, perhaps, the most decisive proof which mere philosophy can supply, of that God whom we are told is a spirit, and to be worshipped in spirit and in truth. More fortunate in the choice of a fertile subject of inquiry were Collier's contemporaries who addicted themselves to natural philosophy; for physical science alone, and to this Collier was almost a stranger, presented a field for investigation alike unexhausted and inexhaustible. Here there was ample scope for inquiry, and here the labours of philosophical research are still perpetually disclosing some hidden

treasure. The Almighty seems to have set the world sailing on its stupendous orbit, full of lockers containing the most valuable secrets of nature, the discovery of which, from age to age, is left to chance, or to the sagacity of a few highly gifted individuals; and no sooner are these secrets divulged than they give birth to new results and fresh analogies, which engage the mind in a continual course of rapturous contemplation, increase the comfort and convenience of mankind, and at the same time afford additional proofs of the benevolent Source from which they all originally spring.

# ⊙ A SERMON.

# A SERMON.

*But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept.*—1 Cor. xv. 20.

THIS is the great and fundamental article of the Christian faith, the strength of our confidence, and the stay of all our hopes. This is our glory and our rejoicing, whereby we may triumph over our adversaries, and by reflecting upon which, we have good reason to raise our drooping spirits, and look heaven in the face with joy and assurance. With the armour of this assurance the apostles ventured upon the conversion of a whole world of sinners and idolaters, encountered and overcame many thousands of their bitter enemies, reduced whole kingdoms and nations to obedience, and led in triumph all the powers of darkness.

Christ is risen from the dead, was the watch-word that sounded throughout the world, and shook the whole government of Satan to pieces. Kings and emperors promoted the course of it, and wicked tyrants submitted to the power of it. It ran like fire among the stubble throughout the earth, and brought down and purified whatsoever it met with. It kindled, likewise, a fire in the

minds of all whose ears it reached; it awakened and roused them from their deep lethargy of sin and corruption; and taught all that received it to speak a new language, even the language of heaven and the new Jerusalem.

An universal joy spread through all hearts; it taught the ignorant true wisdom, and made the wise men confess themselves to be fools. It reduced aliens and strangers into covenant with God, and taught the heathen to cry, Abba, Father. Nay, so great was the power of Christ's resurrection, that it made the very dead arise out of their graves to see the wonder, and partake of the benefit of it. Nay, this is not all; for by this he has given us an earnest of, and set his seal to, our resurrection. For, as he said of himself: "If I be lifted up, I will draw all men after me," with relation to his death and sufferings, for the reconciliation of God to fallen man; so may the same be applied to his resurrection. For if Christ be risen from the dead, then shall all men rise in like manner from their graves. But every man in his own order: first Christ, who is said to be the first fruits from the dead; afterwards they that are Christ's, at his second coming to judgment. So that his resurrection may be said to be the pledge and assurance of a general resurrection, and the prelude of that great transaction, when he shall put all enemies under his feet, and death shall be swallowed up in victory.

In treating on these two grand articles of our faith, the resurrection of Christ, and that of all men at his return to judgment, I shall suppose both to be true, and take them for granted; partly for brevity's sake, and partly because I am willing to believe that they are both firmly believed and trusted in by all that are here present; so that my business at this time shall be to make the most useful reflections and observations upon these two great points that my meditation will suggest to me, and so conclude.

Here, then, are two things in general which I have obliged myself to consider: — first, the resurrection of our Saviour; secondly, ours, or the general resurrection of all men at the end of the world. On each of these I shall bestow a reflection or two; for, indeed, if there is any thing worthy our meditations, these two subjects may justly claim a great part of them, as well by reason of their importance as their use. The doctrines that relate to both are great and noble, wonderful and supernatural; and the practice that follows from these doctrines is as necessary to the perfection of our hearts as the doctrines are to the completion and establishment of our faith.

To begin, then, with the first of these, the resurrection of Christ, about which I shall consider, first, those things that are to be believed, or matters of doctrine; and secondly, those things

that are to be done and practised in consequence of our belief.

As a matter of doctrine, then, we are first to consider the power by which Christ rose from the dead. Of this we are told by St. Peter, that he was raised from the dead by the power of God—saying to the Jews, that this Jesus, whom ye have crucified, hath God raised from the dead. And the same is testified in many places by St. Paul; so that hitherto there is no difficulty nor controversy. But we are taught to believe that Jesus Christ was the only begotten Son of God; and we are told by St. Paul, Rom. i. 4, that he was declared to be the Son of God with power, by his resurrection from the dead. Now, it does not follow universally that he must be the son of God who is raised from the dead; for if so, then we might call Lazarus, and the widow's son of Nain, the sons of God, as well as he whom we believe to be his only Son, since they were all raised from the dead, and by the power of God too. For it is manifest that God alone can raise the dead, by a true and proper power; for, beside that we are told in Scripture that all power belongs properly to God, and is one of his incommunicable attributes, it is likewise manifest that there is the same power requisite to restore a dead man to life, as there was at first to give life to man newly made.

But it is God who is said in Scripture to give not only life and breath, but all things else; and

therefore he alone is the true cause of a resurrection. But every one that is raised from death by the power of God does not immediately become the son of God, though a son of the resurrection. Nevertheless, we are told that our Saviour Christ sufficiently argued himself to be the Son of God, from his being raised from the dead. To satisfy this inquiry, we are to consider, first, that our Saviour in his lifetime, before his crucifixion, declared himself to be the Son of God, and prophesied of his resurrection — making it also the test and argument of the truth of his testimony.

Now here, then, it is to be observed, that though it does not invincibly follow that any one is the son of God because God raises him from the dead, yet it follows, that whomsoever God raises from the dead, in confirmation of his own former affirmation that he is the son of God, that this person is truly what he affirmed himself to be. For by raising him from the dead, God sets his seal to the truth of his testimony, and confirms whatsoever he said before in his lifetime. Now, thus it was with our Saviour Christ: he before, in his lifetime, appealed to his resurrection for the truth of his mission, and his saying of himself that he was the Son of God. Accordingly, God raised him from the dead; and that too, as Christ before prophesied of himself, the third day after his crucifixion: and this was a full testimony that he was the person he declared himself to be.

But again, secondly: as it is said in one place that God raised him from the dead, so he says of himself, that he raised himself from the dead. "No man taketh my life from me," said Christ; "I have power to lay it down, and I have power also to take it up again; *this power have I received from the Father.*"

Now, if his power to raise himself from the dead was a true power, as doubtless it was, since he says in another place that all that the Father has was also his—then it follows, farther, that he is not only to be called the Son of God, which is a name given also to others as well as him, but that he was really and truly God, or essentially one with the divine nature.

To justify this conclusion, we must remember what was before observed, that all true power belongeth to, and is only of God; and so, consequently, that it is God only who can raise any from the dead. But our Saviour says of himself, that he had power to raise himself from the dead, and accordingly did it by his own power. It follows, then, that he is God as well as man, since he has done those works which none but God is able to perform. For, as in one place we are told that God raised him from the dead, and in another that he did it by his own power, it evidently follows that he is one with the divine nature. Thus much concerning the power whereby Christ was raised from the dead.

My second observation shall be to consider what was the end and efficacy of our Saviour's resurrection. There are three general ends for which our Saviour rose from the dead: the first was to manifest himself to be the Son of God; as I have observed already, that by this he fully proved it. And as he proved himself by this to be the Son of God, so likewise he made it evident that he was the true Messiah, the prophet that was to come into the world, and the true Saviour of the world. This he made appear two ways: first, in that he appealed before to his resurrection for the confirmation of his being the Messiah. For when the Jews questioned with him, and demanded of him a sign from heaven of his mission and authority, he said to them, "Destroy this temple (which we know he spake of his body, though the Jews misunderstood or perverted his words), and in three days," said he, "I will raise it again." And secondly, in that, by this instance of power in raising himself from the dead, he manifested himself to be able to save and defend all those that should afterwards put their trust in him. For such an high-priest became us, who was God as well as man; who was not only touched with the feeling of our infirmities, and so willing to succour those that are tempted as he was, but also as able as he was willing. And as he rose to testify his being the Messiah, so he as evidently, for the same

reason, justified his innocence against his murderers, and those malicious accusations brought against him at his trial before Pilate and the chief priests.

The second general end of his rising from the dead was to give an assurance, not only of the possibility of a resurrection, but also of the certainty of our and all men's resurrection. The reason of this I shall have occasion to lay open more directly hereafter.

I consider, therefore, the third general end of our Saviour's resurrection, which was, as says St. Paul, for our justification. Rom. iv. 25: "He was delivered to death for our offences, and was raised again for our justification." As he died, so he rose again, in a public capacity, and in the person and stead of all mankind. He died to make satisfaction for the sins of the world, the honour of the law, and the satisfaction of justice. But he rose again to sign and confirm our pardon, and complete our reconciliation.

Death was the punishment denounced against Adam, and which his disobedience brought upon all his posterity. So, then, as the first Adam sinned as the person of all mankind, so the second Adam suffered for all mankind. "In the first Adam all died, in the second shall all be made alive," as says the apostle. For as our Saviour Christ was a public person, and one that stood representative of

all mankind, when he died for sin, all mankind was supposed to die virtually in him; and when he rose from the dead, all men rose with him.

The plain meaning of all which is, that our Saviour Christ having died to satisfy the demands of the law and of justice in the stead of all mankind, he, by rising again from the dead, triumphed over death, which is the wages of sin, and one of the demands of strict justice upon every breach of the law; and by doing this, he reconciled God to man, by disarming his justice against him, and reinstated him into perfect friendship with God, who upon this has promised to impute no sin upon man, but what is committed against the second covenant, which is not a law of works, or the most strict fulfilling the utmost demands of the law, but a covenant of grace, wherein God will accept the best we can do, though we are not able to do all that the law requires. This is now our justification, and this is what Christ purchased for us by his death, and sealed and confirmed to us by his resurrection. Thus much for doctrine and matter of faith. I come now to observe some things from our Saviour's resurrection, that concern our practice.

I observe then, first, in general, how great obligations we have upon us to perform our parts in this covenant of grace, which God has made with us, at no less expense than of the blood of his only Son. As is the mercy of God in this

covenant, so do our obligations rise proportionably. We are now freed from the heavy yoke and curse of the law, and placed in a state of freedom, even that glorious liberty of being the sons of God. Had we a due sense of the misery of living under the law, wherein a curse was pronounced upon every the least violation of it, and yet where it was impossible for any man to keep it, and that all this was owing to man's own fault—did we, I say, sufficiently reflect upon the more than Egyptian slavery of such a condition (which certainly is the greatest on this side hell, and hell itself hereafter, too), it should, methinks, make us exceeding joyful that we are delivered from this heavy yoke and burden of ordinances, and that, of all men living, we should think him the happiest whose unrighteousness is forgiven, and whose sin is covered. Yet this is the happy condition we are all placed in by the death and resurrection of our Saviour. "For while we were weak," as says St. Paul, in that miserable state of weakness just mentioned, "even then Christ died for the ungodly."

Were we to make a just comparison, I believe it would appear that our Redeemer has done greater things for us than our Creator. God, as Creator, has given us life and strength, and all other things which we usually call the gifts of nature. But as our Saviour says, "What would it profit a man to gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" so might it have been said of man under the

law, that all the powers and faculties, God, as the author of nature, gave him, served only to make him miserable; for having not strength to keep the law, the curse unavoidably seized on him, and, according to the order of justice, ruined him eternally. So that whereas, on one hand, the goodness of God gave him life, his justice, on the other hand, made him miserable. But God, as our Redeemer, has removed the curse, and brought life and immortality to light by the Gospel. "For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life."

How great, then, must our obligations be to this our good Redeemer, who has done such great things for us! How joyfully ought we to enter into his gracious covenant, which is so all over mercy and goodness, that it is not only infinitely beyond our deserts to obtain the rewards themselves that are annexed to the performance of it, but vastly beyond our merits to be put even in the capacity of performing it!

The very privilege of being admitted into so gracious a covenant is more valuable than that of life. So that were the reward of our performance of it no greater than the bare suspension of that eternal punishment which we naturally deserve, it would even then be a covenant of grace, and vastly beyond man's deserts: but to consider that eternal misery is no sooner taken away, but everlasting

happiness succeeds in its room; this is mercy beyond all thought and conception, and what, for the greatness of it, the angels may well desire to look into, but what they may never be able to comprehend.

These are the general grounds and reasons of our great obligations to do our utmost towards the observance of this divine covenant, which are so surpassingly great, that I believe I should not speak at random, should I affirm that so gracious an offer as this is would have been enough to have prevailed upon the devils themselves to have entered into the same covenant, if God had been pleased to have made it to them, and would have entered into covenant with them.

I consider, secondly, more particularly, that God, by sending his Son into the world to live and die in the flesh, has sanctified through his body the worship of the body.* It is true, bodily worship of itself, considered apart from the heart, and from spiritual worship, is a dead service, and according to the oldness of the letter; so is works without faith. But, then, it is to be considered, that it is as true that spiritual worship is likewise as dead alone without the worship of the body, as St. James tells us faith is without works. It is true also, that under the Jewish state and law there was little other worship given to God be-

* This part of the sermon seems to be aimed at the doctrines of the Quakers, then a very active sect.

side that of the body, but there was always more required, according to the more retired and implicit sense of the law; as we find God complaining of them, that they drew nigh to him with their lips, whilst their hearts were far from him. Nevertheless, we no where find that bodily worship was ever forbidden, or so much as placed among the ceremonial laws; but we find, on the contrary, that it was commanded by God in the prophets, and abundantly by the prophet David, neither of whose precepts are to be reckoned into the ceremonial law, and so not to cease at the coming of Christ. Accordingly, neither did Christ abrogate any of these laws, but only refined and spiritualised them, and restored them to their first and primitive meaning, and patriarchal use. This we know evidently from his own example, as from his last prayer in the garden, where he used bodily worship, and from many other instances, too many to name here.

It is true, indeed, he says, "that the time now comes, that they that worship the Father must worship him in spirit and in truth." But this does not in the least exclude bodily worship. No, it only tells us that bodily worship alone will not serve our turn, but that to our bodily we must add the devotion of our heart and spirit, and the subjection of our minds as well as our members; otherwise we serve God in vain. He, by this, also tells us, that now is the time of maturity, in which we

are to lay aside all sensible and low opinions of God and his service, and wherein we must learn to worship him with our whole selves. That in the times of darkness, ignorance, and imperfection, God was willing to wink at the grossness of man's way of serving him; but that now, under the Gospel, we were come to full age and strength, and that it is now high time to learn to worship God with our minds, as well as with our bodies; that is, with both together, with our bodies to raise and express the devotion of our minds, and with our minds to answer the devout postures of our bodies. This is expressly enjoined by his great apostle, St. Paul, (Rom. xii. 1.) "I beseech you, therefore, by the mercies of God, that ye present your bodies a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God, which is your reasonable service." Here, then, observe first, that St. Paul enjoins bodily worship in those words, "present your bodies a sacrifice to God." Observe, again, that he likewise enjoins the worship of the spirit in those words, "a living sacrifice;" for, as I said before, bodily worship, without spiritual, is dead and ineffectual: but we may observe thirdly, that joining both together, we serve God acceptably, and according to holiness, as we are told in the next words, that the worship here enjoined is holy and acceptable to God, and that this is our reasonable and Christian service. We may observe, lastly, from the same words, the reason and ground of

this exhortation of the apostle, in these words, "I beseech you, by the mercies of God, to present your bodies," &c.; where by the mercies of God are meant his great mercies in the redemption of the world by his Son: so that we see that bodily worship is not only lawful and commanded under the covenant of the Gospel, but made one of the first consequents upon the nature of this covenant. For St. Paul makes it his first practical inference from all the doctrines that he had delivered in the former part of the epistle, and directly concludes the necessity of it from the great mercies of God in establishing this covenant: as if he had said, that since Christ, the Son of God, has been pleased to take our flesh upon him, and has served his Father in the flesh, and died in the flesh, and risen again in the flesh, he has by this fully sanctified that sort of worship, and made the obedience of the flesh one acceptable part of divine worship. Let us, therefore, as Christ has done before us, and in remembrance of his great mercy and condescension to mankind, so worship the Father as he worshipped him, which is, "to present our bodies a living sacrifice to him," &c.

Accordingly, St. Paul, in another place, says thus: "ye are bought with a price; glorify, therefore, God in your bodies, and in your spirit, which are God's." Here we find that the foundation and reason of our glorifying God with both body and spirit, is because we are bought with a price;

that is, Christ has bought us by his death and resurrection: but lest any should fall short in their conclusions from this matter, St. Paul adds farther, that it was our whole man, body as well as soul, that Christ purchased of his Father, ("your body and your spirit, which are God's"); and therefore that we are in return to offer up our whole selves to him that has bought us. This consequence is as plainly deduced by St. Paul as any other in the Bible; which makes me the more wonder how so many persons have either overlooked or perverted it. But I shall proceed no farther at present upon this subject.

I go on, thirdly, to observe another inference that St. Paul makes from our Saviour's death and resurrection; it is this, "Christ, our passover, is sacrificed for us." What then? Why, "therefore let us keep the feast." What feast this was, we all know, as we know what feast that was which came into the room of the passover. It is, in short, the feast of the eucharist, or the communion of the body and blood of our Lord, which we are now about to receive, in memory of Christ our passover, who was sacrificed for us; who, just before his crucifixion, instituted this holy feast, and left this command upon record, to all posterity, "do this in remembrance of me."

As also St. Paul tells us, that the reason of doing this, next to the command, is to shew forth the Lord's death till he comes again to judgment.

This also is the meaning of that saying of Christ, "I will drink no more of the fruit of the vine, till I drink it new;" that is, in a new manner, with his disciples, after his resurrection and ascension, in the kingdom of heaven. This feast is called the eucharist, which signifies joy, or giving thanks to God the Father, for sending his Son into the world to die for man, in the likeness of sinful flesh; and more especially in this is perpetuated that joy which spread through the hearts of all the apostles when our Saviour appeared to them after his resurrection. It was then he conquered death and hell, and signed and sealed the redemption of mankind. Then were his disciples filled with joy and thanksgiving to him who had loosed the chains of death and misery, and brought them the happy news of their reconciliation and salvation.

This joy, even that very joy which raised the drooping heads of the apostles, has by those very apostles been transmitted to posterity, almost throughout the world. This may be said to be the test of our discipleship. If we joy and give thanks with an heart truly affected to God the Father for the resurrection of his Son, then are we sons of God, and partakers of his resurrection. But if we are not yet sensible of the misery and slavery of sin, which our Saviour Christ came to redeem us from by his death, then shall we not find ourselves over-joyful at his resurrection; and

if so, then to us Christ is not risen from the dead, and we are yet in our sins (as says St. Paul).

And, truly, it is no wonder that those who are not sensible of the slavery of the flesh and of sin, should not be very grateful for the delivery Christ has wrought for them: but this I dare say, that whoever is truly thankful for the infinite mercies of Christ, in subduing death and hell for our sakes, will never be backward in celebrating these mercies of our good Saviour and Redeemer, in that divine and heavenly manner which he has prescribed to us in the eucharist.

Thus much for our Saviour's resurrection. I proceed now, secondly, to say something in short concerning our or the general resurrection. For Christ himself is not only risen from the dead, but is also become the first fruits of them that sleep. For as he died, so he rose again in the person of all mankind; first, in order to our spiritual resurrection from sin unto holiness; and, secondly, in order to our carnal or literal resurrection from death unto life, which is the resurrection of our bodies out of their graves at his second coming.

Here, then, let us consider that this second coming of Christ, to visit mankind, is no more to die or suffer for the world, but to take account and judge, either to reward or condemn all those for whom he had before died. His business, then, is not to save the world only, as he has told

us, at his first coming; but to save or destroy, as he shall find men prepared to receive him. He will not then come humbly, riding upon an ass, as he once entered Jerusalem; but then shall he make the clouds his chariots, and come flying upon the wings of the wind. Then shall the heavens stoop under his feet, and the earth melt at his presence; when he shall send forth his voice, and awaken the dead out of their graves, to attend his sacred presence. Then consider with what different affections he will be looked upon by all the members of his new-born creation, when some that have, by patient continuance in well-doing, waited for the blessed redemption of their bodies, shall rejoice with joy unspeakable to see their dear Lord and Master, and to hear his voice from heaven; when others, who have neglected so great salvation in their lives-time, shall now tremble with the astonishments of hell, to see their Redeemer now become their Judge, and come on purpose to take vengeance on their souls and bodies for ever.

Wherefore, brethren, since these things will be, (for our Saviour himself assures us, that the time cometh when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and that some shall arise to their everlasting salvation and happiness, and others to their eternal misery and confusion), "what manner of persons ought we to be, in all holy conversation and godliness?" looking for the redemption of our bodies from this low state of

mortality and corruption, into the glorious liberty of the sons of God and of the resurrection, and waiting earnestly for the coming of Him who has told us positively beforehand, saying, "Behold, I come, and my reward is with me, to give to every one according to his works:" to him that with patience aspires after the honour and glory and immortality of well-doing, will he give eternal life; but to them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth of the Gospel, but obey unrighteousness; indignation and wrath, tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that does evil, upon the Jew first, and also upon the Gentile. For there is no respect of persons with God. If we know these things, happy are we if we do them; which that we may all do, may the peace of God, &c.

# APPENDIX.

# APPENDIX.

(A.)

*July* 14, 1709.

1. I believe the existence of true perfect being, meaning by this the same as being absolute, or being possessed of all degrees (if there be any such) of being or true existence.

2. I believe that true perfect absolute being is universal being, because no particular being can be possessed of all degrees of being. By universal being, I mean the same as being in general, in which are included all the reality and perfection of all particular beings, and on which they all depend in all manner of senses.

3. I believe this universal being to be God, whom we acknowledge to be the maker and preserver of all the particular things that are; or, in other words, I believe God to be no particular being, but being itself, all being, universal being, which with me are words of the same signification.

4. I believe that God, as universal being, is one, and but one only God; in other words, that it is impossible that there should be more Gods than one, because it is so that there should be more universal beings than one. For universal being is plainly all being in one, in which are, and on which depend all particular being, *quatenus* particular.

5. I believe this universal being, called God, is the maker of all particular beings, as efficient cause, as formal cause, as material cause, as final cause. By his being

maker of all things as efficient cause, I mean that his will was and is the true sole cause of their beings; as formal cause, that he made all things according to the platform of his own wisdom; in other words, that their forms or essential differences stand necessarily related to the different ideas exhibited or represented in his one infinite mind. By standing necessarily related, &c., I mean the same as to say, that the perfection and goodness of their being consist in their similitude to their original ideas in the mind of their efficient cause, God. As material cause, &c., I mean that the will that created is the very substantial matter of their being; in other words, that particulars, as such, have no distinct substances of their own, but only different forms or similitudes to the one true substance, which one substance is the common substratum to all particulars, which, as such, are creatures. As final cause, &c., I believe and mean that God made all things for himself, though not all equally, because all creatures are not equally and immediately related to him.

6. I believe a trinity of persons in this universal being, God, formally different from each other, though really and materially one. And I account for this trinity after this manner. Universal being cannot be considered by us to exist really without these three differences; first, as simple, absolute, perfect, conceptive, intelligent, &c. being; secondly, as total, plural, omniform, all-intelligible, exhibitive, representative, ideal, &c. being; thirdly, as agent, active, causal, powerful, willing, &c. being. That these three are one is plain, because universal being cannot be conceived to exist without these three somethings, and that they are really three is as plain as that any three different ideas are not one idea, but are three; for in their formal beings, considered as such abstractedly, they are not included in each other, but are as different as

triangle and square, &c.; for though the thing or being which is conceptive is also exhibitive, &c., yet conceptive being as such, is very different from exhibitive as such, and exhibitive as such, as different from active being as such, &c.

7. Yet I believe that there is a necessary dependence between these three, as 'tis plain that total, &c. being, depends and follows upon simple absolute being; and yet active, volent being supposes or depends upon the prior being, of both the others. These three, in divinity, are called Father, Son, and Holy Ghost.

8. I believe that when God willed to make man, he willed primarily his Son; in other words, that his Son man was the first man made.

9. I believe that the Son, as God-man, made the rest of mankind; and there seems to be this reason for it, besides others; viz. that things purely particular must needs be made by a particular will; God, therefore, must first himself become particular, before he could be said to will any particular thing. Now, the act of his becoming particular is the act of the production of the Son, and the act of his willing in particular, is the cause of all other particulars.

10. I believe that when God made man, he made him to be glorified in his righteousness and obedience; but since God is glorified only in his Son, his Son was first made, that he might glorify God by his righteousness and obedience.

11. I believe that the first men which were created by God, or the Son of God, were those whom we now call angels.

12. I believe that angels are men, though all men are not angels; that is, that as to all essentials they are the same, and deserve the same common name of man or

men, but that they differ only in accidentals; as, for instance, in certain privileges or offices, which both alike are capable of, though both do not enjoy actually.

13. I believe that the first world of men (viz. angels) were created either all at once, if they belonged all to the same orb or world, or at least all that did so belong were created all at once, and not lineally produced of each other, as our human kind is.

14. I believe that their righteousness was by faith in the same Son of God; in other words, that they were not of themselves able to glorify God, since God is glorified only in his Son.

15. Accordingly, I believe that the Son of God, as man, did actually live and converse in the first orb of men, and keep the law of God; and that through him, by faith, many were justified.

16. I believe that this righteousness of the Son of God actually exhibited was a full satisfaction to the law of the Father, even though it had so happened that not one man besides had been justified through him; in other words, though the whole kind in particular had sinned. Or, however this be, since the fact was otherwise, I believe that the demands of the then law for man were actually satisfied and fulfilled by the then human nature; viz. God-man, and those who believed in, and were justified through him.

17. I believe that many of this first mankind sinned.

18. I believe that by their sin they were irrecoverably lost, partly because God is his own final cause, and he was before actually satisfied in the righteousness of man; and partly because it was beneath the dignity and character of the Son of God, who represented nothing less than the whole kind, to undertake or make atonement for the sin only of a part or party of mankind.

19. I believe that, as the first righteous men were afterwards and are now called angels, so that those who are now called devils are those who sinned thus irrecoverably.

20. I believe that the Son of God, by his then righteousness, did not merit and acquire for himself, and those who were justified through him, the highest happiness; in other words, that the angelical or paradisaical state is not a state of the highest happiness man's nature is capable of.

21. Yet I believe that, as God designed to be glorified in the most perfect manner in his Son, so he designed for man the highest happiness his nature is capable of, as correspondent to the most perfect righteousness.

22. I believe that a suffering obedience is a more perfect obedience than a bare simple righteousness without suffering.

23. I believe, therefore, that God has since so made man, as that the whole kind might be concluded under sin; for suffering supposes sin, and the Son of God must first suffer before God could be perfectly glorified in his Son, or mankind be perfectly happy.

24. I believe that the aptest method to this end was to make one man and one woman first, which, accordingly, God did; which couple were to propagate and increase mankind, so as that if this first couple sinned, they might involve their whole posterity, and so God might have mercy upon all.

25. I believe that the first sin of man consisted in transgressing some positive law of God. By which I mean, that the matter of the sinful action was lawful in itself, or, however, not plainly sinful, before it was actually forbidden. Accordingly, it is believed by all, that

the tree in the midst of the garden was free to be eaten of by our first parents, until the act of God's forbidding them it. Of this there may be this treble reason given: first, that by the transgressing a law of this kind—viz. a law positively revealed, and plainly known to be a law of God—their sin might become more exceeding sinful—more so, I mean, than if they had transgressed a law of pure natural reason; for though reason be indeed God, yet it is not so plainly or apparently so, as God manifested himself to be when, by an express revelation he forbade man the aforesaid action: secondly, that by this means might be more probable that the first man should sin, and not any of his posterity before him, since so much depended upon this, as has been before observed; for it is a much easier thing for a man to abstain from doing what he himself believes to be unreasonable, than to abstain from doing what his own reason assures him is in itself lawful before it is forbidden: thirdly, that by this means even reason itself might have some share in the sin (since reason itself was designed afterwards to suffer for it); for the Son of God is that Logos or Reason in which they saw, but which they mistook and misapplied, when our first parents reasoned themselves into their first transgression. To which other reasons may be added.

26. Credo concubitum primarium fuisse hominis peccatum. Hoc saltem admodum verisimile mihi videtur; neque tamen, fateor, ita probatum, ut pro articulo fidei id recipere velim. Quod vero sic mihi persuasum sit, hoc præcipue in causa est, quia,

27. (1.) Credo nullam aliam reddi posse rationem, cur ad velanda τὰ αἰδοῖα, post peccatum commissum, primarii parentes nostri tam commode pariter se accinxerint, nisi

id ipsum peccatum in usu quodam vetito membrorum istorum constitisse putemus. Quinetiam,

28. (2.) Credo Adamum et Evam, ante quam peccassent, pudorem non sensisse, ideoque neque τοῖς αἰδοίοις prius unquam usos fuisse. Hoc tamen ita revera fuisse, multa sunt quod dubitem, si usus iste, ante hominis lapsum, arbitrio ejus fuerit permissus. Quod si nunquam antea concubuissent, primum ipsum concubitum primarium fuisse Adami et Evæ peccatum mihi quidem maxime videtur credibile; præsertim quum per totum terrarum orbem illorum posteris hominibus factum istud semper quodammodo pudori fuisset, quamvis et licitum et sanctum postea id declaratum fuisse universi sciamus.

29. (3.) It seems very agreeable to the benign justice of God to draw the greatest goods out of the greatest evils,—as the sustenance of the patriarchs from their sin in selling their brother to the Ishmaelites; the redemption of the world from the sin of Judas in betraying, and of the whole body of the Jews joined to the Gentiles in crucifying, our Lord, &c. Now, upon the present supposition, the first sin was the very cause of the birth of Christ, so far, I mean, as it was possible in reason; that is, he was as much a son of man as was consistent with his infinite purity; if he had been more so, he had been indeed born in sin: but this being impossible, he was as nearly so as possible; that is, he was born of a woman, though not begotten of man. Thus, the greatest good was the effect of the greatest evil, which, I say, seems to be indeed the very method by which God proceeded; because,

30. (4.) The style of the curse upon the woman, that she should conceive and bring forth in sorrow and pain, seems naturally to carry us to the present supposition; because,

31. (5.) Under the Jewish covenant, which was designed to bring the sin of man's nature to their remembrance, and to stamp a character of censure upon it, circumcision was made the initiating sacrament; because,

32. (6.) David seems to say as much, when he said of himself and all mankind, "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me;" not to name any more texts to the same purpose; because,

33. (7.) St. Chrysostom has these words, which will not easily bear any other interpretation; viz. Hæc ipsa conjunctio maritalis *malum* est ante Deum; non dico *peccatum*, sed malum.

34. I believe that the proper character of the Son of God assuming our nature, is that of Son of man; and that, under this character, he represents the whole kind, since all at present are sons of men.

35. I believe that God is more glorified in the suffering obedience of the Son of man than in his first simple or unsuffering obedience, as man without sin, viz. angel.

36. I believe, therefore, that by this suffering obedience he has purchased for himself the highest happiness.

37. I believe, therefore, that all true believers in him have, in consequence of his merit, a right to the same happiness.

38. I believe, therefore, that we are more than conquerors, as St. Paul has said; that is, that by our faith in the suffering Son we have an immediate right to a higher or greater happiness than the angels attained to by their faith in the Son of God, under his first simple character of righteous only.

39. I believe, notwithstanding this, that at the last day the angels who sinned not will partake of the same highest happiness, because God has plainly made all his

creatures for, and will in the end bring them (supposing that they sin not) to, the highest happiness their natures are capable of.

40. I believe that the angels are ministering spirits to the Church of Christ, and that by this ministry they come in for a share of the same reward, viz. the highest happiness.

41. I believe that this ministerial state of theirs began with the life of Christ here upon earth; for when Christ himself, who was before an angel, even the angel of the covenant, archangel, or angel of the presence, submitted himself to become a servant to men, he, by that act, submitted the angelical to our human nature; for whatever he did he did as representative of the whole kind or nature which he partook of or bore.

42. I believe that before this, viz. from the sin of Adam to the incarnation, the angels were the lawful governors of man; accordingly, the law from Mount Sinai is said to be given by the disposition of angels.

43. I believe that the Son of God bore a double character in his legislation to the Jews. First, as pure one God. Under this character he gave them the ten commandments; but when they immediately broke those, by making themselves an idol-calf, he took on him a more limited or particular character, viz. that of an angel, and so with him the whole kind came in as the Jews' governors. Under this character he gave them what we call the ceremonial law, in which, though they were expressly forbidden not only the worship of more gods than one, but also the having in the temple or tabernacle any picture or image of any kind; yet, by his own appointment, two angels were placed in imagery, even in the holy of holies, and the veil was full of the pictures of angels from

the top to the bottom. This was designed as a trial of their faith, a kind of just prejudice against the unity of the Godhead; and it had this effect, to make the whole nation guilty of idolatry very frequently; which constant aptitude of theirs to fall into this and many other sins was designed by God to make them sensible of the corruption of their natures, and so to bring them to Christ, by a confession of their sins, and an application to his free grace and mercy for their forgiveness.

44. I believe that the Jewish law had two faces or appearances,—one as spiritual, the work only of the heart; the other as carnal, the work of the hands, or outward man only. This serves to make a difference between the spiritual and carnal Jews, to justify both in some kind or degree, and condemn both. For by this the spiritual Jews, who fixed their minds only on the spiritual appearance of the law, soon found themselves unable of their own strength (and there was no grace then to be depended on) to fulfil it. Thus, in the same act they condemned themselves, or plainly saw themselves condemned justly by their law, and at the same time had a way open for their true justification: for they could not but see that God had still some reserve of mercy for them, or that he did not give them a law on purpose to condemn them finally; or, however this be, we know now the end of the law was faith in Christ, and a true confession of sin, and that this was always a ready way to justification. And, then, as for the carnal Jews, on the one hand, the moral or spiritual face of the law was so severe and strict, that they could not but see that they constantly transgressed it. So by this they must needs see themselves condemned, though they never improved by this knowledge; for, on the other hand, the carnal appearance of their

law was so visible, that they easily believed that the law was indeed carnal, and nothing else. Yet God provided even for those low thoughts of religion a reward suitable to the service; for even these found a justification, such as it was,—I mean a temporal prosperity in this world, which was affixed as the never-failing reward for all those that endeavoured punctually (with how low or carnal thoughts soever) to fulfil or observe all the precepts of the law.*

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## (B.)

THE following autobiographical fragment of William Collier, which, as its title implies, was never intended for any eye but his own, I insert as a *pièce justificative* of statements made in the body of my book. A date prefixed to the MS. proves that it was penned in the spring of 1705, and it seems to have been continued by him till the beginning of the year 1707-8. Afterwards, there are short notes of his daily occupations till the autumn of 1709. From these I have only made extracts. There now occurs an interval of more than five years. From the beginning of 1714, to the time of his death in 1732, his entries are alike rare and uninteresting.

*Εἰς Αὐτὸν καὶ περὶ Αὐτοῦ.*

ON the 19th day of August, A.D. 1682, I was born, in the parsonage-house at Steeple Langford, of pious and honest parents; my father, Mr. Arthur Collier, the third successive rector of that parish, in the same family; my mother,

* The MS. here ends abruptly, as if Collier never proceeded farther with these curious speculations.

Mrs. Ann Collier, the daughter of Thomas and Joan Curry, gent., in the county of Somerset. I was born in great weakness; and my mother, without providing any other, undertook to nurse me herself, I being the fifth child she had, all at that time alive. On the 8th of September following I was baptised in the same parish church; Mr. Penruddocke, of Compton,* and Mr. William Ellesdon, my grandfather, being my godfathers, my Lady Hyde my godmother, by whom, after they had performed the usual duties for me, I was again committed to the care of my parents, my mother taking to breed me up herself. I remained in the same house until I was seven years and a half old, at which time I was sent out to board at school with Mr. Delacourt, of Chitterne: my mother had before taught me to read very well, and a little Latin, but by Mr. Delacourt I was further instructed in it so far as Ovid de Tristibus, &c.

Then, at the end of two years and a quarter, I was removed to Salisbury school,† under the care of Mr. E. Hard-

* This Mr. Penruddocke is the person who appeared only a few years after as a witness on the trial of Lady Lisle, and who in the report of that trial is called Colonel Penruddocke. He was the son of the Colonel Penruddocke commemorated *ante*, p. 5. That he could have apprehended Hicks and Nelthorp before they sought refuge at Lady Lisle's house, he confesses himself; but it seems he could not resist the temptation to implicate in alleged treason the aged widow of the judge who had condemned his father to death. The savage Jefferies, in his charge, exclaims, "God Almighty is a just God; and it may be worth considering (especially by her) how God has been pleased to make use of him as the instrument in this business."—*State Trials*.

† At this school, now scarcely in being, Addison, about ten years before, received a portion of his early education. And here I cannot help expressing my regret at the general decay of the

wick as to my education, and of Mrs. G. St. Barb as to my board; there I was entered in the lowest form, in Corderius' Colloquies. After I was got one form higher, there were four of the same form removed into that immediately above; and it was a great trouble to me that I was not one of them.

In this school I remained, and went through several of the classic authors; but when I was at the higher end of the third form, and lately begun to learn Greek, I was, with four more, removed into the second form, being that next above us, which was no small joy to me. Here I lived with as much satisfaction and content as any body; sometimes corrected for idleness and negligence rather than immorality; until, at the end of six years and a quarter, Mrs. St. Barb giving down housekeeping, I, with Mr. R. S., my kinsman, who of six or seven were now the only two boarders remaining with our former mistress, were removed to the boarding-school near the Close-gate, which was then kept by Mr. T. M.: thither we came at St. Michael's day, 1697. I passed the winter very pleasantly, until at the Christmas following my father died of a diabetes, in the fifty-fifth year of his age. I had

old English grammar-school. Their moral value was hardly less than their intellectual importance. The country squire and the shopkeeper, the one attracted by the excellence, the other by the cheapness of instruction, were thus brought up together in early intimacy, which laid the foundation of friendly feeling on both sides for the rest of their lives. The classical school-boy recollections of the tradesman not unfrequently gave a tinge of elegance to his mind, and strength to his judgment, which are now looked for in vain in the same quarter. Doubtless, a greater portion of the people of England can now read and write, than at any former period of our history; but the golden statue of learning, thus broken up into current coin, has been perhaps apportioned among so many as to make all paupers.

just before dreamed I was married; and my kinsman who lay with me, on that very night before I was sent for home to see my father before he died, dreamed that I had drunk a large dose of some corrupted blood, which had the day before been taken from one of the house: and indeed so it came to pass; for this matter was the occasion of giving me very deep draughts of sorrow, and the effects of it I shall feel, I believe, as long as I live. My father being dead (he died on the 10th day of December) and buried, I left a very mournful family and returned to school. The trouble which my mother met with in settling the parsonage to be secure, occasioned by the Bishop of Sarum's severity in rejecting Mr. Hardwick and Mr. Stephens, though both presented lawfully to it by my mother, is such as we shall never forget, and I doubt not the loss of it so great we shall not recover. But at last, about the Whitsuntide following, the parsonage was settled with good security upon Mr. F. Eyre, second son to Judge Samuel Eyre. The Michaelmas following I left the school, said my valedictum, and came home, where I stayed till the 20th of October, at which time I set forth with my brother for Oxford. He had before been one year and three months at Pembroke College, but then (being in the country) he was, at the instance of Mr. E. Strong and Mr. Hardwick, to leave that College, and both of us to be entered at Balliol College; and entered we were, on the 22d day of October, 1698, under the tutorage of Mr. E. Strong. Here I continued until the Easter following, and then we were both sent for into the country: accordingly we went. While we were there, I began to learn to play upon the violin of Mr. Hull,* of Sarum, until about the middle of June. I went again

* He appears to have studied music deeply, judging from a MS. of his on that science.

to Oxford to leave Balliol College and go to Wadham College, in order to stand for a scholarship there.

1699. Accordingly, I removed from Balliol College in June, and entered at Wadham College, where, on the 29th day of that month (being St. Peter's day), I stood the election for scholars, more out of form than any hope of succeeding, it being usual in that College for none (hardly) to be chosen the first time of their standing. Here I continued pretty constant at prayers and the exercises of the College all that winter, and until the next election, which was on the same day twelvemonth.

1700. At which time I stood again; but there being but one place void for about nine candidates, my endeavour proved without success; and so forthwith I went into the country, where I remained until November 5th of the same year, when I returned to Oxford, and passed that winter there. In the Whitsuntide week,

1701. I took a jaunt into Buckinghamshire with Mr. J. B., a fellow-collegiate: we resided at Marsh, which was then the warden of Wadham's parsonage, and where my companion's father had an estate, from whence we went about the country, to Bicester, &c., and at length returned to Oxford; the election drawing on, I (upon some consideration) resolved not to stand; and while I was thus thinking, I received a *little* letter from my mother, wherein she gave me orders to the same effect, and withal to come into the country as soon as possible; accordingly, when I had stayed to keep the term, I went down, and there I stayed a whole year, until the act-term following: that winter I idled away, for the most part in following my gun; but towards spring I laid it aside, and began to study,

1702. Till, at the act-term, I returned to Oxford and kept the term, but omitted to do juraments then, in

expectation of returning the Michaelmas following; but then, going down again into the country, I found it impracticable for me to come up at Michaelmas; so I set to my study that winter, and about Christmas prepared my lectures for my bachelor's degree. On the 13th January I returned to Oxford, read my lectures, took my bachelor's degree, determined publicly, and, having gone through all the orders and expense of it, stayed there until April, and some part in Easter term,

1703. And went down for good into the country, having no expectation to return to reside in Oxford. From that time I applied myself with industry to my study, aiming still so to read as to fit myself for holy orders, which I then fully intended, by God's assistance, to undertake that summer. We continued in my mother's house; at which time Mr. Eyre having the presentation of Treddington in Worcestershire, was obliged to quit Langford; and then the presentation of it was given to Mr. E. Hardwick, which was not granted him by the bishop before; that winter past, and in the spring Mr. Eyre went from the parsonage-house, whither we removed the 20th of March,

1704. And being settled there, I continued at my study. On the 11th day of April, about midnight, I was seized violently ill * * * * till, in two or three days, by my mother's care, I pretty well recovered. (D.G.) And also on the 11th day of November, [on the 20th, W. S—tt was taken ill, and died on the 2d of December,] having a great cold, with a violent cough, I was taken immediately after dinner with coughing, which forced up what I had eat; and the cough continuing stopped my breath, and had like to have choked me; but by the providence of God I escaped—(D.G.) that winter passed.

1705. And after having made some sermons preparatory for orders, I went to Sarum, on the 30th of May, and applied myself to the bishop for ordination, which, after examination, he conferred on me the Sunday following, with three others, and one priest. Being thus admitted *deacon*, I preached the next Sunday in the parish church of Langford; and so continued in making sermons and preaching, with other studies, till the 5th of August, when I preached for Mr. G. P., who had then the curacy of Broad Chalk. He removing from thence, I was appointed by the bishop to supply that place till Michaelmas, at which time Mr. A——n, the vicar of it, was to reside on or resign it. Then I went to board with Mr. Shaw at Fifield: while there I served the three churches of Broad Chalk, Bower Chalk, and Alvediston, for the space of seven weeks; and Michaelmas then coming on, I expected to return home: but so it pleased God, that the people, being content with my ministry, agreed to go to the bishop and request him that I might be continued among them, which they accordingly did (the persons that went were Mr. R. Good, Mr. C. Good, Mr. J. Combe, for me, and farmer Penny, of Fifield, for Mr. Shaw); and the bishop, declaring that his only aim was to please the people, granted their request.

1706. From thenceforth I applied myself to the discharge of my duty in the cure of those two parishes, Broad Chalk and Bower Chalk; and having only these two to care for, my business was the easier. I still continued with Mr. Shaw, only advancing his pay from twelve to fifteen pounds per annum: there I continued till May, when he and I happening, unaccountably, to disagree, he gave me warning to leave his house in a week or a month; and, for some reasons, I thought

not fit to go till my year was up, which it was at Michaelmas.

And then I removed to Mr. R. Good's house, at Bower Chalk (Mr. Shaw having made me an offer to stay with him till Lady-day, or to come back to him if things were not agreeable; but I chose to go thither); and being settled, I passed that winter, not uncomfortably, only till March, when Mr. G.'s youngest son R., having been bit once by a mad dog, and after by a mad cat, died about five weeks after he was last bitten, and was buried March 24th: but there I continued till the end of the month.

1707. And on the 1st of April I removed to my own vicarage-house at Broad Chalk, where, taking a man-servant, I began to keep my own house, and live a little more at my liberty.

In May following I went with my brother to Misterton to see my mother, whither she and four daughters removed from Langford in November before.

Being returned, I followed the business of my parish, and had at this time a dispute with Mr. R. Good about paying three rates towards the discharge of his law with Mr. Teape; I, considering that he had done all that an honest man could do in the matter of the law (not of the seizure), though I was not persuaded that the right was on his side, yet chose rather to pay than contend.

Oct. 17th. I bought a horse of J. S. of B——n, and find it much the more convenient than to hire.

Jan. 1st. Mr. S[ympso]n was married to my sister Mary, at Misterton: she much desired to be married by me, but Mrs. Good's illness and the badness of the weather hindered that I could not go.

At this time Mr. W. dying, my brother, that same

day, wrote to the bishop in my behalf, to confer the presentation of it upon me; but though many sued for it, yet my lord bishop thought fit to confer it upon Mr. Fox, a man eminent for piety.

1707. March 18. At home; at the race Colonel Evelyn's horse won the prize. 24. At home; at Fifield; the christening day; intemperance; stayed out late, walked in the garden one o'clock mane. 25. At home; at race in the afternoon, between Mr. Whitehead of Titherly and Farmer Maton; the first won the race. 29. At home; read the life and death of King Charles the First, was extremely concerned. 31. . . . . Dull at prayers, and indevout for want of preparation; carried Thomas à Kempis to Mrs. Lawes; much good discourse; determined concerning the lawfulness of usury affirmatively.

1708. April 8. At Fordingbridge . . . . Talked with Mr. Hawker about Arminianism, Sir Dewy Bulkeley and Sir Thomas Hobby came in; invited to Sir Thomas's house. 13. At Sarum; stayed in Mr. Hele's chamber; studied Dr. Lightfoot, &c.; went to Mr. Albert's; came home. 20. At home; at Sarum; at the church, Mr. Adams preached the visitation sermon; went into the chapter-house; exhibited orders; went to the common hall; dined at the Dolphin; should have gone with brother Sympson; went to Mr. Hele's, and to Mr. Coles's; to the George; demurred upon the payment of procurations for Broad Chalk; . . . . saw my sister Ann, &c.

May 5. At Langford; saw my mother, &c. 6. At Langford; sister Sympson and sister Johanna came. 7. At Langford; came home. 11. At Sarum; studied at Mr. Hele's; came home. 17. At home; at Langford; signed the writings for sister Amy's marriage. 18. At

Langford; my sister Amy married to Mr. R. Hele; I gave her away, &c. 19. At Langford. 20. At Langford; went with my brother to Sarum; supped and lay there. 21. At Sarum; dined at Mr. Hele's; went with my brother to the great church; came home. 29. At home; made a will for Thomas Dominick; J. Sympson was here.

June 8. At home; my brother sent his paper; sent sermon. 12. Man came here from Langford with letter from my brother. 14. Went to Langford; lay there that night. 15. At Langford; dined; went to Sarum; saw brother and sister Hele, and sister Joanna. 24. At home; at church; christened two children; my mother, three brothers, and four sisters were here.

July 8. At home; went to Bower Chalk; buried Anne Penny; came home; the news of the Duke of Marlborough's victory over the French; the bells rung, and I sent two mugs of beer.

August 1. At church three times; a Quakers' meeting at Stoke; sent the churchwardens. 5. At Chicklade, met brother and sister from Langford; saw my mother; came home; thunder, &c. 9. At Sarum; went to the bishop about the Quakers' meeting, he would not meddle in it;* dined at sister Hele's; saw aunt M. 19. At home; at Fifield; prayed with S. Shaw; at church; thanksgiving day at Fifield; my birth-day. 20. At Sarum; dined at brother Hele's.

September 12. At church three times; the bishop preached and confirmed; I read prayers only at Bower Chalk, in the afternoon at Broad Chalk. 15. Went to

* This non-intervention of Bishop Burnet exactly accords with his character, as drawn by his contemporaries. His moderation made many converts to the church.

Titherly; very wet; dined at Mr. Whitehead's; went to the parsonage-house, and bought a parcel of books of Mr. Thomas Hussey to the value of thirty-three pounds. 16. At Titherly; packed up the books safe. 29. At Sarum; paid Dr. Mullins thirteen pounds nineteen shillings and sixpence, in part for Mr. Hussey's books.

October 9. Sent J. Blackmore to Sarum, to brother Hele to preach for me, because of a hoarseness. 10. At church three times; brother Hele preached for me twice.

November 2. At Langford; lay there. 3. At Langford; at Sarum; dined with brother Hele; came home. 26. At Langford; my brother read his discourse on the church. 27. At Langford; Mr. Wake, &c. dined there; came home.

December 4. At home, study; made nine candles.

January 13. At home; my day with the clergy; played cards late; Mr. Berjew lay here.

February 2. At church; christened Pyke's child; at Ebbesbourne; dined there; lost six shillings at cards; came home late. 7. Went to Langford; lay there. 8. At Langford in the afternoon; came home in a very hard frost. 11. At home; studied Du Pin.

1709. April 7. At home; christened Everly's child; bottled up two dozen of the last beer; at the race; a Berkshire farmer's horse won at the second post; came home. 11. At Langford; brother read his sermon; lay there. 12. At Langford; mother and sister Hele there from Sarum; with them to Sarum; supped there; lay at brother Hele's. 13. At Sarum; dined with my mother. 21. At home; study; made under-yarn stockings and night-cap.

May 2. At Langford to see the child, had been sick, now pretty well. 3. At Langford; music. 25. At home; brother and sister came and dined here; I went to Lang-

ford with them. 26. At Sarum; dined with the bishop; returned to Langford. 27. At Langford; came home. 29. At church three times; brother Hele preached; went to Sarum; lay at my mother's.

June 12. Whitsunday; at church three times; sacrament; "now there are diversities, &c." 15. At Sarum; in the fair, bought, &c.; dined at brother Hele's, Dr. Heath and Mr. Clements there; came home. 20. Went to Sarum; went with Mr. Searle to Marlborough; lay there. 21. At Marlborough, &c.; danced at night; came down late. 22. At Marlborough; at church; Mr. Moss came here; we went upon the Mount; saw the Duke of Somerset's house; paid one shilling; came up the street. 23. At Marlborough; came home with Mr. Searle; came to Sarum; called at Mr. Merefield's; supped at my mother's, Mr. Hofman there; read Bishop Blackall's answer to Mr. Hoadly.

July 6. At Sarum with Mr. Hofman; heard sister Hele was brought to bed of a girl, saw her and the child; Mr. H. cut the glass. 28. At Sarum; went to Langford, and dined there; Mrs. Whittle, music; returned to Sarum; lay there.

August 1. At home; brother Collier here. 2. Went to Langford with brother Collier; lay there; music. 30. At home; Mr. Shaw dined here; after went to Langford. 31. At Langford; intending to come home, was hindered.

September 1. At Langford; brother Hele, &c. came; stayed all night; battle near Mons. 2. At Langford; Mr. Johnson there; Mr. Palmer; went to Sarum with sister Anne and brother Hele; lay there. 11. At church three times; the bishop preached and confirmed; no sermon at Broad Chalk.

October 4. At Sarum; went to Langford, Mr. Johnson

and his wife there; went in the boat. 5. At Langford; music, &c.; went in the boat with sister and Mrs. Johnson. 6. At Langford; heard the bill and answer read; Sir Stephen Fox—came home. 10. At home; brother and sister, Mr. Johnson and his wife here, went with them to Langford. 11. At Langford; walked and lay there. 12. At Langford; went to Sarum, and came home.

1714. March 9. Went to Langford; Mr. Johnson there. 10. At Amesbury; election of convocation-men, Mr. Fox of Melksham and Mr. Pink of Damerham chosen; came home with my brother, Mr. Hersent, and Mr. Shaw. 11. At Langford; came home; cousin Biggs and wife to dine at Langford. 12. At home; study; exposition of the Catechism, sect. 7.* 13. At Swallowcliffe in the morning, at Baverstock† in the afternoon; catechised the children. 16. At home; rose early; brother Collier, brother Hele, and Mr. Albert, brother and sister Sympson, dined here. 17. At home; study; finished section 8 of the exposition of the Catechism. 19. At home; the sycamores in Baverstock churchyard cut down; at farmer Green's at Baverstock again with my wife. 22. At home; went to Sarum with my wife; agreed with Mr. Pitts for Hurdcote tithes, at twenty-eight pounds per annum. 23. At home; studied the chronological tables. 24. Ditto. 25. At home; Lady-day; study; exposition of the Church Catechism. 31. At home; brother Collier and cousin Scott dined here; went to the race together; Fagg's horse won; cousin Scott came back with me.

April 2. At home; study; exposition of Church Catechism. 7. At home; went to Shaftesbury with my wife;

* This work of William Collier still remains in MS. It is unfinished.

† He was instituted into this rectory in 1713.

dined with Mr. Bowles* of Lower Donhead. 9. At Shaftesbury; paid Mr. Glass for drawing the advowson of Baverstock. 13. At home; brother Collier, Mr. Johnson, and Arty here. 17. Easter-day; at church twice; sacrament at Baverstock; at Swallowcliffe in the afternoon. 20. At home; brother and sister Collier, Mr. Johnson, and wife dined here. 22. At home; total eclipse of the sun at half-quarter before nine in the morning; the stars were very visible, and the cold extreme. 27. At home; went to Sarum; my mother Scott came from Marlborough; looked over the writings of Heddington estate; lay at brother Hele's.

May 2. Made up the account in full for the parsonage of Baverstock. 4. From May the 4th to the 28th a London journey. 31. At home; rose half an hour after three o'clock; I went a-fishing; went to Langford, carried sister Collier's things; my brother and Mr. Johnson at London, she there; came home.

1716. May 7. A thanksgiving day for the victory of Preston in Lancashire.

October 1. Went to Compton, paid Mr. Penruddocke half a year's house-rent. 17. Went to Chalk, dined at Mr. Fawkener's; agreed to subscribe to Fiddes's Body of Divinity. 24. Went to Sarum; Mrs. Trangrowse and Mrs. Dove there, and subscribed to Mr. Fiddes's book, 2 vols., half a guinea the first payment.

1718. November 2. Being Sunday, Mr. Penruddocke, in the presence of his lady, gave me a promise of the vicarage of Compton, after Mr. Polhill. He also at the same time assured me he would never put me out of my house, nor raise the rent.

* The great-grandfather of the Rev. W. Lisle Bowles; to be ranked amongst whose friends by the poet himself, I look upon as one of the most flattering circumstances of my life.

1720. July 9. Mr. Merchant, junior, called here and told me that Exeter College were willing to buy the advowson of Baverstock at the price of four hundred and fifty pounds.*

1723. December 17. I took the oaths to King George, in company with Mr. W. Wyndham, senior, of Dinton, Mr. Hersent, Mr. Graham, curate of Bishopston; present, Mr. Pitts of Burcombe, Mr. Harris, senior, of the Close, Mr. Eghill, &c.

1728. January 16. The old yew-tree in Baverstock churchyard was cut down, and, January 23, a yew-tree was planted there.

173½. Mr. Penruddocke renewed his promise of giving me the vicarage of Compton, in the presence of Mr. Kneller.†

* The advowson of this benefice, purchased of the Bowles family by William Collier, was subsequently sold by him to Exeter College, to whom it still belongs.

† Shortly after the date of this entry W. Collier died. The brothers seem to have quitted the world almost simultaneously.

THE END.

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